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Epistemic Injustice and Sexual Violence Intervention Advocacy
by
Jennifer Ware

Advisor: Jesse Prinz
In this project, I will explore how victims of sexual violence have faced epistemic injustices by
reviewing the histories of two advocacy movements aimed at improving collective understanding of
those experiences. In doing so, I will consider how those very activist movements may have
introduced new epistemic lacunas and, even while successfully addressing some injustices,
committed further epistemic wrongs as well. I will explore forms of hermeneutical resistance used
by victims of sexual violence and their advocates. While these methods of resistance have been
discussed elsewhere, I contribute to this ongoing work by applying these ideas to new examples.
Finally, I will explore pitfalls of select methods of resistance commonly used by activists, and in
doing so I will define some novel kinds of epistemic harm and expand upon others that have been
described elsewhere.
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DEDICATION

Perhaps a better world is drawing near
Just as easily it could all disappear
Along with whatever meaning you might have found
Don’t let the uncertainty turn you around
Go on and make a joyful sound
- Jackson Browne, For A Dancer

For my father, Otho Thomas Ware.
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KEY TERMINOLOGY
Insiders and Outsiders
I need a way to refer quickly and consistently to people who are the subjects of experiences
obscured from collective understanding and to distinguish them from the people who are not. While
in many cases those who are the subjects of these hermeneutically obscure experiences are the social
outsiders in those contexts, they are insiders in the sense that they are members of the relevant social
group that is subject to the experience. Thus, when I use the term insiders from this point on, I am
referring to the people who are subject to a given experience. Outsiders, on the other hand, are
people who are not subject to the relevant experience.

Admittedly, this language misleadingly suggests that there are clear boundaries between insiders and
outsiders. This is not the case, not only because of disagreement about where to draw the conceptual
boundaries around the definitions of both sexual assault and sex trafficking, but also because of
incredible variability in the ways that individuals are subject to these experiences. According to the
law, someone who has been sexually exploited once and someone who is exploited incessantly for
years are both victims of trafficking. According to some advocates, anyone involved in commercial
sex is a victim. The perspectives of these individuals, however, may be extremely different. While
someone who has been a victim of some sexual violence may have more direct knowledge of
experiences of that kind than someone who has not, an individual’s experience will not be
generalizable in such a way that they have special insight into the experiences of all other victims.

Advocate
An advocate is someone engaged in work to improve understanding of an experience shared by a
group of marginalized people. Advocates may include victims, community members, members of
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other marginalized groups, social workers, lawyers, lawmakers, law enforcement, social scientists,
etc.

Victim/Survivor
Law enforcement representatives usually identify people have experienced sexual violence as victims,
and the word is strongly tied to ideas of crime and legal intervention. Social workers and advocates
often describe these individuals as survivors, a word that has stronger associations with triumph and
resilience. Elsewhere the words may also be used to establish whether someone is presently being
harmed, with “victim” indicating abuse is ongoing and “survivor” indicating it is wholly in the past. I
will use the words “victim” and “survivor” interchangeably to refer to individuals who have sexual
violence perpetrated against them.

Commercial Sex Act
I will use the phrase as it is defined by the Trafficking Victims Protecting Act (TVPA), which is to
describe, “any sex act on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.”

Legal Definition of Sex Trafficking (US)
The TVPA defines sex trafficking as any act involving the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for a commercial sex act.

Not all acts that meet this definition are punishable as trafficking. Punishable acts must be severe,
meaning they involve either (a) sex trafficking of a minor or (b) sex trafficking of an adult induced
by the means of force, fraud, or coercion.

x

Sex Trafficking/Commercial Sexual Exploitation
By “sex trafficking,” I will refer to the severe form as defined by the TVPA. In other words, I will be
referring to all and only those circumstances in which someone induces another person to engage in
a commercial sex act through the means of force, fraud, or coercion. I will use the phrases “sex
trafficking” and “commercial sexual exploitation” interchangeably. I will use the identifiers “victim
of sex trafficking” and “victim of commercial sexual exploitation” to refer to people who have been
induced to engage in commercial sex through the means of force, fraud, or coercion.

Sex Work
By “sex work,” I will mean any instances of commercial sex that are not induced through force,
fraud, or coercion. I have in mind circumstances in which the sex act is consensual and intentional
for all parties involved. I will use the identifier “sex worker” to refer to those who are involved in
commercial sex intentionally or willfully.

Abolitionists
Abolitionists are anti-trafficking activists in the abolitionist movement, also known as the left/right
coalition or the neo-abolitionist movement (Doezema 1999, 33). Abolitionists are also sometimes referred
to as abolitionist feminists (Kempadoo 2015, 11) or anti-prostitution feminists (Peters 2010, 50 citing Stolz).
Abolitionists view all commercial sex as either constituting trafficking or problematic because it
contributes to demand for trafficking. Abolitionists favor a conceptual and legal distinction between
sex and labor trafficking, sometimes arguing that sex trafficking is especially horrific. The Coalition
Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) and Standing Against Global Exploitation (SAGE) are
organizations that represent this orientation toward anti-trafficking work.
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Rights-Based Advocates
Rights-based advocates are anti-trafficking activists in the rights-based movement. They are also
known as the liberal feminist coalition, mainstream feminists (Weitzer, 2007), or autonomy feminists (Schwarz,
Kennedy, and Britton, 4). Kempadoo describes the anti-trafficking movement spearheaded by these
advocates as modern slavery abolitionism (Kempadoo 2015, 9). Rights-Based Advocates tend to view sex
trafficking as a species of labor trafficking, and they also distinguish between sex work and sex
trafficking. The Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) is an organization that
represents this orientation toward anti-trafficking work.
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INTRODUCTION

It is a time of shifting currents for victims of sexual violence and their advocates. The
#MeToo movement has turned a spotlight toward the pervasiveness of sexual violence at work, on
dates, and as a persistent background threat for many. Assault accusations against powerful people
(Donald Trump, Brett Kavanaugh, Harvey Weinstein) and institutions (the Catholic Church, Boy
Scouts of America) frequently make front-page news. Bill Cosby’s accusers were featured on the
cover of The New Yorker, and Dr. Christine Blasey Ford was selected as a Times Magazine Person of
the Year. Documentaries (Surviving R. Kelley, Leaving Neverland, Very Young Girls, Blowin’ Up)1 and
narrative films (The Tale, Unbelievable) about and sexual abuse are popular and critically renowned.

These changes may foster a sense that we as a society are in the midst of a great awakening,
one that will, if we listen closely and are courageous enough to reflect sincerely, bring us closer to
the truth. And perhaps with the right representation, steadfast activism, and appropriate
accountability, we can come to truly understand sexual violence and empower and support victims.

Knowing who is and is not a victim has more than epistemic value. Victims are often
entitled to certain services and opportunities that non-victims are not. Victims may have legal
options when accused of crimes or paths to citizenship available to them that non-victims do not.

1

The subject of this documentary is the Queens’s County Human Trafficking Intervention

Court in New York City. My time working in this court as a representative of Mt. Sinai’s Sexual
Assault and Violence Intervention program overlapped with filming for the documentary. I can be
seen in a few shots of the film, but I was not meaningfully involved with its production.

1

They may have access to critical resources like housing, health care, and counseling based on their
being identified as a survivor of sexual violence.

This changing landscape raises complicated epistemic questions. Are we getting closer to
accurate definitions of forms of sexual violence like sexual assault and commercial sex exploitation?2
Can we engineer concepts that distinguish between sexual violations and non-violations? Is it
possible to construct laws that do the same? When services or opportunities are contingent upon
someone being a victim, who should get to decide whether they do or do not qualify?

In this project, I will delve into the recent history of activist movements that have, among
other things, aimed to raise awareness about the realities of sexual violence. This review, I will argue,
can shed light on prior epistemic lacunas, and can thereby teach us more about epistemic justice and
injustice. I will consider how ideas introduced by epistemologists like Spivak, Fricker, Medina,
Goetze, and Dotson can help us understand what it would mean for 75 percent of women who have

2

This question presumes, of course, that there is an “accurate” definition of sexual violence.

However, whether that is or is not the case depends on whether sexual violence is socially
constructed. If it is, then we must ask what would make it such that some definitions are better than
others. As the definition changes to encompass more kinds of behavior, we “create” victims and
perpetrators in ways that are similar to those outlined by Ian Hacking in “The Making and Molding
of Child Abuse” (Critical Inquiry, 1991). Ronald Weitzer discusses the social construction of
trafficking and prostitution in “The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and
Institutionalization of a Moral Crusade” (2007). Unfortunately, these are issues that extend beyond
the scope of what I will be able to address in this project.
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been raped to not realize they have had such an experience, or how alleged revelations about the
nature of trafficking might support claims that we are in the midst of an epidemic.

In the first chapter of the dissertation, I will review the concepts of epistemic injustice that I
will make use of later in the project. I will consider who it is that has and who it is that lacks access
to hermeneutical resources in different manifestations of hermeneutical injustice. Then, I will
identify several warning signs that an epistemic lacuna may be afoot. While much of this chapter will
function as a literature review, I will also introduce some novel concepts and frameworks that
complement existing philosophical work and will be used in analyses to come in later sections of the
dissertation.

During the second chapter, I will turn my attention to the recent histories of activist
movements and the arguments those activists have made (though not always explicitly) that victims
of sexual violence have faced and continue to face epistemic injustices. This section will summarize
key moments, findings, and claims of the advocacy movements dedicated to improving collective
understanding of sexual assault and sex trafficking. While I will begin by taking the assertions of
activists at face value in order to tease out connections to concepts of epistemic injustice, I will later
turn a critical eye toward those claims.

In the third chapter of the dissertation, I will explore methods of hermeneutical resistance
and dissent, again looking to these movements for examples and inspiration. Some of the methods
of dissent introduced in this section have been thoroughly explored elsewhere in the literature, and
my contribution will be to tie those to sexual violence intervention advocacy. Other methods of
dissent or resistance will be framed differently here than they are elsewhere.
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In the final chapter of the dissertation, I will survey epistemic harms that may be produced
by the kind of advocacy work reviewed in chapters two and three, even when that work is intended
to improve collective understanding of a previously epistemically obscure experience. These very
assertions, narratives, statistics, and perspectives can, I will argue, harm and wrong victims and other
vulnerable people in their capacities as knowers.

Anti-trafficking advocates are strongly divided on the question of whether all sex work is
exploitative, and thus whether all sex workers are trafficked. Abolitionists, also known as the
left/right coalition, argue that all commercial sex is exploitative and either constitutes sex trafficking
or enables it. Activists taking a rights-based approach tend distinguish sex work from sex trafficking
and instead support conceptualizations of trafficking that portray it as a manifestation of labor
trafficking. Also referred to as the liberal coalition, these rights-based advocates argue that the
abolitionist approach renders sex workers who do not identify as trafficking victims invisible. If the
abolitionists are right, then what they are doing is attempting to expand the hermeneutical resources
not only of collective society, but also of the victims who are not able to correctly interpret their
own experiences. If they are wrong, then I will argue they are guilty of posturing and hijacking the
process of hermeneutical dissent.

It is in this final section that I will contribute most to ongoing efforts to identity species of
epistemic harms and injustices. Ultimately, my aim is to articulate the complexities of engineering
new or better hermeneutical resources in spaces where a deficit of interpretive tools exists, as well as
the dangers that may befall those who try. It is no surprise that naming the unnamed, describing that
for which we have insufficient conceptual tools, and raising collective understanding of experiences
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considered impossible or inscrutable are not easy tasks. When taking on these efforts, we must be
mindful of who is granted the authority to name, describe, and convince.

5

CHAPTER ONE: EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE

People can be wronged when they are deprived of access to epistemic resources, like
libraries, databases, and knowledge-generating spaces like colleges and universities. A person who is
not given an opportunity to learn to read is also prevented from making use of a trove of ideas that
they might find useful for improving their epistemic standing. These can be thought of as epistemic
wrongs, but they are more directly distributive injustices.

In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007), an important contribution that has
inspired articles, books, and conferences, Miranda Fricker argues that there are ways in which people
can be wronged in their capacity as knowers. Recognizing the potential harms caused by these
epistemic injustices, Fricker introduces a framework for understanding two types that she calls
testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.

In doing so, she joined existing efforts to identify ways that social identity, marginalization,
and power impact who is seen as having knowledge and who can contribute to knowledgeproduction efforts. Foucault recognized the entanglement of knowledge and power, acknowledging
that power confers the ability to effect the conceptual framework used to determine what is and is
not considered true or rational, how truth is assessed, and who is considered capable of declaring
what is true and is not (1980, 131). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak wrote of the epistemic violence
committed against “men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the trials, the lowest strata of the
urban subproletariat” during colonial efforts to mark the knowledge of the oppressed as in deficient
(1988, 25). Patricia Hill Collins took up a question posed by Maria Stewart, who asked why the “rich
intellectual tradition” of Black women’s thoughts and voices “remained virtually invisible” for so
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long. Collins argued that the obfuscation of Black women’s hermeneutical resources and
contributions was “neither accidental nor benign,” but rather the result of a strategy by those with
social power to further oppress the powerless through the suppression of their knowledge (2000, 3).

In recent years, many authors have contributed to efforts to identify and taxonomize
different forms of epistemic injustice. Below, I have identified three conditions that seem to carve
out distinct classes of epistemic injustices.

Figure 1: Select Kinds of Epistemic Injustices

First, there are epistemic injustices that occur in particular instances of expression - when a
speaker considers communicating or attempts to communicate something meaningful to a hearer or
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hearers. Speakers may suppress their expressions due to features of the dynamic between themselves
and their listeners (like in the case of testimonial smothering). In other cases, the listener’s evaluation
of the speaker’s expression may be wrongfully affected by prejudice.

Second, there are epistemic injustices that occur when there are gaps in a collective’s
hermeneutical resources. Fricker’s concept of hermeneutical injustice falls into this class, and this
kind of injustice will be the primary focus of Chapter Two.

Third, there are epistemic injustices that occur during efforts to produce new epistemic tools
and to introduce those into the collective’s hermeneutical resources. I will explore these in depth in
Chapter Four.

As we continue to identify new forms of epistemic violence and better understand how they
relate to one another (in what conditions they are produced, the unique and shared harms they
cause, and how they may be ameliorated), I expect that our classification schemes will evolve. Not
only do I present the orientation of harms presented in this taxonomy as tentative, it is important to
note that these lists are not exhaustive. Heeding Dotson’s caution, we must leave open the
possibility that there are additional unrevealed forms of epistemic injustice, lest we became
overconfident that that which we cannot currently expect or understand would not be
understandable were we to have different epistemic resources (2012, 24-25). In Dotson’s words, this
is “an account of epistemic injustice,” (2012, 42) which I am confident will shift and expand, and as
Medina notes, it may be to our advantage to explore multiple ways to classify epistemic injustices
rather than seeking a single, complete classificatory system (2017, 45).
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In the remaining sections of this chapter I will introduce the forms of epistemic injustice
included in the figure above. Later in the project, I will use these kinds of epistemic injustices to
evaluate some of the arguments and statements made by anti-sexual violence advocates. I will also
use these descriptions of epistemic injustice to assess the arguments made by those who are critical
of the statements and attitudes expressed by some advocates. Some of the forms of epistemic
injustice I survey here been developed extensively elsewhere, and my contribution will be to apply
those ideas to efforts to improve collective understanding of sexual assault and sex trafficking. In
other cases, I will be proposing new definitions for capturing forms of epistemic injustice or further
developing descriptions of forms described by others.

All cognitive disadvantages are epistemically unfortunate. Whenever a person does not know
something or does not have the tools to understand something, then they are in a worse
epistemological position than they would be if they possessed that knowledge or had access to that
epistemic tool. Some cognitive disadvantages are significant. A person is significantly cognitively
disadvantaged if they do not know something that would be importantly in their interest to know.
When someone suffers a significant cognitive disadvantage, they are epistemically harmed more
severely than if they suffer an insignificant cognitive disadvantage. And while all cognitive
disadvantages are epistemic harms, some may benefit subjects a great deal. As Fricker notes,
someone who sexually harasses another may benefit from a deficit of collective understanding about
sexual harassment, as the epistemic lacuna “suits his purpose,” and if the harasser is not someone
who would have refrained from harassment had he known better, then the cognitive disadvantage is
very much to his benefit (2007, 151). Thus, not all cognitive disadvantages are harmful on the whole.
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Epistemic harms may be either intrinsic or extrinsic, and extrinsic harms may be either
epistemic or practical. Extrinsic harms include some unfortunate epistemic consequences - like the
harmed person coming to doubt their own intellectual abilities or lose confidence in their beliefs and
judgments (Fricker 2007, 47) - and other unfortunate practical consequences - like the harmed
person not getting credit for their ideas, not being believed by police, in court, or in other spaces
that can have a significant impact on the person’s life, or missing out on or being denied
employment opportunities (Fricker 2007, 46).

Epistemic objectification is the intrinsic harm characteristic of interpersonal harms.
Epistemic objectification is the wrong of disrespecting a person’s humanity by undermining that
person in their “capacity as a giver of knowledge” (Fricker 2007, 133). In Fricker’s words, “[t]o be
wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity essential to human value”
(2007, 44). In so far as an essential part of humanity is our capacity to reason, wrongs that diminish
one’s ability to express ideas and beliefs and potentially influence the ideas and beliefs of others
strike at the core of one’s very being. This dishonoring of the individual as a knower and thus, as a
person, is the primary, intrinsic harm of epistemic injustices that are interpersonal in nature. When
one is persistently and systemically disrespected as a knower, that could erode one’s confidence not
only in what one knows, but also in one’s very sense of self (Fricker 2007, 53).

Structurally-produced epistemic injustices create situations where some people suffer
asymmetrically significant cognitive disadvantages, as they are unable to understand some aspects of
their experiences that are in their interest to make sense of (Fricker 2007, 151). Thus, the cognitive
disadvantages of structural epistemic injustices are not equally felt by all. The central harm of
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structural epistemic injustices is unequal, unfair treatment of subjects as contributors to our shared
conceptual and interpretive resources.

If someone suffers an intrinsic or extrinsic harm due to another’s epistemic mistake, but that
mistake is not one for which they are both epistemologically and ethically culpable, then the harm is
the unfortunate result of an innocent error (Fricker 2007, 21). This does not make the harm any less
hurtful, but it does mean that the harm is not an epistemic wrong. No injustice occurs as a result of
the mistake.

If someone suffers a cognitive disadvantage that impacts them asymmetrically and is
significant, but the disadvantage is not a result of structural prejudice that unfairly excludes the
person from contributing to shared conceptual resources, then the person suffers from epistemic
bad luck. Epistemic bad luck can have tremendous consequences. As Fricker notes, if there is an
illness for which there is no diagnosis or treatment available, then everyone is at a cognitive
disadvantage. But for someone who has that illness, the disadvantage is felt acutely - perhaps
devastatingly. This is terribly unfortunate, but unless the lack of diagnosis is the result of structural
inequalities or prejudices, it is not necessarily an injustice (Fricker 2007, 152).

To be wrongful, epistemic harms must be not only unfortunate, but also unfair.
Interpersonal epistemic harms are wrongful when the person who causes the harm is
epistemologically and ethically culpable for their behavior or attitude. In cases where an epistemic
injustice is committed, the ethically blameworthy component will often be rooted in the influence of
prejudice on the wrongdoer’s epistemic attitudes and judgments. Ethically culpable epistemological
misjudgments wrong their victims by disrespecting their status as knowers. When testimonial
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injustices are caused by prejudices that “track the subject through different dimensions of social
activity - economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious, and so on” (Fricker
2007, 27), then the testimonial injustice is systemic rather than incidental.

Wrongful epistemic harms that are structural in nature are produced by coercive dynamics
that prevent some people from participating in meaning making. Fricker calls this hermeneutical
marginalization. Structural epistemic injustices produce a sub-class of knowers, which disrespects
these individuals as knowers, and thus as people. Someone is hermeneutically marginalized if they
“have a less than a fair crack at contributing to the shared pool of concepts and interpretive tropes
that we use to make generally share-able sense of our social experiences” (Fricker, 2016, 163), and
this exclusion from collective knowledge production is identified by Fricker as the central harm of
hermeneutical injustice, the structural epistemic injustice she introduces.

Assessing when epistemic harms constitute wrongs and injustices and when someone or a
group is epistemically oppressed rather than unlucky requires, in part, determining whether the
possible injustice is interpersonal or systemic in nature. I categorize the injustices that I discuss in
subsequent sections and chapters as follows:
Interpersonal
•

•
•
•

Systemic

Testimonial Injustice (including
Posturing, Identity-Prejudicial
Credibility Excess, and some forms
of Testimonial Silencing)
Epistemic Exploitation
Testimonial Smothering
Contributory Injustice

•
•
•
•

Hermeneutical Injustice
Epistemic Appropriation
Hermeneutical Hijacking
Narrative Constraint

Table 1: Interpersonal and Systemic Forms of Epistemic Injustice
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While structural epistemic injustices occur even when no other knower is personally culpable
for those wrongs, this does not preclude the possibility that individual knowers may be culpable for
their behaviors and attitudes if those behaviors or attitudes support the structural inequalities that
lead to the hermeneutical marginalization of less dominantly-situated people. I will argue that
epistemic appropriation and hermeneutical hijacking are structural injustices, but that knowers who
harbor prejudiced attitudes and behave in ways that enable the phenomena of epistemic
appropriation or hermeneutical hijacking to occur are therefore culpable for the part they have
played in those structural injustices.

1.1 Relating to Expression

Epistemic injustices of this kind occur in exchanges between marginalized speakers and
relatively dominantly-situated listeners. All epistemic harms of this kind that I review are
interpersonal in nature. They involve errors made on the part of individual listeners, and when those
errors are epistemologically and ethically culpable, the listener will have wronged the speaker.

Epistemic Exploitation

Epistemic exploitation occurs when marginalized people are compelled by those in
dominantly-situated positions to offer an explanation of their own oppression (Berenstain 2016,
570). This labor is often unrecognized and uncompensated, despite being extremely costly. But
importantly, oppressed people do not have a legitimate choice about whether or not to engage in
this work, as they face a double bind. If they do not engage, then they could be blamed for being
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complicit in their own oppression by not taking a more active role in re-educating others. When
speaking up, there is a significant risk that marginalized people will not be granted due credibility,
thereby being subjected to a subsequent testimonial injustice (Berenstain 2016, 576). Even if their
testimony is successful in changing the attitudes of listeners, there are costs nonetheless. In
particular, Berenstain describes the opportunity cost that occurs when an oppressed person has been
compelled to explain their oppression. Even when in doing so they transform the hearers
understanding of their experience, they have still spent their time doing this labor instead of
something else. This can result in a kind of busy work that keeps oppressed people caught up in
activities and conversations related to explaining their experiences and trying to convince other
people why they should be taken seriously.

In order for epistemic exploitation to not only harm, but also wrong speakers, listeners must
be ethically culpable for the harm they cause when compelling those speakers to present a case
demonstrating they are oppressed. Some ways that a listener may behave unethically include, but are
not limited to, holding prejudiced beliefs about the speaker, not acting in good faith when
compelling the speaker to explain their oppression (i.e., by demanding that the speaker provide a
convincing argument that they are oppressed when the listener already recognizes that the
oppression exists), or refusing to engage in the labor of understanding if or how the speaker is
oppressed themselves (in other words, requiring that this work be done by the oppressed person or
not at all).

To be clear, not all instances in which a marginalized person engages in epistemic labor to
improve a listener’s understanding of their oppression will constitute wrongful epistemic
exploitation. Even when listeners behave in epistemologically and ethically upstanding ways, there
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will be circumstances where marginalized people will feel compelled to speak about their oppression.
Marginalized people and their testimony must and should be central to efforts to bring about
epistemic justice. Thus, epistemic justice itself compels marginalized people to speak about the
oppression they experience. Even when they are not wronged, these experiences may be
uncomfortable or painful; such unfortunate cases harm the speaker, and we may even feel that they
are unfair. But they do not constitute an epistemic injustice if they are not brought about by some
ethically culpable behavior of listeners.

Berenstain derides the idea that oppressed people must explain or educate others about their
oppression as a mistaken, stating “it masquerades as a necessary and even epistemically virtuous
form of intellectual engagement” (2016, 570). It is unclear to me if she means that such labor is never
necessary or epistemically virtuous, but if this is what she intends, then in distinguishing between
unfortunate, possibly even harmful instances of epistemic labor and unjust, and wrongful instances
that constitute unjust epistemic exploitation, I depart from Berenstain’s presentation of the
phenomenon.

Testimonial Smothering

Dotson identifies testimonial smothering as a kind of testimonial silencing. Other forms of
testimonial silencing include testimonial quieting (when a speaker provides testimony, but that
testimony is so completely ignored or disregarded that it is as if they said nothing at all. See Dotson,
2011) and sincerity silencing (when a speaker’s statement is undermined by a listener’s assessment
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that was has been said is not sincere. See McGowan, 2013).3 Using the classificatory scheme I have
introduced, I identify all three of these forms of testimonial silencing as belonging to the class of
epistemic injustices that relate to expression, but I classify testimonial quieting and sincerity silencing
as belonging to the category of testimonial injustice.

Testimonial smothering occurs when epistemically oppressed people choose or are coerced
into omitting, truncating, or otherwise altering their communicative contributions because they
determine some conversations are too risky to have, possibly because other people in those
conversations have demonstrated in the past that they are unwilling or unable to properly receive the
testimony provided by the speaker. In many cases, testimonial smothering is a result of marginalized
people taking steps to protect themselves; it is a way for folks who have been epistemically exploited
in the past to protect their well-being and to avoid putting energy and resources into work that has
proved to be harmful or futile.

When the would-be speaker’s assessment of the would-be listener accurately picks up on
some ethically culpable attitude that would make it risky to speak, then the would-be speaker has
been wronged. In some circumstances, it may be so systemically risky to speak that would-be
speakers are silenced across significant domains where it would be in their interest to have a voice.

There is a collective loss when testimonial smothering occurs. Would-be speakers are
deprived of the opportunity to express themselves, and would-be listeners suffer the cognitive
3

McGowan introduces the concept of sincerity silencing to explain how it is in cases of

sexual assault that a victim may say “no,” but a listener may conclude the speaker means something
else.
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disadvantage of not being exposed to new ideas and information. Testimonial smothering prevents
knowledge from entering the epistemic marketplace. However, the harms caused by testimonial
smothering are asymmetrical. Ultimately those who are in relatively privileged positions are mostly
fine without being exposed to the additional epistemic resources that are not being introduced
because of the silence of those who are oppressed. The experiences and ideas of the oppressed, on
the other hand, continue to be unspoken, truncated, or distorted, and that silence brings with it the
harms of epistemic oppression. The silenced are compromised as knowers, and thus as human
beings, as part of what it means to be a knower and a human being is to be able to express ideas and
beliefs in an effort to influence the ideas and beliefs of others. Participation in the epistemic
marketplace is an essential part of personhood, so exclusion from the epistemic marketplace (even if
it is self-inflicted as a means of self-protection) harms the silenced individual as a knower and a
person.

Testimonial Injustice

According to Fricker, the central case of testimonial injustices involves a person being
granted less credibility than they ought to be as a result of prejudiced attitudes the listener holds
toward the speaker (2007, 4). Testimonial injustices are interpersonal in nature. They occur during
interactions between speakers and listeners and result from assessments of the credibility of
particular speakers by particular listeners. Inaccurate assessments of the credibility of a speaker may
cause harm even when they are the byproduct of innocent errors. But when speakers are not given
due credibility as a result of prejudiced beliefs about the speaker based on their social identity, then
they are wronged by the listener’s epistemologically and ethically culpable misdeed.
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While acknowledging that “prejudicial discounting in testimonial practice can be of two
kinds,” (2007, 17) Fricker argues that credibility deficits are more likely to wrong the speaker in their
capacity as a knower than credibility excesses (2007, 20). Furthermore, she notes that the most
severe cases of prejudicial credibility deficits are systemic, tracking speakers through different realms
of their social lives based on widespread prejudiced attitudes based on the speaker’s social identity
(2007, 28-29). Thus, her central case of testimonial injustice involves persistent and systemic
identity-prejudicial credibility deficit.

Davis, however, contests the idea that credibility excesses are most often benign or
beneficial, contending that speakers may be harmed when they are presumed to have an excess of
credibility, too. She calls this identity-prejudicial credibility excess, and states that this kind of
injustice occurs when “hearers assume that features of their target’s social identity - as indicated by a
target’s racialized, gendered, and so on, appearance - are reliable indicators of what sort of
knowledge the target possesses” (2016, 487). Treating individuals as mere tokens of the groups to
which they belong is epistemically objectifying, as doing so fails to recognize the individuality of
each speaker.4 Identity-prejudicial credibility excess could also lead to epistemic exploitation, as
individuals are compelled to advocate on behalf of their group regardless of their estimation of
whether such advocacy will be successful and despite the costs associated with that work.

In describing the conditions under which epistemic exploitation might occur and the harms
that might result from it, Berenstain introduces an example in which a white person responds
4

This can lead to narrative constraint when certain speakers are vocal and their testimony

comes to be treated as inappropriately generalizable. I discuss narrative constraint more in a later
section of this chapter and in Chapter Four.
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skeptically to a black person’s testimony about their experiences of racism. Berenstain states that in
such a circumstance, the white listener “positions herself as the epistemic peer” of the speaker and
“implicitly suggests that she is as qualified as her conversation partner to evaluate what counts as an
experience of racism.” Berenstain describes this privileged listener as “uninformed,” adding that they
engage in posturing when they mistakenly identify themselves as an epistemic peer of the speaker
(2016, 579).

Building on the idea touched on in Berenstain’s example, I will call the kind of epistemic
harm that occurs when a listener inappropriately positions themselves in a way that suggests they are
the epistemic peer of a speaker by the name ‘posturing.’ This harm constitutes an injustice if it is
produced in an ethically and epistemologically culpable way, like as the result of a prejudiced attitude
directed toward the speaker. When posturing results in an epistemic injustice, it is an interpersonal
one.

Berenstain’s example suggests it is the white listener’s race and relative privilege that makes
her uninformed and mistaken in her self-identification as an epistemic peer of the speaker. We could
take this to mean that any time a listener expresses doubt about or fails to endorse the views
expressed by a marginalized speaker - particularly those related to their marginalization - they
commit the harm of posturing. In other words, whenever an outsider doubts or denies the testimony
of an insider, they posture. Such a view would require that we see the marginalized speaker’s insight
into their marginalization as necessarily epistemically advantaged.

However, there is good reason to doubt that we have privileged access to knowledge about
our own mental states and processes. Understanding prejudice and marginalization requires not only
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insight into our own internal states, but an understanding of complex relationships between people
and institutions, as well. Thus, I will understand posturing in less absolute terms. I leave open the
possibility that someone who has not had an experience of kind x could be the epistemic peer of
someone who has, even when the discussion or disagreement pertains to an experience of kind x.
Further, in some cases a person who has not had an experience of kind x could have a better
understanding of those kinds of experiences than someone who has been the subject of x.5 In such
cases, a listener would not make a mistake if they positioned themselves as an epistemic peer of the
speaker. They would, therefore, not be guilty of posturing, even if they are skeptical of or disagree
with the speaker’s testimony.

Assessing whether someone is or is not guilty of posturing will be difficult in practice. In
many cases, we will not be able to determine with certainty if this harm or wrong has occurred, as
we will not have enough information to determine whether the listener’s assessment of themselves
as appropriately situated to judge the speaker’s testimony is mistaken or not. But because of the
possibility that the testimony of less socially powerful speakers will be treated with less than due
credibility because of their social identity, and given the significant harms that are caused when these
speakers are degraded as knowers, we should tread carefully when even the risk of posturing is
present.

5

Later in this chapter I will recognize species of hermeneutical injustice that would produce

dynamics where an outsider is better able to understand the experiences of insiders than insiders
themselves. Namely, this would be true in situations of separation, exportation, and exclusion. In
these cases, outsiders would not be mistaken if they were to see themselves as epistemic peers of
insiders. In fact, they may sometimes be at an epistemic advantage.
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There is a risk of posturing whenever a dominantly-situated listener takes a position of
skepticism toward or denies the views expressed by a marginalized person. The risk may be greater
or lesser depending on the situation. The risk is greatest in circumstances where the listener endorses
prejudiced views of the speaker and has little exposure to the experience or subject the speaker is
talking about. The risk is lesser in circumstances where the listener has dedicated time and energy to
learning about the subject the speaker is talking about. Whether the speaker has committed
themselves to the cultivation of good epistemic habits, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter
Three, might also inform an assessment of the risk of posturing in a given case. In Chapter Four I
will consider examples where outsider advocates are at risk of posturing. In doing so, I will further
explore conditions that enhance or mitigate that risk.

1.2 Relating to Conceptual Gaps

Some epistemic injustices occur because there are significant gaps in collective epistemic
resources, and those gaps render the experiences of marginalized people inscrutable.

Hermeneutical Injustice

The resources we have available to us to make sense of our lives and the lives of others are
shaped by the understandings and experiences of those in positions of social power. Thus,
experiences that are unique to people and groups who are relatively powerless are more likely to be
obscured from collective understanding. This may make it difficult for marginalized people to
conceptualize their own experiences or to render those experiences intelligible to others. Fricker
introduces the concept of hermeneutical injustice to pick out the way in which knowers are wronged
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when some significant part of their social experience is obfuscated due to a lack of collective
understanding that results from their being hermeneutically marginalized (2007, 154-55).
Hermeneutical marginalization occurs when members of a disadvantaged group have less than equal
participation in processes if meaning making. Hermeneutical injustices can render a person’s
experiences, perspectives, and even life illegible in some substantial way.

Ultimately, a hermeneutical injustice reflects a deep misunderstanding, but one that has the
most significant consequences for the marginalized person who is misunderstood. While everyone
subject to the epistemic lacuna suffers a cognitive disadvantage, the harm is borne asymmetrically.
The person whose experience is obscured from collective understanding suffers a significant
cognitive disadvantage, preventing “her from understanding a significant patch of her own
experience: that is a patch of experience which is strongly in her interests to understand…” whereas
the powerful person’s ignorance may even suit their interests in some way (Fricker 2007, 151).
Goetze identifies the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice as being “that the subject has some
distinctive and important social experience that at some crucial moment lacks intelligibility” (2018,
79), though it is important to note that all unintelligible social experiences are not wrongful. Part of
someone’s social experience could be unintelligible as a result of epistemic bad luck. To be wrongful,
the unintelligibility must be a result of the subject’s being hermeneutically marginalized.

Contributory Injustice

Contributory injustices occur when there are hermeneutical resources available to a listener
that would enable them to understand what is being expressed by a speaker, but the listener refuses
to make use of those resources (Dotson 2012, 32). Contributory injustice is importantly related to
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willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when agents refuse to learn and make use of
epistemic resources developed by marginalized knowers (Pohlhaus Jr. 2012, 722).

There may be some instances in which hermeneutical resources are available, but
nonetheless some listeners may not be aware of their availability or skilled enough in their
application. This does not necessitate that those listeners are willfully evading epistemic
responsibility. Rather, it highlights the difficulty of creating, disseminating, and applying
hermeneutical resources. As Dotson recognizes, fluency with new hermeneutical resources,
concepts, and alternative logics can take years or even decades to gain. In some cases, epistemic
resources may be intentionally kept secret from the broader collective so that they can be used
strategically as oppositional secrets by marginalized people.

Thus, departing from Dotson, I distinguish between:

A) instances where new conceptual tools have been introduced, are part of the collective
hermeneutical resources, but are ignored or misused by people in positions of privilege. These are
instances of contributory injustices.
and
B) instances where conceptual resources have been produced by a subgroup but are not yet
intercommunally accessible, but that lack of access is without any willfulness impairing the uptake of
those resources. These are instances of hermeneutical injustice, as there is still a significant part of
the experiences of marginalized people that are obfuscated from collective understanding.
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While hermeneutical injustice is a structural phenomenon, contributory injustice is an
interpersonal one. Contributory injustices occur when individual listeners fail to use resources that
are available to them. For this failure, the listener bears epistemological culpability. When their
failure is motivated by discriminatory or prejudiced attitudes, then their choices are ethically culpable
as well. When many dominantly situated knowers are collectively willfully ignorant, this produces a
severe, systemic form of the injustice. This combination of both personal and, at times, systemic
complicity moves Dotson to identify contributory injustice as “located within the gray area between
agential and structural perpetuation of epistemic injustice” (2012, 31).

1.2.1 Conceptual Gaps: Who Doesn’t Understand?

Much of my attention in the rest of the project will focus on highlighting hermeneutical
injustices, evaluating methods of hermeneutical dissent, and identifying epistemic harms that that
can result from those attempts to produce and improve collective understanding of those
experiences that were hermeneutically inaccessible.

So before moving on, I want to spend some time considering an important question about
the nature of hermeneutical injustice. In order for a hermeneutical injustice to occur, there must be a
deficit of interpretive resources available to the collective. But which resources make up the
collective’s hermeneutical resources?

The challenge of answering this question comes into focus when we recognize that for any
collective and community that we identify, there are sub-groups that make up that larger group.
Social groups are heterogeneous. Constituents will be members of a complex networking of
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overlapping and distinct mini-collectives, which will themselves be made up of smaller subsets. As
Davis notes, there are hermeneutical resources shared and used only within a subgroup
(intracommunal) and resources shared and used between subgroups (intercommunal) (201, 702).

A satisfactory account of what makes up a collective’s available hermeneutical resources
should recognize and be able to make sense of the following conditions:

1.

There may be multiple social groups that constitute a collective.

2.

Those discrete social groups may have their own idiosyncratic epistemic resources that
sometimes are and sometimes are not shared with other social groups.

3.

Hermeneutical dissent occurs in circumstances in which marginalized individuals create
hermeneutical resources to address lacunas and attempt to alter collective understanding by
dissemination of those resources.

Now, let us review several ways of defining collective hermeneutical resources, evaluating
how well each is able to accommodate these conditions.

Cumulative Account

One possible response is that hermeneutical resources include all resources available to
anyone who is part of a community. Goetze describes this as a cumulative understanding of a
community’s collective resources. If the community is made up of subgroups, and members of those
subgroups have access to different hermeneutical resources, the collective’s resources are the sum of
the resources available to all subgroups. Collective hermeneutical resources, on this account, include
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all the hermeneutical resources available to all groups. Berenstain’s account of hermeneutical
injustice when describing epistemic exploitation also presumes that hermeneutical injustice is
restricted to instances in which everyone, including the hermeneutically marginalized subjects, has a
deficit in the epistemic resources available to them. This presumes a cumulative account (2016, 584).

According to the cumulative account, as soon as anyone or any subgroup has access to those
resources, then there is no longer a lacuna, and thus, no longer a hermeneutical injustice (though
other epistemic injustices, like contributory injustices, may persist).

Figure 2: Cumulative Account of Collective Resources
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Thus, the cumulative account is not compatible with statement 3 above, that hermeneutical
dissent occurs in circumstances in which marginalized individuals create hermeneutical resources to address lacunas and
attempt to alter collective understanding by dissemination of those resources, because the cumulative account
does not allow for the possibility there could be hermeneutical resources that both exist and are not
part of the collective’s hermeneutical resources.

To see why this understanding of what constitutes a collective’s hermeneutical resources is
troubling, consider an example introduced by Trystan Goetze in “Hermeneutical Dissent and the
Species of Hermeneutical Injustice.” Members of the LGBTQ+ community have articulated gender
and sexual identifications that, at their inception, were not part of the accepted lexicon. Concepts
like agender, for example, came about because of difficult intergroup collaboration (2018, 74).
Though such concepts are now at least somewhat recognized by the collective, we should not forget
how hard they were to generate and disseminate in the first place. This work of creating alternative
or additional hermeneutical resources to describe the experiences of those who are at a social
disadvantage is hermeneutical dissent, and it is a powerful means of bringing about hermeneutical
justice.

If collective hermeneutical resources include all resources available to anyone who is part of
a community, then we lose sight of what is radical and challenging about the worked done by
members of epistemically marginalized grips and their allies when they strive to create terms and
concepts to describe their experiences when those are missing. Medina argues against this
understanding of what constitutes collective hermeneutical resources on the grounds that we must
acknowledge the “different interpretative communities and expressive practices that coexist”
(Medina 2012, 201).
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Exhaustive Account

In her assessment of Fricker, Dotson states “Fricker seems to assume that there is but one
set of collective hermeneutical resources that we are all equally dependent upon.” If this were the
case, no resources would be available outside of them, and they would be available to all members of
the collective. Both Mason and Dotson understand Fricker to be advocating for an exhaustive
account of collective resources (Goetze 2018, 75), although they add the criticism that such an
understanding renders dominant resources complete and in doing so erases the resources of
marginalized groups.

The exhaustive account is demonstrably unrepresentative of how epistemic resources
actually function. There are hermeneutical resources available to some that are not available to
others. Any nascent concept will at some point be available to only a few. If this were the account of
collective resources we were to accept, then I believe Mason would be right in her criticism that we
would “[miss] an ethically and epistemologically significant phenomenon,” namely, that of
hermeneutical dissent by marginalized subjects (2011, 296).
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Figure 3: Exhaustive Account of Collective Resources

Mainstream Account

As Goetze argues, a robust understanding of the possibility of hermeneutical dissent requires
that the collective hermeneutical resources are neither cumulative nor exhaustive. It is important to
preserve this conceptual space for hermeneutical dissent because even if resources have been
introduced by marginalized people, if they have yet to be adopted by others, then those marginalized
people will still seem inscrutable and confused to outsiders.
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Goetze proposes that we understand collective hermeneutical resources as those that make
up a subset of the cumulative and exhaustive resources, but a subset reflecting the perspectives of
many decision-makers and epistemic “legitimizers” in a community.

Though Fricker has been characterized as both endorsing cumulative and exhaustive
accounts (based in different interpretations of her work) she has also explicitly recognized that
resources available in localized hermeneutical communities may not be available to the broader,
collective, global community. With this in mind, we can understand collective resources as those that
are available to and used by different sub-groups within a community. Thus, collective
hermeneutical resources are neither cumulative nor exhaustive, but instead pick out what is available
and integrated intercommunally, across social spaces (Fricker 2016, 167).

If a marginalized community generates interpretive resources, but those don’t gain uptake in
other sub-groups, then this produces a situation in which hermeneutical resources exist (perhaps as a
result of hermeneutical dissent), but the community whose resources have not gained uptake remain
hermeneutically marginalized. I will call this the mainstream account, as it asserts that collective
hermeneutical resources include all and only those resources that are available across some
significant cross-section of social groups. The mainstream resources will typically contain resources
used and endorsed by dominant subjects in the community, though they may include other
resources that dominant subjects have access to and the capacity to apply.
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Figure 4: Mainstream Account of Collective Resources

I believe the mainstream account best explains the realities of the complicated epistemic
dynamics that emerge between marginalized and socially dominant groups, as it allows for us to
understand all three of the conditions listed above to be true of collectives experiencing
hermeneutical injustice. Further, if the three statements above are true, then it must be the case that
there are hermeneutical resources that are not part of the collective hermeneutical resources.
Hermeneutical injustice occurs when some meaningful part of a marginalized group’s experience is
obscured from understanding by application of the collective hermeneutical resources. Therefore, it
is possible for hermeneutical injustices to occur even when hermeneutical resources capable of
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making sense of the obscured experiences exist, so long as they are not part of the collective
hermeneutical resources shared between groups.

Given that different social groups have access to and successfully make use of different
interpretive tools, hermeneutical injustices will manifest differently depending on who does and who
does not have access to the tools needed to render legible the experiences of epistemically
marginalized individuals.

Goetze introduces distinct species of hermeneutical injustices. The dynamics likely to play
out between the various social groups involved will vary depending on the species in question. I will
adopt the six species introduced by Goetze, adding a seventh that I will call exclusion.

Species

Collective
understands?

Subject
understands?

Subject’s
social group
understands?

Another social
group
understands?

Effacement

No

No

No

No

Isolation

No

Yes

No

No

Separation

No

No

No

Yes

Ghettoization

No

Yes

Yes

No

Exportation

No

Yes

No

Yes

Obstruction

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Exclusion

No

No

Yes

Yes

Table 2: Species of Hermeneutical Injustices
Adapted from Goetze, 2018
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Effacement: In situations of effacement, no one, including the subject, has the interpretative
tools to render the marginalized person’s experience intelligible (Goetze 2018, 81).

Consider the example of postpartum depression introduced by Fricker. The women
identified in this example knew they felt unwell, knew, in some cases, it was complicating their
bonds with their newborns, and knew their feelings were meaningfully connected to becoming new
mothers. However, the shame and guilt these women felt suggests even they were not fully able to
make sense of their experiences. Despite all that they did know, they did not possess knowledge that
postpartum depression is a serious but common condition that can occur just before and in the
months after labor and delivery, and that their feelings, as uncomfortable and upsetting as they were,
were the result of a natural and biochemical reaction. The epistemic lacuna, in this case, impaired the
understanding of not only outsiders, but subjects with the most intimate connection to the
experience, too.

Isolation: Isolation occurs when the subject has personally developed or uncovered
interpretive tools to make sense of their situation, but is unable to communicate that to others, both
within and outside of her social group, in a way that those others can understand. The subject is
alone in their understanding (Goetze 2018, 81-82).

The possibility of isolation also highlights the fact that no one member or subset of
members can speak for an entire group, as the experiences of group members are always
heterogeneous.
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Separation: Separation occurs when hermeneutical tools that a subject could use to make
sense of their experience are available, but only to members of different social groups. The subject
and other members of their social group (the social group to whom this experience belongs) lack
those interpretive tools, and thus cannot render their own experiences legible to themselves (Goetze
2018, 82-83).

Jenkins describes this manifestation of hermeneutical injustice as “the reverse of privileged
ignorance,” since “the relevant conceptual resources are available at some social locations but are
inaccessible to the person who needs to render their experiences of injustice intelligible” (2017, 200).

Let us consider three contexts in which separation could occur:

1) A social group that is marginalized in some similar way has generated the relevant
interpretive resources, but for some reason communication between the two groups is nonexistent
Goetze illustrates this way that separation can manifest using Fricker’s Sanford case, where a subject
and others in her social group generate tools to make sense of postpartum depression, a
phenomenon they previously had no hermeneutical resources to understand. But even when they
lacked those resources, other similarly constituted groups in other places had those resources. Thus,
the dividing line between the groups that had the tools and those that didn’t was not a matter of
similarity of experience, but rather separation by time or space.

2) Another social group with similar kinds of experiences develops interpretive tools that
they use to gain knowledge of those experiences, but for some reason those tools are not shared
with or seen as applicable to the subject and her group. For example, activists and survivors working
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on unpacking the phenomena of domestic violence and various coercive techniques used by
domestic abusers may develop interpretive tools for understanding those experiences.
Simultaneously, survivors and activists in the world of commercial sexual exploitation may be
unaware of some of those tools, even though they’d be applicable when trying to understand and
gain knowledge about that phenomenon as well. In this case, the separation is more than a result of
time or space, but of difference in the constitutive members of the groups that do and don’t possess
the interpretive tools. But the members of these groups are more alike than different in the ways
relevant to the interpretive tools in question.

3) I would like to suggest separation can occur when a social group that is not subject to
some experience (or similar experiences) nonetheless develops hermeneutical resources that are not
available to the subjects of those experiences. In such cases, a group distinct from the group whose
experiences are not collectively understood has hold of interpretive resources that would be valuable
for collective uptake and that are not possessed by members of the group whose experiences they
render coherent.

It may be that some group of individuals who are not subject to an experience have a better
understanding of that experience than those who are subject to it. Generation of hermeneutical
resources is messy and complicated business, and sometimes outsiders may strike epistemic gold
before insiders. Perhaps outsiders have some privilege that allows them to recognize those tools, or
insiders are in too perilous a position to come to those resources first.

But I believe we should be wary of the possibility of perpetrating further epistemic harms
when separation seems to best describe the state of how hermeneutical resources are distributed.
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When this happens, we should be concerned that the outsiders will mischaracterize the experiences
they are trying to illuminate. We should worry that when outsiders claim to understand something
more than insiders do, that the result will be paternalistic and may alter future attempts at further
understanding. Self-understanding on the part of subjects may be shaped and guided by the tools
crafted by outsiders. I will return to these dangers in the final section of this project.

Ghettoization: Ghettoization occurs when a subject and the subject’s social group possess
interpretive resources to facilitate knowledge of their experiences, but other social groups do not
have those resources. Goetze’s characterization of ghettoization suggests this lack of uptake by other
social groups is, at least in her limited example, a result of an indifference or resistance on the part of
the other social group (2018, 83). In such cases, members of those other social groups could be
accused of perpetrating a contributory injustice. They may also be accused of willful hermeneutical
ignorance, and in circumstances where the epistemically oppressed attempt to communicate their
tools and are prevented from doing so, there may be occurrences of testimonial injustice as well.

However, in some cases ghettoization may be a result of strategic resistance on the part of
the marginalized. As Hundelby acknowledges in “The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional
Secrets,” in-group secrets can be extremely valuable for survival. Not all concepts developed
through hermeneutical dissent would be prudent to share with outsiders in other social groups.

If only the subjects of the epistemically obscure experience have access to the relevant
concepts, we might expect that they will be met with incredulousness by those with whom they try
to communicate their experiences. In such cases, the members of hermeneutically marginalized
group may even have language to describe their experiences, and they may be able to communicate
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about them with one another. However, that language is likely to be misunderstood by those outside
of the group, and if these subjects aren’t given appropriate credibility when describing their
experiences, this would result in a further testimonial injustice. Behaviors may be marked as deviant
or criminal, and the epistemically marginalized people may be outright punished for responding to
circumstances that are poorly understood.

Exportation: This occurs when a subject has relevant interpretive tools to gain knowledge
about their experiences, and some other group has those tools, too, but other members of the
subject’s group do not. In such cases, a subject may have acquired those tools from the other group,
but those resources have no yet gained uptake in the subject’s group (Goetze 2018, 83-84).

Obstruction: This dynamic suggests what Goetze calls a “favorable hermeneutical climate,”
since the subject, members of her own group, and members of some other group possess
hermeneutical resources to gain knowledge of the epistemically obscured experiences (2018, 84).
However, there may still be a hermeneutical injustice if there are some other social groups outside the
in-group and the in-the-know out-group that do not possess the relevant interpretive tools. If the
out-group that has resisted these tools or is for some other reason unable to incorporate them into
their hermeneutical framework is powerful or dominant enough, then the marginalized group could
still be at a significant disadvantage and suffer communicative harms.

Perhaps there are circumstances in which powerful institutions constitute the other social
group that recognizes the existence of what was once epistemically opaque before the general public
can be said to catch on. This might occur in circumstances in which laws have changed in ways that
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have outpaced public awareness and understanding. Those “official” changes can play an important
role in ushering in a new era of general concern about the phenomena.

If both the marginalized individuals and institutions recognize something important about
gaps in understanding, but the general population does not, institutions may be able to help in
communicating relevant information. In doing so, they can alleviate the burden of epistemic labor,
but there is a remaining threat that the account will be distorted. The institutional interpretation of
the experience may come to carry more weight that the individual accounts of the people affected,
which could itself come to shape those experiences. Furthermore, the concepts and tools developed
by the marginalized communities may be quickly co-opted to serve the interests of those in more
dominant social positions.

Exclusion: I would like to make the case for a seventh species of hermeneutical injustice,
exclusion, in which members of a subject’s social group and members of some other social group or
groups have relevant interpretive tools, but nonetheless the collective and some particular subject or
sub-set of subjects of that experience lack those tools. To explain the need for an additional species,
let us walk through a scenario in which different species may emerge at different times. We begin my
imagining a circumstance in which workplace sexual harassment is occurring (women are being
objectified and mistreated in the workplace), but no one currently has the appropriate hermeneutical
resources to understand the phenomenon. At this time, we have a case of effacement. No one, not
the collective, the subject of the harassment, the social group the subject belongs to, nor any other
social group, has the interpretive tools to attain knowledge of this experience.
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Then, these women impacted by this particular kind of mistreatment in the workplace come
together and recognize their shared experience. They name it and develop ways of thinking and
talking about it. At this point, the hermeneutical injustice transforms into a case of ghettoization.
Subjects and their social group have interpretive tools to understand their situation, but those tools
have not yet been widely disseminated. They are not yet mainstream.

We can imagine that this motivated group of women then decides to share their interpretive
resources with other social groups. They decide it is not strategically in their best interest to keep the
tools they have developed as oppositional secrets, but to raise awareness that their experiences are
real and rooted in systemic problems. We can even go so far as to assume that these consciousness
raising efforts are sometimes successful, and members of some other groups grant credibility to their
testimony and over time come to incorporate these hermeneutical resources into their lives and
interpretations. Is it possible that a hermeneutical injustice lingers? I contend that it is.

We may be inclined to say that in cases where a subject’s social group and other social
groups have access to interpretive tools necessary to attain knowledge of an experience, but some
particular subject or sub-group of subjects do not, there is no hermeneutical injustice because the
lack of knowledge seem individual, personal even, and not systemic. Perhaps such dynamics are
instead ones of mere epistemic bad luck.

However, given that we have acknowledged that it is possible for multiple subgroups to have
access to interpretive tools and for a hermeneutical injustice to still persist, then it seems similarly
possible for a subject to be isolated from tools necessary for understanding their experiences while
other members of their social group and members of other social groups have those tools. And this
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separation could still to be the result of systemic barriers and prejudices, and thus the result of more
than just bad luck.

Imagine there is a subject who herself encounters the experiences of workplace sexual
harassment, but lacks those interpretive tools. Maybe she’s just never been in the room when the
label has been used. Maybe she is disinclined to engage in the kinds of conversations that would
reveal them to her. Maybe she does not have a lot of time to catch up with her peers, and to
discover that she isn’t alone in being harassed and violated by her boss. If her ignorance is simply a
personal problem, that would not constitute a hermeneutical injustice. But what if it isn’t a personal
problem? What if there are systemic reasons why she does not have access to those interpretive
tools?

Imagine she and others like her are members of the social group that developed the
interpretive resources, but are also members of some other social groups that those women do not
belong to. Maybe the women responsible for introducing language and concepts that make
knowledge of workplace sexual harassment possible are mostly in secretarial positions, are educated,
and are native English speakers. Imagine that our “out of the loop” subject works in a custodial
position, or has not had access to certain educational opportunities; or maybe she speaks English as
a second language or not at all. She may still be subject to workplace sexual harassment while
nonetheless being deprived of the interpretive tools to attain knowledge of her experience. There
may be others like her, all of whom belong to the social group “women,” and the narrower social
group “women who are vulnerable to sexual harassment in the workplace.” Many, maybe most,
members of that social group could have the relevant hermeneutical resources to attain knowledge
of their experiences, other social groups could have those tools, and the subject (and others similarly
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situated) could lack them for reasons that involve systemic barriers. In such cases, the subject faces
both cognitive and communicative harms (Goetze, 78), and I will refer to this species of
hermeneutical injustice as exclusion.

1.2.2 Conceptual Gaps: Finding Lacunas

When no one is aware that there is an epistemic lacuna, including subjects of the
hermeneutical injustice, then the ignorance is shared and it is especially difficult to see how the
injustice could be righted. How can we come to recognize that which we do not know is missing?

Interestingly, many of Fricker’s examples in Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
(2007) are from works of fiction. In these pieces, we as the reader can stand outside of the events
that are unfolding in ways that make it easier to see what the characters in those works may not. Her
other examples are historic, as the benefit of time allows us to identify injustices in retrospect. She
discusses the introduction of names and concepts like postpartum depression and workplace sexual
harassment, conceptual innovations she describes as having been introduced into the lexicon and
collective consciousness in the recent past.

In what follows, I will try to motivate the position that there are certain epistemically
obscure areas that require more and better-articulated resources. But ultimately, most of what we
can learn about hermeneutical injustice has to be done after the fact. Once concepts are introduced once the unnamed is named - then we can reflect on why it was ever nameless in the first place.
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What I believe we can identify in real-time are the signs that a hermeneutical injustice is
likely. Spotting these signs has practical value. When inadequate interpretive or communicative
resources exist, then people attempting to communicate their experiences are likely to seem unclear,
confused, or otherwise difficult to understand to those they are communicating with. A general take
away from the discussion of epistemic injustice is a recognition that when we find ourselves
incredulous of a speaker’s testimony or attempt to communicate about their experiences, we should
consider ways that epistemic injustices may be at the heart of what makes it so challenging to
understand what is being reported.

Justice-minded listeners who want to improve their hermeneutical fluency, give speakers due
credibility, and contribute to creating a more epistemically just community will have an interest in
honing their sensitivity to the possibility that hermeneutical injustices are contributing to
communicative failures and frustrations.

I propose the following as indications that we should expect that the speakers in question are
hermeneutically marginalized, and thus that aspects of their lives are not well described by available
hermeneutical resources. These conditions are posited as neither necessary nor sufficient signs of
hermeneutical injustices:

1.

The speaker is a member of a group toward whom prejudiced attitudes are held, particularly
if those attitudes are present in a systemic way.

2.

The speaker is subject to testimonial injustices. Testimonial injustices make it difficult to
overcome hermeneutical gaps, since attempts by the speaker to identify those gaps will be
taken less seriously due to tendency to undervalue the speaker’s epistemic contributions.
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3.

A concept purporting to describe an experience shared by non-dominantly-situated people is
in a state of flux, going through iterations of definitions that change the scope and meaning
of the concept.

I will now explore warning sign 3 in more detail, as I believe it requires the most in way of
defense.

First, when a concept is introduced or challenged by or on behalf of members of a
marginalized group, that suggests the possibility that a hermeneutical injustice has been perpetrated
at least up until that point, and that some part of the lived experiences of members of that group
had, until that time, been obscured from collective understanding, namely. When we attempt to
name what has been unnamed, to create interpretive resources where they’ve been lacking, we have
to start somewhere. It should be more surprising than not if we happen to start in the right place.
Because concept generation is such a hard project, we should expect that there will be continuous
adjustments and redefining of the concepts and resources that we create when we’re attempting to
fill a lacuna in our existing epistemic resources.

This is especially worth noting because one common criticism of emerging social
movements, particularly those surrounding the defining of what it means to be a victim, is that the
definitions are always shifting. For example, we can think about controversies around the changing
definitions of sexual assault. A common criticism is that what sexual assault is – how it is defined
and what “counts” - keeps expanding. Critics suggest that this somehow introduces a question of
legitimacy about whether or not there really is a “there” there, or whether or not people are taking
advantage of work being done to highlight the existence of a certain kind of victimhood. Critics
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suggest the expanding concept is evidence of a culture of victims, and that we’re expanding our
concepts so that everyone will eventually fall under that umbrella.

Taking seriously these changing definitions doesn’t require that we accept that concepts can’t
be overextended; this isn’t to say that there isn’t a truth of whether or not we sometimes push the
boundaries a bit too far.6 Rather it is a note that we should expect conceptual boundaries to ebb and
flow, to expand and contract, as we try to get at the truth of our concepts and how to define them.
We should expect that we’ll need to adjust meanings and definitions as we work to find concepts
that ring true to the experiences of the people that were attempting to better understand or the
people who are attempting to make themselves more legible. Rather, we should find ourselves
suspicious of unchanging concepts and critical of those who police their boundaries.

When conceptual boundaries remain in flux, then that is a signal that there may have been a
pre-existing epistemic lacuna that resulted in a hermeneutical injustice for those whose experiences
were rendered less legible as a result. The changing boundaries should also increase our awareness
and sensitivity to ongoing hermeneutical injustices, as the concept at a given time may be deficient,
introducing opportunities both for listening and increasing and understanding, on the one hand, and
exploiting, silencing, and causing great harm, on the other.
6

In this dissertation, I am unable to seriously consider the question of how we can tell when

a concept has been extended to far or why we should be alarmed by such a possibility. But we
should be concerned about such questions because overextension of concepts threatens to
pathologies, sermonize, and criminalize behaviors in ways that could results in further oppression
(See Hacking and Berkowitz for discussions of the consequences of redefining normalcy and
deviance).
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Operating with this idea that fluctuating definitions and concepts relating to the experiences
of marginalized folks is an indication that we’ve identified a “hot spot” of potential hermeneutical
injustice, in Chapter Two I am going to discuss the histories and current state of affairs for
describing, delineating, and understanding experiences of sexual assault and sex trafficking.

Whether there are current, persisting hermeneutical injustices perpetrated against survivors
of these traumas is not something I can say without the advantage of time and objectivity. But
historic deficits in understanding and the fact that survivors are still relegated to a diminished role in
the development of important resources to make sense of those experiences suggests to me that
there likely are ongoing injustices of this kind.

1.3 Relating to Concept Generation/Dissemination

The final category of epistemic injustices I will review are those that occur during efforts to
create and disseminate concepts in to fill an epistemic lacuna. I will use the phrase ‘hermeneutical
resistance’ to refer to the broad category of efforts both insiders and outsiders might undertake to
address hermeneutical blind spots. I will use Goetze’s notion of hermeneutical dissent to pick out
the subset of efforts carried out by the hermeneutically marginalized subjects of those experiences
(2018, 74). Both hermeneutical resistance and hermeneutical dissent are forms of conceptual
engineering. Conceptual engineering is the idea “that there are concepts other than those we actually
have and employ, and some of those concepts may be better suited for various purposes than our
actual ones are” (Eklund, 1). In this case, the sense in which some concepts are better than others is
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that some are better suited for epistemic justice. Some concepts better reflect the perspectives and
capture the experiences of marginalized knowers.
The three forms of epistemic injustice I introduce here all arise during the process of concept
generation. All follow in the wake of a pre-existing epistemic lacuna obscuring some significant part
of the lives of hermeneutically marginalized people. When lacunas exist in collective understanding
as a result of structural prejudice, then that inhibits members of the hermeneutically marginalized
group from influencing knowledge-production. This same structural prejudice will tend to sideline
the voices of those marginalized people during the development of new hermeneutical resources.
Finally, all injustices in this category demonstrate that even when new concepts are introduced to fill
gaps in collective understanding, it is still possible to produce the right concepts wrongly.

Hermeneutical Hijacking

When outsiders involve themselves in the process of creating new hermeneutical resources
in ways that make it harder for the subjects of those experiences to develop and disseminate their
own interpretive resources, this results in an epistemic harm that I will call hermeneutical hijacking.

Hermeneutical hijacking is characterized not by the intentions with which outsiders operate.
As Alcoff notes in “Problem of Speaking for Others,” even well-intentioned speakers may
“reinforce racist, imperialist conceptions and perhaps also further silence the lesser-privileged
group’s own ability to speak and be heard” when they take themselves to be capable of speaking for
the marginalized (1992, 26). Rather it is that the outsiders are problematically positioned to dominate
the process of knowledge production; they risk speaking for the marginalized. Because allies may
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have greater social authority, and thus are more likely to be believed and to have their voices
amplified than marginalized subjects themselves, they may come to dominate the conversation. This
should always be treated as sensitive and wrought with danger, and it should be especially alarming
when members of the marginalized groups protest the out-sized influence of outsider voices.
Hermeneutical hijacking produces the most severe harms when there is collective uptake of
hermeneutical resources created or disseminated by outsiders against background conditions of
hermeneutical marginalization.

Importantly, the threat of hermeneutical hijacking illustrates that better understanding may
not produce, on the whole, more justice if that improved understanding is brought about in a way
that sustains intergroup dynamics that are hermeneutically marginalizing and epistemically
oppressive. Though there may be no acute cognitive disadvantage if the hermeneutical resources
introduced by more powerful outsiders adequately communicate what they are intended to
illuminate, the subjects of those experiences are no less hermeneutically marginalized, as they are still
denied a fair chance to contribute to shared hermeneutical resources. In some cases, the voices of
those dominantly-situated knowers may exert such influence the voices of marginalized knowers are
drowned out, and as a result they may find themselves with even further limited opportunities to
contribute to the production of social meanings. The very fact that the dominantly-situated person
took on the role of spokesperson may be used as evidence that the marginalized knower cannot or
should not be included in meaning making. When this is the case, hermeneutical hijacking occurs,
and victims of the injustice are wronged even when the result is some improvement in collective
understanding. Hermeneutical hijacking sustains and possibly reinforces the existence of a class of
sub-knowers, denying them the opportunity for full and fair participation in knowledge production
and sharing.
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The wrongness of hermeneutical hijacking is not dependent on any ethically bad attitude
held by the outsider who has involved themselves in the process of hermeneutical resistance. Rather,
it is rooted in structural prejudice that hermeneutically marginalizes its victims, excluding them from
full and fair participation in the epistemic marketplace. This does not preclude the possibility that
outsiders may be culpable in some cases. If an outsider recognizes that their involvement in a
process of hermeneutical resistance is at odds with or has a silencing effect on the work of insiders,
but they choose to continue their efforts, then they would bear personal responsibility for that
decision. If those continued efforts are founded on a prejudiced belief about the insiders, then they
are morally and epistemologically culpable for the harms suffered by insiders.

For example, a doctor who is a man might see himself as engaged in work to improve
collective understanding of the experiences of women by researching and publishing on postpartum
depression. Because of his social power, he may be more successful at improving understanding that
women dedicated to this work. Even while working in their interests, the doctor may harbor
prejudiced beliefs about women, like a belief that they are less rational or intelligent than men. For
this reason, he may refuse to take steps to amplify the voices of women engaged in hermeneutical
dissent or to limit how much his own contributions hinder their work. In doing so, the doctor would
be culpable for his wrongdoing.

Other authors have suggested views that are similar to hermeneutical hijacking, though there
are important differences.
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For example, Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. argues that epistemic resources should be “developed from”
the situations they describe. She states that such resources should be developed by people who are
themselves subjects of those experiences, and that outsiders should “trust those persons have
developed them well” (2012, 731). Thus, I understand Pohlhaus Jr. to argue that it is inappropriate
for outsiders to develop or disseminate hermeneutical resources at all, regardless of whether doing
so precludes contributories from hermeneutically marginalized knowers. If this understanding of
Pohlhaus Jr. is accurate, then it is too absolute, especially given the possibility that in some cases,
hermeneutically marginalized knowers may be unable to render intelligible their experiences to
themselves even while the necessary tools for interpreting those resources are available elsewhere, as
would be true in cases of separation (Goetze 2018, 82-83).

Steers-McCrum argues for a species of testimonial injustice he calls self-appointed speaking
for. According to Steers-McCrum, self-appointed speaking for occurs any time a person “speaks on
behalf of or in place of another individuals or group without their authorization” (2019, 241). He
identifies this as a species of testimonial injustice because the primary harm is that the person
spoken for is disrespected as a knower. However, Steers-McCrum challenges Fricker’s
conceptualization of the central case of testimonial injustice by taking the position that all selfappointed speaking for is harmful and wrongful, regardless of whether it is the result of prejudice.

Self-appointed speaking for has some commonalities with my concept of hermeneutical
hijacking. Both are rooted in a recognition that significant epistemic harm can occur when
marginalized subjects are spoken for. Furthermore, I completely agree with Steers-McCrum when he
notes that it is not enough for the stories of marginalized people to be told or for their experiences
to be highlighted, but that “[w]ho gets to do the telling matters too.” I also agree that the erosion of

49

hermeneutical marginalization requires that socially powerless people and groups not be excluded
from active participation in the collective conceptualization of their own lives. Self-appointed
speaking for and hermeneutical hijacking both highlight the risk that the voices of relatively
powerful people could further silence those for whom they speak. Steers-McCrum and I also agree
that these harms and wrongs can be produced even when those speaking for oppressed people do
so with no prejudice or malicious intentions.

However, there are important differences between the two. First, I do not identify
hermeneutical hijacking as a species of testimonial injustice. Because the central feature of
hermeneutical hijacking is the exclusion of some social groups from the creation of social meanings,
hermeneutical hijacking is a structural kind of epistemic injustice. Because I identify hermeneutical
hijacking as a structural epistemic injustice, I can explain why it can be both harmful and wrongful
for outsiders to insert themselves into concept generation efforts even when those outsiders do not
have prejudiced attitudes about the people they speak for without doing away with the condition
that in order for interpersonal epistemic injustices like testimonial injustice to be wrongful, they
must be tainted by the “ethical poison” of prejudice.

Finally, hermeneutical hijacking leaves open the possibility that some instances of selfappointed speaking for are not wrongful, which I believe is a virtue of the concept as I have defined
it here. I will elaborate more on why I feel speaking for may sometimes be in the interest of justice,
epistemic and otherwise, at other points in this dissertation, but here I will briefly explain two
reasons:
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1) I agree that denying people the opportunity to contribute “as full participants in the
epistemic community” because of prejudiced attitudes about who they are disrespects the
person as a knower (2019, 245). But I reject Steers-McCrum’s suggestion that any time it is
determined that someone may not have the requisite knowledge to speak for themselves or
the hermeneutical resources to express themselves that this is necessarily disrespects that
person as an epistemic agent. Sometimes people do lack the information or resources to
articulate or advocate for themselves, even when the topic at hand is their own experience.

Epistemic lacunas may render the experiences of marginalized knowers unintelligible even to
themselves. Earlier in this chapter, I considered various species of hermeneutical injustice
that would result from different subgroups within a collective having or not having access to
interpretive resources that are not yet available to the collective, meaning they have not been
incorporated into the set of intercommunal resources. In all but the species of effacement,
someone or some group has access to interpretive resources that other individuals or groups
do not. Hermeneutical resistance in response to all of those remaining species of injustice
seems to necessitate some amount of speaking for others. Insofar as hermeneutical resistance
is in the interest of epistemic justice, speaking for others may be not only permissible, but
the right thing to do.

Sometimes speaking for others in the name of epistemic justice may involve some
individuals speaking for others who they have something important in common with. This
occurs when people from oppressed groups work to raise awareness not only about their
own circumstances, but about those that affect their communities. While the speakers may
have something in common with those they have appointed themselves to speak for, it is
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important to consider how within every group of people bound together by some common
experience, there are tremendous variations in how those individuals feel about the
experience and how the experience impacts other parts of their lives and identities.

It may also sometimes be the case that those outside of a hermeneutically marginalized group
are best positioned to shed light on epistemic blind spots that have rendered some
experience of that group unintelligible using intercommunal hermeneutical resources, and
they may be able to do so even when members of that group do not yet have the interpretive
tools to make sense of those experiences for themselves. Consider an example I will explore
in greater depth in later chapters. In the late 1980s, researchers and anti-sexual violence
advocates argued that acquaintance rape was far more common than the public believed, and
that most victims of acquaintance rape did not realize they had been sexually assaulted.
These researchers and advocates spoke for the victims they had identified without having
been appointed to do so. In fact, part of what they said on behalf of the victims they spoke
for was that many of those victims were unable to appoint someone to speak for them
because of the hermeneutical injustice they suffered. While there are many indications that
people who later self-identified as victims appreciated that researchers and advocates spoke
for them, this retroactive endorsement does not change the fact that at the time they spoke
on their behalf, they had not and could not have been appointed to do so by those victims.

One might retort that the researchers and advocates were, in fact, appointed to speak for
victims. While many people who would later come to recognize their experiences as ones of
sexual assault did not have access to the necessary concepts at the time, and thus could not
appoint anyone to speak on their behalf about those issues, there were some victims who
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were able to identify their experiences as ones of rape. In fact, many advocates and
researchers involved in consciousness raising work about acquaintance rape were survivors
themselves. So, perhaps approval by victims who had the requisite hermeneutical resources
means that the researchers and advocates who spoke out about the experience were
appointed to do so.

This response highlights another flaw in Steers-McCrum’s concept of self-appointed
speaking for as an epistemic injustice. If speaking for is not unjust when the speaker is
appointed, who has the authority to appoint someone as the mouthpiece for a group? Yes,
some survivors of sexual assault were comfortable appointing advocates committed to
raising awareness about acquaintance rape to speak on their behalf, but others were not.
Some felt these advocates presented themselves as if they were speaking for women
generally. This was strongly contested by women who expressed in no uncertain terms that
the advocates did not speak for them.

Efforts to improve collective understanding of harms and injustices suffered by marginalized
groups will require that some individuals speak for others. Sometimes people from within
the affected group will speak for others in that group, and when they do they will appoint
themselves to speak for some members of the group who feel they ought not. Sometimes
people from outside of the group may speak for insiders, and they may do so even when
insiders are unable to authorize those mouthpieces because of their hermeneutical deficits at
the time.
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2) Secondly, not all speaking for is disrespectful and exclusionary. Rather, some speaking for
could be motivated out of a deep respect for marginalized knowers and recognition of the
high costs of the epistemic labor that they would otherwise have to do. Steers-McCrum
states that self-appointed speaking for harms those who are spoken for because “[e]ven if
what is said is exactly what victims would have said, they are denied the chance to participate
for themselves” (2019, 244), but in some contexts it may be more accurate to say that they are
spared the obligation to participate in costly speech and debate.

Steers-McCrum considers this sort of objection. He accepts that this may be a sort of
necessary evil in cases where subjects cannot speak for themselves or where there is a strong
likelihood that they will be ignored if they do so. According to Steers-McCrum, selfappointed speaking for in such cases is an unfortunate strategic concession, but maybe the
best of bad options. But I do not see why we must concede that in such cases, speaking for
is unjust. We can accept that self-appointed speaking for may inflict some harms, but still see
it as an act of epistemic justice when carried out with respect for the subject’s capacity as a
knower and potential as a contributor to collective hermeneutical resources.

Rather than identify all instances of self-appointed speaking for as unjust, I believe we can
evaluate the examples Steers-McCrum provides and identify alternative explanations for how the
speakers may wrong or harm those they intend to speak for. Steers-McCrum first presents an
example in which a man orders for a woman at a restaurant, stating that regardless of the man’s
intentions or attitudes, he has disrespected her as a knower and excluded her from the opportunity
to express herself as a knower. I contend that he may be guilty of an epistemic injustice if he harbors
a prejudiced attitude toward women, but he could also have been misinformed about what counts as
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respectful behavior in that context. If so, then it is not clear that the woman has been harmed as a
knower. He has not undervalued her capacity to contribute as an epistemic agent, and insofar as she
is able to correct him, she has not been excluded from epistemic participation, either. In McCrum’s
example that recounts Cordova’s telling of an interaction with a white folklorist, it is more evident to
me that an epistemic injustice has occurred. Had the folklorist succeeded in co-opting Cordova’s
story, and in doing so made it more difficult for Cordova and other Native Americans to contribute
as knowers, then according to the definition I have introduced above, the folklorist would be guilty
of hermeneutical hijacking. The folklorist’s insistence that Cordova ought to share those stories, and
the added pressure to “teach ‘natives’ how to do such transcriptions” (Steers-McCrum quoting
Cordova, 2019, 243) constitutes epistemic exploitation.

To be clear, I believe many instances of speaking for others will be harmful and wrongful. If
a subject protests that someone is speaking over them, or if it is the case that someone’s speaking
for another makes it more challenging for the subject to contribute to the conversation when and
how they want, then there is good reason to worry that the subject is being harmed and possibly
wronged as a knower. But whether speaking for another is unjust depends not only on whether one
has been appointed to do so, but how that act of speaking for perpetuates or alters the conditions of
hermeneutical marginalization.

Epistemic Appropriation

According to Davis, epistemic appropriation occurs when, during hermeneutical dissent,
marginalized folks become detached from the dissemination of new hermeneutical resources they
have created or when those resources are then used in ways that disproportionately benefit the
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powerful (2018, 705). Thus, while epistemically marginalized subjects are able to contribute to the
development of conceptual tools that make sense of their experiences, they are “prevented from
being recognized” for that labor (2018, 722). Importantly, epistemic appropriation is not a species of
hermeneutical injustice, as in cases of appropriation, Davis argues there is no conceptual deficit
(resources exist - they are precisely what is being appropriated) and individuals may behave in
culpable ways when participating in the process of conceptual theft (2018, 719).

While I agree with Davis that there are instances where the individuals who appropriate the
hermeneutical resources produced by marginalized people are blameworthy for doing so, I do not
believe individual wrongdoing gets to the core of the injustice brought about by epistemic
appropriation. Davis herself acknowledges that “epistemic appropriate involves individual agents
(some of whom are culpable) and structures alike” (2018, 719). Marginalized knowers may be
unfairly detached from the resources they have created even if no particular, dominantly-situated
knowers intend to exclude them. Rather, the primary wrong of epistemic appropriation is the
continued hermeneutical marginalization and epistemic oppression of victims, even when they have
done work that should prove to any naysayers that they deserve to be full participants in the
production and sharing of hermeneutical resources. The exclusion of the hermeneutically
marginalized from making an impact with and on shared epistemic resources is sustained by their
being detached from their efforts. While in cases of epistemic appropriation, the epistemically
oppressed have succeeded in impacting the collective’s shared epistemic resources, this success is
mediated by the insertion of dominantly-situated knowers and speakers into the process. Exclusion
from knowledge-production processes cannot be executed by any particular listener. Rather, it is the
product of structural prejudice that privileges the resources and ways of communicating available to
some knowers and not others.
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If a hermeneutically marginalized knower is detached from their epistemic contributions and
those resources disproportionately benefit the powerful, then the knower is both harmed and
wronged by epistemic appropriation. This can occur even when individual agents involved in the
appropriation have not behaved in ethically culpable ways. For example, Davis presents the example
of Taylor Mill’s ideas and writings being published under the name of her husband, John Stuart Mill.
While the result is one in which “a marginalized knower contributes to the intercommunally shared
pool of epistemic resources, but only be first detaching herself from her epistemic contributions,”
(2018, 709-10) the decision to be detached from those resources was carried out strategically and
through the collaborative efforts of both Taylor Mill and John Stuart Mill. Taylor Mill was harmed
and wronged when she was separated from the ideas she developed, but John Stuart Mill is not
blameworthy for the role he played in that separation. While one may be inclined to interpret Taylor
Mill’s active role in detaching herself from her ideas as an indication that she was neither harmed nor
wronged by the situation, it is important to remember that subjects may strategically silence
themselves to protect against additional harms or wrongs. This sacrifice on the part of the
marginalized knower does not mitigate the harms and wrongs they suffer because of the double bind
they face.

However, if agents involved in the co-opting of hermeneutical resources developed by
marginalized knowers are or should be aware that their actions unduly benefit the powerful, or if
they are motivated by prejudiced attitudes about the marginalized knowers, then those wrongs are
both structural and interpersonal. In such cases, those agents are culpable for the harms and wrongs
that result from their actions. Let us contrast the example of Taylor Mill and John Stuart Mill with
another Davis that introduces. Davis assesses and article written by Harriet Beecher Stowe about
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Sojourner Truth. She notes that Stowe appropriated Truth’s ideas while presenting her in a
caricatured way. It is plausible that Stowe’s misrepresentation of Truth - presenting her “words in an
artificial dialect that utilizes obsessive detail to depict Truth - who was borne in the state of New
York - as a foreign ‘exotic’” - was motivated by her own prejudiced beliefs. Furthermore, Truth did
not condone Stowe’s depiction of herself and her ideas (2018, 711-12). Again, this involuntary
appropriation of Truth’s work contrasts with Mill’s strategic, volitional detachment from hers.
Because of her prejudiced othering of Truth while simultaneously benefiting from her epistemic
labor, Stowe bears personal culpability for some of the harms and wrongs produced by the epistemic
appropriation of Truth’s hermeneutical dissent.

Both hermeneutical hijacking and epistemic appropriation have to do with dominantlysituated knowers inserting themselves into the process of hermeneutical resistance and efforts to
improve collective understanding, though they differ in that hermeneutical hijacking involves the
creation of resources and epistemic appropriation has to do with the communication and delivery of
those resources to other people.

Narrative Constraint

No group of people is monolithic. But efforts to improve collective understanding of the
experiences of marginalized people often highlight the stories and experiences of a few. Despite the
particularity of those stories and experiences, they may be generalized and come to be seen as
representative of the group. They may shape collective understanding of that group in a way that
distorts the heterogeneity of the group’s actual composition. In some cases, those accepted
narratives may become prescriptive, deeply connected to ideas about how members of that group
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should behave or how they should see themselves. People with different experiences or perspectives
may be rendered less visible and legible, further concealing those who already have some significant
parts of their lives obscured from collective understanding.

When, in the process of improving collective understanding about the experiences of
epistemically marginalized people, certain kinds of experiences come to be seen as representative in
a way that further marginalizes the experiences of others with different experiences, I will refer to
this as narrative constraint. The harm of narrative constraint is that it restricts the collectively
accepted ways of being for members of a group. This harm is separate from the central harm of
hermeneutical marginalization, which is exclusion from the processes of contributing to the
collective’s epistemic resources. But the two are closely connected, and the harm of narrative
constraint demonstrates the potential for hermeneutical dissent to produce further hermeneutical
injustice.

Not all circumstances where members of a group are presented in oversimplified ways result
in narrative constraint. Dominantly-situated knowers may be painted in broad (and sometimes
unflattering) strokes. Some outsiders may even come to believe that those stereotypes are accurate;
the stereotypes may make the relatively socially powerful group members uncomfortable. However,
if their available ways of being are not meaningfully restricted by those generalizations, then they
have not suffered a wrong in the form of narrative constraint. The wrong of narrative constraint is
essentially tied to generalizations producing restricted ways of conceptualizing people and their
experiences, and this restricted way of seeing placing subsequent constraints on the available ways of
being for those individuals.
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1.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed various forms of epistemic harms and wrongs. In what
follows, I will turn my attention toward statements made by advocates in anti-sexual violence
movements. In Chapter Two, I will primarily highlight potential hermeneutical injustices that victims
of acquaintance rape and sex trafficking have experienced as evidenced by the consciousness raising
work carried out by those advocates. The other forms of epistemic injustice I have reviewed thus far
will be applied in Chapter Four, where I assess some potential pitfalls of consciousness raising work.
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CHAPTER TWO: APPLYING CONCEPTS OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE TO SEXUAL
VIOLENCE INTERVENTION ADVOCACY

In what follows, I will review claims made by advocates working to improve collective
understanding about, first, sexual assault and, then, sex trafficking. In both cases, advocates, who are
both insiders and outsiders, argue that there are prevalent myths and misunderstandings that have
distorted our ability to recognize and respond to victims of these harms. They allege that these
cognitive deficits afflict the general public, people in positions of power, and even subjects of those
experiences.

Influential advocates in both movements and the positions they have put forth have been
vigorously criticized, often by advocates similarly committed to improving collective understanding
of these experiences. These dissenters have argued that in both movements, advocates have
exaggerated statistics, meddled with definitions, and cherry-picked stories for maximum emotional
impact to produce a desired response. In both cases, dissenters have also criticized those advocates
for depicting victims as helpless, innocent, passive, and ignorant. The result, they argue, is a moral
panic that itself influences the reality of how people perceive and make sense of their experiences.

In this chapter, I will review the recent history of both movements. I will consider how the
claims made by advocates and changing laws suggest the existence of a prior and at times persisting
hermeneutical lacuna. In subsequent chapters, I will review common strategies used by outsiders and
insiders in these movements to improve collective understanding. I will also consider how the
objections presented by dissenters highlight ways that efforts to improve collective understanding
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about sexual violence may lead to additional epistemic harms and wrongs committed against victims,
sex workers, and other marginalized people.

2.1 Victims of Sexual Violence, Identity Prejudice, and Hermeneutical Marginalization

As a volunteer with and eventual employee of Mt. Sinai’s Sexual Assault and Violence
Intervention Program (SAVI), a non-profit in New York City, I have worked with over one
thousand survivors of sexual assault, intimate partner violence, or sex trafficking who have sought
supportive services. I began my relationship with the organization in 2015 as an advocate working in
emergency departments. There, I provided support to patients who disclosed a sexual assault or
violent encounter with an intimate partner while at the hospital. This often involved helping
survivors consider their options, advocating for the patient’s wishes to medical staff and law
enforcement, and informing survivors about resources available to them once they left the
emergency department. In 2016, I began representing SAVI in Queens County’s Human Trafficking
Intervention Court (HTIC). From 2018 until 2020 I served as the organization’s intake coordinator.
I cite these experiences only to provide some context for why, in this dissertation, I am identifying
and exploring epistemic injustices as they relate to sexual assault and sex trafficking.7

7

Because my focus in this project is on the epistemic injustices faced by victims of sexual

violence and the measures taken by advocates to improve collective understanding of those
experiences, I will limit my discussion of trafficking to sex trafficking. This is a rather unfortunate
restriction, as the general focus on sex trafficking has meant that the experiences of victims who are
trafficked in other industries (like hospitality, food, domestic services, and agriculture) have been
largely ignored by advocates, politicians, and the media. There are fewer organizations dedicated to
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I contend that victims of sexual violence are not only harmed as knowers, but in many
instances they are also wronged. As I reviewed in Chapter One, it is possible for an epistemic blind
spot to be harmful without being wrongful or unjust. For example, someone who has an illness that
has not been recognized by the medical world at the time they are alive may suffer greatly as a result,
both epistemically and otherwise. While harmful, that suffering may not be unjust. It could rather be
a case of epistemic bad luck. The poor soul could happen to be alive at a time when doctors and
researchers just do not have the tools to diagnose and treat the disorder. In order for the epistemic
lacuna that obscures a person or group’s experiences from collective understanding to count as an
epistemic injustice, it must be a result of the person or group in question being hermeneutically
marginalized. Hermeneutical marginalization occurs when a group faces structural or institutional
barriers that prevent their fair contribution to shared hermeneutical resources. If the sick person’s
undiagnosable illness has been under researched or otherwise treated with little regard because of
the relative powerlessness of the people who typically suffer from the ailment, then that could
constitute a hermeneutical injustice. If, for example, someone suffers from postpartum depression
during a time when that is not a recognized medical diagnosis in large part due to it being the case
that the people who experience it are seen as irrational and unable to offer testimony about the
disorder that is taken seriously by the medical community, then the resultant lacuna is at least partly
the result of the hermeneutical marginalization of those who suffer from the condition. We can
imagine that a better understanding of the disorder would likely be available if doctors and medical
researchers did not discount the complaints of new mothers as being overly emotional and indicative
of personal problems and shortcomings and instead took them to be evidence of a problem worthy
serving these survivors, they may garner less sympathy, and they may be more likely to be
overlooked even when working in plain sight.
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of further investigation. Not only is the hermeneutical deficit harmful, creating a significant
cognitive disadvantage for those who suffer from postpartum depressing, it is also wrongful, as the
collective ignorance about the condition is a result of their being systemically excluded from shaping
available interpretive resources.

In some cases, victims of sexual violence are wronged because of prejudiced attitudes held
by particular listeners they encounter. In others, they are wronged by structural inequalities that
result in their hermeneutical marginalization.

There is no shared trait that distinguishes victims of sexual violence from non-victims; the
difficult truth is that anyone can be harmed in this way. But something that many victims share is
vulnerability because of some aspect of their identity that renders them powerless or less powerful in
some situations. Being disabled, having limited resources, not speaking English, not having a legal
immigration status, being a person of color, having a mental illness, suffering from a substance
abuse problem, being a LGBTQ+ person, and other identifications or statuses that increase a
person’s social vulnerability also increase one’s risk of being a victim of sexual abuse or exploitation.

Sexual assault and sex trafficking are often described as forms of gendered violence.
Evidence suggests that women are victims of these violations at higher rates than men, and, in many
cases, they are subject to these experiences because they are women. Interpersonal epistemic
injustices occur when a listener is morally and epistemologically culpable for their mistreatment of a
speaker, and such prejudiced devaluations of women’s testimony often occur when they disclose
they have been the victim of sexual violence. A listener may disregard the testimony because they
hold sexist beliefs about women and their sexuality, like the idea that women should not even
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suggest that they are sexually available, and that if they behave in ways that are perceived as
promiscuous then they are “asking for” whatever ends up happening to them. Other listeners may
be unjustly dismissive of the testimony of women because they believe women falsely claim they
have been sexually assaulted to avoid the responsibility of having made the decision to have sex or
because they regret the decision the next morning. Prejudiced attitudes about women and their
intellectual abilities have long resulted in their being excluded from many spaces where knowledge is
created and shared, including those related to education, law, social and political policies, and health.
The sexist exclusion of women from spaces where collective concepts are developed and systemic
devaluation of women’s testimony and epistemic contributions combine to make it the case that
women are hermeneutically marginalized by structural sexism.

Because victims of sexual violence do tend to be women, by and large, perhaps it is partly
because of the existing prejudices about gender that there is a deficit of epistemic resources for
understanding these experiences. If so, then sexual violence is connected to gender in an important
way even though not all victims are women. For example, it could be that one of the reasons we
systemically decrease credibility granted to survivors of sexual assault is that those survivors are
more often than not women, and women are granted a deficit of credibility generally. This strong
association of women and victims may result in a transfer of the decreased credibility to victims who
are not women. Some have argued that the vulnerability of women as trafficking victims and many
of the problems that will be discussed relating to the defining of and response to trafficking have to
do with the social identity of women as marginalized people. According to Doezema, “trafficking is
characterized as the result of women’s sexual subordination and/or women’s economic
subordination as well as the result of inequitable development and globalization” (2005, 63).
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However, I worry that conceiving of the epistemic injustices suffered by victims of sexual
violence in this way threatens to contribute to the erasure of people who are not women or who do
not identify as women from the conversation. Men and boys are also assaulted, violated, and
exploited. Importantly, sexism affects non-women, too. Insofar as masculinity is strongly associated
with physical strength and a lack of emotion and vulnerability, men and boys who are victims of
sexual violence may be seen as weak and unmanly. Some people mistakenly believe that it is not
possible for men or boys to be sexually assaulted because of common stereotypes that men are
always interested in sex or the mistaken belief that men are not able to perform sexually if they do
not want to have sex. If they are assaulted by someone of the same sex, victims may question their
own sexuality and persistent prejudiced attitudes about homosexuality may heighten that anxiety.
Fear of such responses, which are all tainted by prejudice, may cause many survivors to remain silent
about their suffering. This is an example of wrongful testimonial silencing. If survivors speak up,
their feeling of violation may be met with a testimonial injustice, with their testimony being treated
without due credibility or disregarded so completely that it’s as if they did not speak at all.

2.2 Epistemic Injustice and Changing Conceptions of Sexual Assault

In Chapter One I suggested that when the way that something is defined is in a state of flux
- when we find ourselves engineering and re-engineering a contested concept - that could be an
indication of a possible hermeneutical lacuna. The moving boundaries suggest there is some
underlying experience that we have not quite managed to articulate well enough or that there are
cases that are considered marginal or beyond the scope of those concepts that warrant inclusion or
some further consideration.
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Ideas of what constitutes sexual consent and sexual assault are far from settled. Laws and
definitions relating to both have changed time and time again, and there are still significant
controversies over what exactly constitutes an assault or violation, who decides, and how we can tell.
These changing concepts signal that there is some obscurity at the core of our understanding of
what sexual assault is and is not. Because victims are so often relatively socially powerless or
members of vulnerable populations, these changing concepts should serve as warning signs that this
is a domain of experiences about which we are likely to have epistemic blind spots.

A deficit of collective understanding of sexual assault can be largely attributed to the social
silence around the topic that was prevalent until the middle of the 1970s. According to Rutherford,
silence reinforced general beliefs that “rape, incest and domestic violence rarely happened…” (2017,
104). But a tremendous amount of change and growth has occurred surrounding this subject in just
the last 50 years. Much of the evolution of the concept of rape has been carried out publicly and
recorded for assessment in ways that other conceptual engineering projects perhaps have not. This
provides an opportunity for reflection on who knew what (and who claimed to know what) when.

Significant attention began to be paid to date rape in the 1980s and early 1990s. In a New
York Times special report published in 1991, it is stated that ‘[s]exual activity that goes too far and
becomes abhorrent to the woman is not new among college students… but calling it date rape is”
(Celis, 1991). Ms. Magazine published a study conducted by Mary P. Koss that looked at the
prevalence of acquaintance rape among college women. She found that 1 in 4 women surveyed was
a survivor of rape or attempted rape (15 percent were survivors of rape). The vast majority of the
survivors knew their attacker (at odds with the stereotype that rapists are strangers hiding in bushes)
(Warshaw 1994, 11). Critically, only 27 percent of the women who reported an experience of rape
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identified themselves as rape victims (Warshaw 1994, 26). This demonstrated a “disconnect between
experiencing certain acts and labeling them rape” (Rutherford 2017, 107).

2.2.1 Why Victims May Not Self-Identify

How could it be that nearly 3 out of every 4 individuals Koss surveyed that reported an
experience that fit the legal description of rape or attempted rape did not identify as victim of those
crimes?

The information reported by Koss’ study indicates that there was an experience (what would
later come to be known as date rape) and the ability to make sense of it (at least to some degree, as
indicated by the ability of Koss’ research team to conduct and report on the study), but there were
subjects of that experience who did not have the interpretive tools to arrive at correctly identifying
the experience for themselves. In fact, so many individual subjects lacked that knowledge that the
relevant social group, generally speaking, lacked the relevant knowledge. The relevant knowledge
was mostly held by members of some other social groups, but not ones that are representative of the
collective. In this case, the social group aware of the concept included some folks in the legal
community and at least some psychologists like Koss and her collaborators. We know this
community has the relevant concepts because the assessment that 1 in 4 women included in the
survey were raped because the criteria for assessing whether a woman’s responses indicated assault
came from the “North American statutes” at the time, defining rape as “unwanted sexual
penetration perpetrated by force, threat of harm, or mental or physical inability to give consent
(including intoxication)” (Warshaw 1994, xiii). This dynamic suggests the hermeneutical injustice is
of the species separation, as defined by Goetze.
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Warshaw recognizes the oddness of the dynamics the study establishes between the
experiencers and knowers, asking “[h]ow can women count as rape victims if they don’t call
themselves that?” Her answer again appeals to the superior epistemic position of “[c]riminal justice
experts” (1994, xxiv), who have precise definitions to help clear up ambiguities that might confuse
non-experts. But this seems to reduce the lack of understanding to a mere linguistic difference.
Survivors just don’t have the right word and the right definition. This interpretation is supported by
Koss’ finding that 90 percent of rape victims felt victimized, despite not seeing themselves as rape
victims (Warshaw 1994, xxiv-xxv). Another way to understand the purported fact that nearly threequarters of victims don’t recognize they are victims is that they don’t have a conceptual recognition
of the systematicity of their experiences, that they are not merely victims of an anomalous situation
that they may be made to feel is their fault, but rather that their experience is one that is tragically
familiar to many others.

Both of these ways of making sense of Koss’ surprising findings suggest her work is
significant because it illuminates and makes articulable a description of experience that resonates
with many victims. Because so many victims of sexual violence are hermeneutically marginalized, the
experience had not previously been recognized by those who had, “traditionally, held the power to
name certain experiences as consequentially real” (Rutherford 2017, 116) New terminology and ways
of understanding sexual violence that led to greater awareness of the kind of experience Koss called
date rape did not create an experience that did not previously exist. Rather, advocacy to improve
collective understanding made the experience of acquaintance rape expressible and publicly
acknowledgeable as a reality.
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Even if we accept that it is possible for outsiders to have knowledge about the nature of an
experience when insiders do not, we may still wonder how that can be. Warshaw reviews numerous
studies which purport to the prevalence of acquaintance rape (1994, 13), so the concepts Koss
makes use of in the Ms Magazine. study were not hers exclusively. If these researchers could have the
information (going as far back as 1957 in the studies cited by Warshaw), why didn’t victims?

Another way to make sense of how victims may not possess hermeneutical resources to
make sense of their experiences even when such resources are available to someone, somewhere is
to recognize the role that internalized myths play in how we interpret our lives. Katharine Jenkins
argues that, “persistent social misconceptions, or myths” about domestic violence and rape can,
“obscure understanding of these phenomena, including victims’ understanding of their own
experiences” (2017, 191-192).

Jenkins identifies the belief “[t]hat rape is only committed by strangers and cannot occur
within marriage/a relationship/a friendship” as an example of a common rape myth (2017, 192),
noting that this myth persists despite being at odds with the legal definition of rape. Jerkins cites a
study by Petersen and Muehlenhrad (2004) that found that rape victims who had experiences a rape
that fits the description of a widely accepted myth while themselves accepting that myth were less
likely to identify their own experiences as ones of rape. Jenkins concludes that this research
“strongly suggests that one effect of rape myths is to prevent some victims of rape from
conceptualizing their experience as one of rape” (2017, 193).

To explain how it could be that victims could suffer an epistemic injustice while the relevant
resources are available somewhere in the epistemic marketplace, Jenkins makes use of Haslanger’s
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distinction between manifest and operative concepts. Manifest concepts are formal definitions, while
operative ones are those that are actually used in the broader community. In this case, the manifest
concepts available to some (like anti-violence advocates and law enforcement) have not gained
uptake in the broader community. The operative concepts of rape and the myths that accompany
them sustain an epistemic lacuna (2017, 195-196). 8, 9

When accurate concepts are not widely available, collective misunderstanding can be used to
harm victims. For example, Warshaw notes in the foreword to I Never Called it Rape that widespread
beliefs that a woman’s prior sexual history could justify what would otherwise be seen as assault
were internalized by victims themselves, and “would convince many women… not to pursue
[criminal] cases” against their perpetrators (1994, xviii).
8

While in this case the formally defined manifest conceptive is presented as the right one,

Jenkins notes that the formally defined concept should not always be preferred. Sometimes the law
takes a while to catch up, and it may be that a community comes to understanding something as
oppressive or harmful that was previously misunderstood or ignored. In such a case, the operative
concept may develop to better recognize a previously hermeneutically obscure experience before it is
formally acknowledged by a manifest concept. She uses the example of marital rape laws lagging
behind public opinion about the wrongness of marital rape. Before the law changed, the operative
concept (which condemned marital rape) was more hermeneutically enlightened than the manifest
one (2017, 196).
9

Note that Jenkins’ discussion of hermeneutical injustice assumes that it is possible that

within a given community, hermeneutical resources can exist for an experience that remains
hermeneutically obscure. This requires something like the mainstream account that I endorsed in the
first chapter.
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Katie Koestner was thrust into the spotlight in 1990 after she began publicly speaking about
being sexually assaulted during a date. In her retelling of the event, she notes that even when pinned
to the ground by someone and while trying to prevent him from undressing her, she “never thought
about being raped,” because “rape was still stranger rape” in her mind at that time. Even after she
found words to describe her experience, the people she reached out to for help were still operating
with those myths in mind, recommending she sleep the experience off, think carefully before ruining
the perpetrator’s life, and blaming her for making the choice of inviting him to her room (Koestner,
2016).

To understand how it could be that so many people could be victims but so few victims
would recognize themselves as such, we must consider how isolating it would be to experience an
assault in a community where such an experience is treated as unspeakable. Considering how often
victims are scrutinized and blamed for their assaults, it becomes easier to understand why one may
feel inclined to resist classifying oneself as a victim. When such denial and avoidance is widespread,
that would prevent individuals from being able to see that their experiences are shared by many and
are symptoms of systemic problems.

2.2.2 Harms Resulting from Poor Understanding

According to Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice, all parties suffer an epistemic
harm when a lacuna exists in shared understanding. When she describes the revelation of workplace
sexual harassment as a reality, she notes that prior to the introduction of new hermeneutical
resources, both victims and perpetrators of such harassment lacked conceptual tools to name the
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experience or make sense of its systematic impact on other members of the hermeneutically
marginalized group. Nonetheless, only the victims of such harassment experienced an epistemic
injustice, since the perpetrators were not harmed by and more likely benefited from their ignorance.

However, greater understanding and access to additional hermeneutical resources does not
necessarily and immediately reduce these harms. Warshaw acknowledges that being able to identify
her assault as such did not help, at least not right away (1994, 6). Coming to obtain or identify
concepts relevant to one’s situation is not necessarily beneficial. It is contingently beneficial if
understanding permits one to exert greater control over one’s situation, and, given enough time, it
may provide the benefit of diminishing feelings of personal responsibility and shame.

When experiences are shrouded in epistemic obscurity, they are available to none or few.
Changing attitudes about what constitutes sexual violence as a result of increased awareness of the
prevalence of acquaintance assault also produced increased anxiety among those who feared they
might be the perpetrators of such assault. In a New York Times report titled ‘Agony on Campus,’ it
was stated that “[m]en who have been accused of rape by women they have known or dated are
often befuddled by the current controversy,” adding that they believed refusals to engage in sex were
part of “a ‘mating game’ ritual.” One student at Lehigh University is quoted as initially denying
having ever committed rape, but then expressing some a lack of confidence that all his past sexual
partners had consented, concluding that he felt “very confused” and may have assaulted some of his
partners (Celis, 1991).

While it is possible that some people who are guilty of perpetrating dating violence were not
aware that they were committing a crime or behaving violently, they were not harmed by their
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ignorance in the same way that the victims of sexual violence were. Rather, it is the knowledge of
what they have done that is likely to cause them the most harm. For those who were truly ignorant,
awareness of the harm that has been caused would likely produce unpleasant feelings.

Corrigan and Shdaimah argue that whether or not a person is believed when making a claim
that they have been sexually violated is best assessed by evaluating the area of intelligibility that the
alleged victim and their listeners occupy (2016, 446-47). Being identified as a victim brings resources
and recognition (2016, 448). This space plays a critical role in determining what facets of a person’s
experience are considered reasonable or even legible. Intelligibility is determined by the interaction
of “women’s representations of themselves; criminal justice officials’ individual preferences… and
institutional forces that make some responses viable and other s unlikely” (2016, 451-52). Thus,
having a way of communicating about one’s experiences that is considered acceptable and
understandable is essential for being recognized as a victim and being treated appropriately.

2.3 Advocacy for Victims of Sex Trafficking and Epistemic Injustice

In this section of the project, my aim will be to provide support for the idea that there are
survivors of commercial sexual exploitation who have had their experiences obscured from
collective understanding due, in part, to their hermeneutical marginalization, and thus that those
victims have suffered epistemic injustices. I will survey changing laws and advocacy movements
aimed at improving collective awareness about sex trafficking, as well as arguments and surveys
intended to shed light on myths that obscure understanding of the purported realities of those
experiences. To achieve these aims, I will take the claims made by activists that those experiences
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have been largely misunderstood, both by the larger community and those subjects themselves, at
face value.

Later in the dissertation, I will turn a critical eye toward some of these assertions. The
specifications of anti-trafficking laws and the accuracy of the statistics and descriptions of the reality
of sex trafficking presented by the most vocal and visible anti-trafficking activists are all
controversial. I will give serious consideration to objections to all of the above when reviewing some
of the potential epistemic harms perpetrated by the anti-trafficking movement.

2.3.1 The Legal Definition of Sex Trafficking

At the very end of the twentieth century, a remarkable thing happened. Some feminists10 on
the left of the political spectrum and conservative activists on the right came together to raise
awareness about human trafficking.11 In 2000, these efforts culminated in two significant legislative
landmarks; Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA), and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons
Especially Women and Children, also known as the Palermo Protocol, was ratified by the United
Nations.

10

The feminists associated with this alliance would mostly likely be identified as representing

the second-wave movement.
11

The circumstances surrounding this unlikely alliance and the development of these articles

of legislation are controversial and will be explored later in the project.
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According to the TVPA, any act involving the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for a commercial sex act is sex trafficking. Thus, any commercial
sex that is facilitated or supported by a third party constitutes sex trafficking, even when no
exploitative or harmful means are used to induce someone to engage in a commercial sex act against
their will.

In order to be punishable, however, trafficking must be of a “severe form,” and thus must
involve either:

(a) commercial sex involving adults induced by means of force, fraud or coercion, or

(b) commercial sex involving a minor

Thus, punishable trafficking of adults involves certain actions - like recruiting, harboring, or
obtaining - brought about by particular means - force, fraud, or coercion - for the purposes of
commercial sex. Contrastingly, any instance in which someone facilitates a commercial sex act that
involves a person under the age of 18, regardless of how they do so, counts as an instance of severe
sex trafficking.

The Palermo Protocol was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in November
of 2000 just one month after the TVPA was passed. It required that ratifying states make a
commitment to anti-trafficking interventions and legislation.
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Article 3 of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children states:

(a) ‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving of payments of benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of
the prostitution others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in
subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph
(a) have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose
of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does not involve any of the
means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

(d) ‘Child’ shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

The TVPA mandated an annual Trafficking in Person’s Report, and in the 2002 issue, the
first to provide estimates of the scale of both international and domestic trafficking, the U.S.
Department of State asserted that as many as 4 million people were victims of transnational human
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trafficking, with 50,000 of those victims residing in the United States. Vocal anti-trafficking
advocates asserted that the problem was “mushrooming” and that victims were getting younger (see
Yen, 2008). In the years that have followed, the estimated number of trafficking victims has
fluctuated significantly, but the highest estimates have approached 25 million (combining both labor
and sex trafficking).

In the decades since the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA were passed into law, a significant
number of federal and state agencies have created forces or programs dedicated to investigating or
responding to human trafficking. These are reviewed thoroughly by Peters in her dissertation titled
“Trafficking in Meaning: Law, Victims, and the State,” in which she assesses the contentiousness of
debates about the meaning of trafficking from an anthropological perspective. These dedicated
forces and programs include the FBI, ICE, the Department of Health and Human Services,
Department of Justice, Department of Sates, Department of Labor, Homeland Security, and
countless state and city law enforcement departments (Peters 2010, 6-8). The number of NGOs
dedicated to serving victims of sex trafficking has increased by 50 percent, and the number of
articles published on the topic rose from nearly nothing to over 400 each year (Bonilla and Mo,
2018).

2.3.2 Myths and Misunderstandings

Despite what may seem to be a straightforward definition of trafficking provided by the
TVPA, what does and does not “count” as trafficking is controversial and conceptually ambiguous.
Hume and Sidun note that “[t]here are no clean boundaries, no tidy classifications that
unambiguously tell us that this is trafficking, and that is not trafficking,” and “not everyone who
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might fit the definition of a victim of trafficking will self-identify as such” (2017, 9). Furthermore,
advocates have argued that the general population lacks an understanding of what trafficking is and
who trafficking victims are. Advocate Linda Smith likens the current state of ignorance and
opportunity for understanding trafficking to changes around public understanding of domestic
violence (2015).

Advocates frequently argue that many people do not understand what trafficking is because
they have consistently been shown a version of trafficking this is misleading. Karly Church, a
survivor of trafficking, states in a TEDx talk that based on her experience, “[m]edia and movies
portray human trafficking to look one way, and it looks completely different than that.” Human
trafficking, sometimes called “modern day slavery,” tends to call to mind images of people being
transported internationally, violently forced to work in dangerous or grueling circumstances, and
kept in isolation from a larger community – frequently in shackles or otherwise restrained (2020).
However, advocates argue and the law dictates that trafficking is both a domestic and international
issue, may or may not involve transportation across borders, and often occurs in circumstances
where the trafficked person is not always or may never be physically restrained.

These statements indicate that there is a kind of experience, the existence of which is certain,
but the nature of which we have a limited understanding. Victims of the experience are marginalized.
And as I argued in the first chapter, the presence of a concept with fluctuating boundaries and a
controversial scope is a sign that a hermeneutical injustice may be afoot. While the law recognizes
trafficking as a complicated issue that manifests in a plurality of ways, arguably the legal definition is
not broadly recognized. This suggests a large gap between, using Jenkins’ language, the manifest
concept and operative concepts available. Common myths about trafficking give rise to a shaky
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operative concept that applies only to a limited subset of victims - namely, those who are physically
abused, smuggled, and innocent seeming enough to elicit sympathy.

Myths about the nature of sex trafficking and ideas about who is trafficked contribute to
making it the case that individuals who are trafficked have their experiences hidden from collective
and, at times, personal understanding.

Some of these myths include beliefs that a person is not commercially sexually exploited if
they:12

1.

Are not physically restrained or abused

2.

Were not smuggled across a border

3.

Are a United States Citizen
12

I do not believe this list is exhaustive. It is based on my experiences working with an

organization that provides services for survivors of trafficking and in a trafficking intervention court,
conversations I’ve had with social workers who support victims of trafficking, and research cited in
this section.

Dr. Makini Chisolm-Straker, co-founder of HEAL Trafficking, provides an overlapping list of
myths. Chisolm-Straker also identifies the tendency to think of trafficking as limited to that which
involves commercial sex as a pervasive and harmful myth. I agree that the lack of collective
awareness about and interest in labor trafficking is unjust, and feel it is unfortunate that the limited
focus of this paper may contribute to ongoing neglect of such experience (Look Beneath the Surface
to End Trafficking, 2018).
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4.

Have ever voluntarily engaged in the commercial sex industry

5.

Have a personal relationship with the person who is their trafficker

6.

Are not a woman or a child

7.

Are not kidnapped or made choices that made them vulnerable to being exploited

8.

Do not accept help when it is offered

I will now review these myths in more detail, providing some motivation for rejecting these limiting
ideas about who is and who is not a victim of commercial sexual exploitation.

Myth 1: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they are not physically restrained or abused

People who are trafficked may not be physically restrained at all. Instead, control may be
exerted using means of fraud or coercion. For example, Peters interviewed a victim she calls Silvia
who reported feeling trapped not only by physical violence, but because her trafficker would make
“threats about harming her children.” A victim named Nadia was coerced by threats that “if she did
not pay the $200 a day, her family would be in danger” (2010, 166).

Myth 2: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they are not smuggled across a border

Peters quotes Katherine, a federal prosecutor, as reporting that one reason it is difficult to
correct collective understanding of trafficking is because of the pervasive “media conception of
human trafficking that’s just very general, and it’s pretty much akin to smuggling or movement of
people” (2010, 149). Bonilla and Mo found evidence of this misunderstanding in a survey they
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conducted. Many participants incorrectly indicated they believe trafficking and smuggling are
synonymous (2018).

Though the transportation of someone for the purpose of exploitation may count as
trafficking, neither the TVPA nor the Palermo Protocol require that people be transported to meet
the conditions of being trafficking victims. Illegal transportation of people is essential for smuggling,
whereas trafficking is essentially tied to labor under exploitative conditions.

Myth 3: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they are an U.S. Citizen

Barbara Amaya, a victim of sexual exploitation as a child, remarks that people are often
surprised that sex trafficking happens in the United States (2015). Nacole, the mother of a minor
who was sexually exploited, begins a TEDx talk by admitting she was surprised when her daughter
became a victim because she had previously believed sex trafficking was a problem that happens
somewhere else (2014).

Myth 4: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they have ever voluntarily participated in the commercial sex
industry13

Some victims of trafficking may have willingly engaged in sex work at some point in their
lives, and they may return to sex work after being trafficked. For example, Markie Dell, a trafficking
survivor, was initially forced into commercial sex acts by physical and sexual violence. After meeting
13

Abolitionist advocates will take issue with what I have presented here, as they are

committed to the idea that all sex work is inherently exploitative.
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a police officer who shared information with her that led her to see that she was being trafficked,
she escaped her circumstances and moved to a safe house. Sometime after arriving at the safe house,
she was propositioned by another resident to have sex in exchange for money. She accepted the
offer, reporting she felt it might make her feel more in control (2019).

The persistent perception of sex workers as liars also makes victim identification and
support challenging. Nacole notes that when her daughter had run away and was being exploited,
she was once held by police and let go. When asked why, the officer responded “well, these girls lie.
Big boobs and a pretty face” (2014).

Sometimes victims may even voluntarily participate in activities that fit the legal definition of
trafficking. Peters quotes Ella, an immigration attorney as saying “sometimes when people have a
sort of management position in the operation, like they were doing it for a little while, and then
they’re called in to recruit other women…” Peters quotes a federal agent she calls Will as responding
to such situations by saying “Not all victims are victims” and advocating that people who are
complicit in these ways should be punished as severely as their traffickers, even if they are minors
(2010, 98-99).

Myth 5: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they have a relationship with their trafficker

Trafficking victims may know their traffickers, and they may have complicated personal
relationships with them.

83

Peters indicates that “[c]riminal justice authorities often questioned whether situations
involving family members or romantic relationships were really trafficking, even when force or
coercion were involved… [t]here have been multiple cases in which the traffickers recruited young
women by romancing them and then forced them into prostitution, but because of the relationship
it was difficult to evaluate the level of force that was used” (2010, 97-98).

Myth 6: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they are not a woman or child

Even the name of the Palermo Protocol, officially the United Nations Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, emphasizes a
connection between trafficking and victims who are minors or are identified as women. Victims who
are non-binary, trans, or men are often overlooked.

Myth 7: A person is not a victim of trafficking if they were not kidnapped or made choices that made them vulnerable
to being exploited

Not all victims are kidnapped. Some may choose to leave their homes to live with the people
who will become their traffickers, sometimes to begin a relationship with those individuals (like
Nacole’s daughter). Others may choose to work with smugglers to enter a country illegally. They
may be told they are going to be given a different kind of job, and then forced to engage in
commercial sex. They may be aware they are going to be expected to provide sexual services, but
believe the conditions of their labor (their pay or living conditions) will be different than they are
once they are too vulnerable to back out. As Ella, an immigration attorney interviewed by Peters,
notes that for victims who cross borders, “[i]t’s really often about someone wanting better economic
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opportunities for themselves, and … US immigration law is so limiting on who can migrate here and
work legally, when an opportunity comes up for better economic opportunity or sometimes love…
it’s sort of a hope for a better life” (2010, 96).

Myth 8: A person is not a victim of trafficking if do not accept help with it is offered

An expectation that anyone who is a victim of trafficking would feel tremendously grateful
to law enforcement or victim’s services programs that offer assistance or support may lead people to
reject the idea that anyone who turns down such an offer can truly be a victim. However, people
may not accept offers of “help” for many reasons. They may not trust law enforcement, fearing
arrest or deportation. They may feel that the assistance will be insufficient to protect them from the
risks their traffickers pose. They may worry that talking about their abuse may bring harm to their
families or others they care about (especially if they have a personal relationship with their trafficker,
as they may even be inclined to protect them). They may feel shame about the work they have done
or have been made to do. The help may have conditions that they are not willing to accept (like
religious obligations, curfews, or being unable to communicate with family or friends still involved
with sex work). Finally, they may not identify as victims, so they may not see themselves as qualified
for the services that are offered.

2.3.3 Why Victims May Not Self-Identify

“I started to read and quickly realized that what had been happening to me for the past year had a name. I was
human trafficked.” - Markie Dell, 2014
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A common refrain among advocates and those who provide services for trafficking victims
is that they typically do not identify themselves as victims of sexual exploitation. Peters reports that
many of the survivors she met and interviewed “did not even know that a crime had been
committed against them” (2010, 174). This sentiment was shared by immigration attorneys she
interviewed.14 In a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services report, the first item included in
a list of “Barriers and Challenges to Accessing and Providing Services” is that victims are “unable to
self-identify,” followed in second by “lack of knowledge of services.”15 The same report states that
“research has suggested that trafficking victims are often reluctant to identify themselves as victims”
(Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the Literature, 18-19).

One reason we have for believing that some people are victims even if they do not selfidentify as such is that some survivors come to recognize themselves as having been in retrospect.
For example, one survivor of childhood sexual exploitation stated in an interview that, “I started to
see that I was a victim once people believed and told me I was a victim” (2018). In her memoir,
Jasmine Grace, a survivor of trafficking, alternates between sharing journal entries from the period
in her life where she was trafficked by her boyfriend and offering commentary from ten years later
while she is in, in her words, recovery. Often her later commentary draws attention to how much she
did not understand about her vulnerability and victimhood while those experiences were ongoing
(2016).

14

For example, see Peters’ interviews with Ella and Radh.

15

The same report indicates that the barriers from the side of providers (those positioned to

support victims) also involve knowledge-based obstacles, including “difficult to identify/reach
victims (hidden crime),” and “lack of awareness/training.”
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In this section, I will consider why it might be that victims lack this kind of selfunderstanding while outsiders have access to epistemic resources that allow them to make victim
identifications.

Reasons victims may not self-identify

Vaughn Harper, a special agent with Homeland Security Investigates, states that “[m]any of
the victims don’t identify themselves as victims. Through psychological manipulation, physical
intimidation, or just fear of law enforcement or the stigma that society may give them once they are
identified as a victim of trafficking” (Look Beneath the Surface to End Trafficking, 2018). Not
understanding that they are victims or that there are protections and services they are entitled to,
victims may not “come forward because they fear retribution from their traffickers and fear arrest
and deportation” (Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the
Literature, 18).

It may be that when victims first make contact with people who have access to the epistemic
resources that would classify their experiences as ones of trafficking, they are neither in a position to
engage in the narrative labor of recounting those experiences nor comfortable disclosing
information to those outsiders, many of whom will be connected to law enforcement. In such cases,
they may not come to recognize themselves as trafficking survivors (or to apply the label to
themselves), or come to benefit from the services available for victims - like immigration relief
(TVISAs), federal benefits (like Medicaid, food stamps, and cash assistance), case management, or
legal assistance. Given the very real threats of arrest and deportation sex trafficking victims and sex
workers face, this is not an unreasonable concern. The antagonistic relationship between victims and
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those who have access to the epistemic resources that would enable those victims to see themselves
as such is a significant barrier to understanding.

Even when victims are aware of the definition of trafficking, that it is illegal, and have a
general understanding of what it looks like, they may not apply those concepts to themselves and
self-identify as trafficking victims. A study by Peter Olayiwola found that while most of the children
and parents surveyed were aware of the definition and illegality of trafficking, these children and
parents did not realize trafficking described their situations (children in the study were victims of
domestic servitude, not sex trafficking) (2019, 57-58). Instead, they saw this information as not
affecting them.

It may be that some people resist or are unable to conceive of themselves as victims while
actively being trafficked. Casandra Diamond, a trafficking survivor, reflects on how she wanted to
feel she was in control while working in commercial sex, and resisted thinking she was being
controlled or manipulated (2020). Hughes states that “[f]ew women and girls in prostitution are
willing to acknowledge that they have or are controlled by a pimp. The pimp has convinced her that
he is a boyfriend or someone who cares about and looks after her” (2005, 15). Hughes explains that
admitting that they are being sexually exploited can be “psychologically devastating.”

Strong feelings of attachment to an alleged trafficker are sometimes pointed to as signs that
someone has been brainwashed or so manipulated by their exploiter that they are not able to assess
their own victimhood. Nacole, the mother of a trafficking victim, reports that when her 15-year old
daughter was arrested and returned home, she was mad at everyone except the man who sold her
(2014). A U.S. Department of Health and Human Services report also notes that some victims may
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not see themselves as victims and may protect their exploiters “at all costs” because of “the power
of the trafficker’s or pimp’s seduction and manipulation, as well as the manifestations of Stockholm
syndrome” (Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the Literature, 18).

Trafficking victims are often isolated, unable to talk openly about their circumstances
because of the taboo and illegal nature of sex work. When people are isolated, they may not be able
to see the systemic nature of their suffering. Instead, they may feel that they are especially unlucky or
responsible for what has happened to them. As Hundleby notes, “isolated individuals won’t develop
strong communal perspectives. Isolation from others who share experiences of the same form of
oppression makes experiences of marginalization seem idiosyncratic, or personal rather than
political” (2005, 45). Oree, a trafficking survivor, states that she was unable to see her victimhood
until it was recognized by others. Because people ignored her (despite her age and visible signs of
abuse) she felt her circumstances were just personal problems and that she had to figure them out
for herself (2018).

Peters reports that “many providers and prosecutors told me that trafficking survivors do
not self-identify, that is they do not know the language of trafficking and sometimes even that what
has happened to them is a crime” (2010, 122). Markie Dell, a survivor of sex trafficking, recalls that
for a long time she didn’t know what sex trafficking was. She found out from a police officer. The
officer provided her with literature on trafficking, and she reports, “I started to read and quickly
realized that what had been happening to me for the past year had a name. I was human trafficked”
(2014). Dell knew something was wrong (she describes the horror and humiliation she felt from the
start), and was able to recognize her experiences as ones of trafficking when exposed to the
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conceptual tools she needed to make that connection. The police officer already had those epistemic
tools and applied them to identify her as a victim.

Finally, it could be that victims may not see themselves as such because their lives while
being commercially sexually exploited are not as bad as their real or perceived alternatives. The idea
that someone could prefer conditions that are generally seen as so undesirable may be confusing and
frustrating for outsiders. Peters quotes a federal prosecutor she calls Molly as explaining that while
some outsiders may feel sex trafficking is the worst thing that could happen to someone, victims
may feel differently. According to Molly, a “16-year-old prostitute might be like, ‘Yeah I’m chilling,
I’m cool... I’ve got my new outfit, I’m good,” while nonetheless they are a trafficking victim
according to the TVPA (2010, 101).

Reasons outsiders may be able to identify victims

Outsider advocates often imply or assert outright that they can identify victims of trafficking
even when those purported victims do not self-identify or even reject the label of trafficking victim.
For example, Bernstein quotes one panelist at an anti-trafficking event in New York as describing
the clients who works with at a nonprofit as being trafficking survivors, “even if the women in
question refuse to admit it.” I myself have heard doctors and social workers express similar
sentiments.

It may be that outsiders are sometimes in the position to identify victims because they have
the benefit of comparison. Having worked with many survivors of trafficking in the past, service
providers may develop skills to spot the signs of exploitation even when they are unacknowledged
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by victims themselves. Sheila, a service provider interviewed by Peters, is confident that she has the
ability to distinguish victims from non-victims, explaining that through interviews she feels she can
get a sense of whether they “were coerced or that their freedom was restricted” (2010, 123). Peters
seems to express some skepticism about this ability, noting Sheila assuredness despite how long it
can take to “draw out details of coercion from trafficked persons.”

Others may feel they can identify victims not because they have honed an ability to recognize
hard to see signs of abuse or trauma, but because they have come to understand that all commercial
sex is inherently exploitative and all people who provide commercial sex acts are trafficking, even if
they deny it. This is the position taken by abolitionists. In this case, the special insight advocates
believe that have hold of is conceptual. They feel they have the right definition, which means they
have the right understanding of who is and who is not trafficked even if the people they are
assessing disagree.

2.3.4 Harms Resulting from Poor Understanding

Even if an epistemic lacuna exists in our collective understanding, more needs to be
established in order to demonstrate that trafficking victims are subject to a hermeneutical injustice.
As Fricker notes, not all cognitive deficiencies constitute hermeneutical injustices. In order for some
lack of understanding to count as a hermeneutical injustice, there must be substantial costs that
result from that ignorance. When discussing sexual harassment, for example, she notes that the
“harasser and harassee alike are cognitively handicapped … but the harasser’s cognitive disablement
is not a significant disadvantage to him,” but rather “suits his purpose” (2007, 151).
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The trafficker’s handicap is not typically to their disadvantage. In fact, the dynamics of
trafficking are directly to their benefit. The victim, on the other hand, who is deprived of the
cognitive resources to make sense of their situation, suffers what Fricker calls a “cognitive
disablement” (2007, 151), because presumably it would be in the victim’s interest to understand the
systematic dynamics of trafficking, which they are – unwillingly and unwittingly – a part of.

Victims of human trafficking are often vulnerable and, therefore, exploitable members of
society. Risks that increase the likelihood that someone will be trafficked include (but are not limited
to) being the member of a stigmatized group in society (i.e. being a member of an oppressed race,
being of a sexual orientation that is discriminated against), having limited educational or financial
resources, being unable to speak the dominant language within a community, not having legal status,
and having a history of sexual abuse.

Trafficking victims may also be vulnerable because they feel that they are at least partially
responsible for the situations they find themselves in. For example, someone who entered the
United States through smuggling and agreed to work upon their arrival may believe that they,
therefore, must do whatever it is they are asked to do by an employer. In these cases, the victim may
see their situation, as undesirable and exploitative as it may be, as the result of their own actions.

Victims may also feel shame because of social or religious attitudes about sex or sex work.
They may not want others to know that they’ve been made to engage in commercial sex acts, and
traffickers may use that fear to further exploit them. A report by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services states, “[t]he stigma associated with sexual exploitation in general, and prostitution
in particular, also increases the difficulty in identifying victims… not likely to disclose they’re
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involved in prostitution to providers, especially law enforcement, due to their own sense of shame
and fear of the response” (Human Trafficking Into and Within the United States: A Review of the
Literature, 18).

Social workers and doctors are challenged by the invisibility of trafficking as they attempt to
help and treat those who suffer from it, and even when working with victims of trafficking they may
lack the language and conceptual tools to identify the victim as a victim or to make sense of their
situation.

Peters reports that a Congressional staffer told her that lawmakers must be continually
educated about trafficking as defined by the TVPA, and even though “everyone up here knows that
trafficking is something that is bad and that trafficking is modern-day slavery, and therefore horrible,
but they don’t really know what trafficking is, and so you can totally mischaracterize it in so many
different ways it you’re inclined to do so.” (Peters quoting Victor, 100)

A deficit of public awareness also places some people at risk of being trafficked. Speaking to
representatives at a Congressional hearing, Beatrice Fernando, a trafficking survivor and associate at
the American Anti-Slavery Group, noted that a lack of public awareness led to her being “swept up
in human trafficking because I did not understand the risks and did not know how to look out for
myself ” (Combating Human Trafficking: Achieving Zero Tolerance, 31). She advocates for the
education of those who are vulnerable to “reduce the power of traffickers.” Carly Church, a
trafficking survivor, states that she thinks that if she’d been more aware of the threat of trafficking,
she would have been less likely to have been victimized (2020).
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The lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the realities of trafficking results in tremendous
emotional costs for trafficking victims, presenting barriers to resources that might aid in exiting a
trafficking situation. Furthermore, this lack of understanding alters how the larger community views
trafficking victims, and in many cases they may not be viewed as victims at all. Notably, interactions
with police and the courts are likely to occur in contexts where victims are themselves defendants
and are treated as criminals. A report by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services notes
that, “[a] significant challenge to identifying victims of trafficking is that many have historically been
and in some instances continue to be, viewed as criminals (e.g., undocumented migrants, prostitutes)
and subject to arrest, detention, and/or deportation” (Clawson et al. 2009, 15). Shandra, a trafficking
survivor, reports trying to get help from police and being turned away because they did not see her
as a victim (Look Beneath the Surface to End Trafficking, 2018).

Some of the officials interviewed by Peters note that a lack of understanding of the nature
of trafficking is a barrier to recognizing victims, connecting them will services, and prosecuting
trafficking-related crimes. She quotes a federal agent she calls Dean as saying, “many people have
different definitions of trafficking, and every time people with different definitions start talking it
creates confusion, and what that confusion does is to… either cause people to report lots of things
as trafficking or think things are trafficking that aren’t, at least from our perspective, prosecutable...
Or it’s so narrow that they think somebody has to be chained to a desk to something, that they
overlook cases that could be prosecuted” (2010, 99-100). A lack of understanding or different
understandings of what trafficking is allow for “providers, investigators, government bureaucrats,
and prosecutors,” to make “discretionary interpretations of law and policy, some challenging and
other reinforcing normative assumptions about prostitution and sex trafficking” (2010, 134). Linda
Smith argues that a lack of public understanding of sex trafficking as making it hard for district
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attorneys to enact laws. They worry that juries will not be sympathetic to even child victims (seeing
them as prostitutes) and may sympathize with Johns (who they may see as being like their sons or
fathers) (2015).

Advocates argue that these myths may be weaponized by traffickers. Traffickers may tell their
victims that they deserve what happens to them or that they made a choice to be where they are and
do the work that they do. Traffickers may exploit the vulnerabilities of victims by exerting control
over their access to knowledge and concepts that would help them to make sense of their own
experiences. When those in positions of authority do not have or do not apply conceptual tools to
understand trafficking, traffickers may use that lack of understanding to control victims. Victims
may be told that the will be arrested or deported if they attempt to seek help (Clawson et al., 2009).
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CHAPTER THREE: RIGHTING AND RESISTING EPISTEMIC WRONGS

In this chapter, I will consider various strategies for combating the harms caused by
epistemic injustices and righting epistemic wrongs. This list of strategies to address epistemic
injustices is not exhaustive. Rather, my decisions about which strategies to highlight have been
guided by which I feel are used by victims of sexual violence and advocates attempting to raise
awareness about those experiences. Epistemic rebellion or resistance of the kind reviewed here may
be required when hermeneutical erasure is threatened, with the most radical responses justified when
hermeneutical death is a risk (Medina 2017, 49).

Outsiders - people who are not themselves subjects of an at issue epistemic injustice, but
who want to engage in epistemically and morally good practices - may attempt to right epistemic
wrongs by 1) cultivating good epistemic habits, and engaging in 2) consciousness raising efforts. The
important difference is that 1) is self-directed and involves the outsider making changes to their own
attitudes and behaviors, whereas 2) involves the outsider attempting to change the attitudes and
behaviors of others.

These responses to epistemic injustice may be available to insiders, too. But there are other
responses that are exclusively available to insiders. Among these are strategic
ignorance/appropriating dominant meanings and disengaging.
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Type of Hermeneutical
Resistance/Rebellion/Dissent

Who Would Use It?

Cultivate good epistemic habits

Both (Listeners/Outsiders/Allies and
Subjects/Insiders)

Consciousness raising

Both (Listeners/Outsiders/Allies and
Subjects/Insiders)

Strategic Ignorance/Appropriating
Dominant Meanings

Subject/Insider

Disengaging

Subject/Insider
Table 3: Types of Hermeneutical Resistance

As I stated in Chapter One, I will use the phrase hermeneutical resistance to refer to the
broad category of efforts both insiders and outsiders might undertake to address hermeneutical
blind spots. Both insiders and outsiders may participate in efforts to engineer or re-engineer
concepts so that they better capture the experiences of marginalized people. Some of these
strategies are forms of hermeneutical dissent, a term introduced by Goetze to describe the
production of new concepts by people who are epistemically marginalized (2018, 74).
Hermeneutical dissent begins when subjects experience a feeling of hermeneutical dissonance.
Fricker introduces the language of hermeneutical dissonance in 2007, and Medina describes it as
“the phenomena in which the communicative conflict is internalized and both the dominant and
resistant voices are within one and the same subject” (Medina 2012, 209). This feeling of dissonance
suggests that something is wrong that leads marginalized folks to create new concepts and to disrupt
ways of understanding. It can eventually lead to alternative hermeneutical resources that may even
be incorporated in collective understanding.
Other strategies are forms of resistance or rebellion that allow a marginalized person to
refrain from making use of belief systems that require that they accept untrue or oppressive things
about themselves or other likes them, but that may not directly result in the production of new
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hermeneutical resources. For example, disengaging may allow a subject to protect themselves from
harmful ways of thinking and seeing, but it will not result in the development of new, less
oppressive concepts unless additional strategies are employed.

3.1 Cultivating Good Epistemic Habits

Those who are concerned with issues of social justice will of course ask what can be done
to address injustices once they have been identified. In this section, I will consider how good
epistemic habits might help to combat contributory and hermeneutical injustices.

Contributory Injustices

To combat contributory injustices, a listener may try to develop fluency with different
hermeneutical resources. Contributory justice requires being able to switch between different sets of
hermeneutical resources as is appropriate. But of course, gaining this kind of fluency will not be
easy. It might take years or decades for someone to become fluent in different hermeneutical
resources.

What Doezema does in “Loose Women or Lost Women” is compare the current activism
and political attention being paid to sex trafficking to the panic about white slavery that occurred at
the start of the 20th century. In doing so, she attempts to shed light on ideas and concepts that may
seem inscrutable given the tools we have available to us at this time, but which may be better
understood by making us of hermeneutical resources from the past.
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As is the case for current advocates, reformers thinking and writing about “white slavery” in
the early 1900s meant different things by the term. Some were referring to all sex work, while others
were referring only to sex work that involved crossing borders or elements of force or coercion. But
according to Doezema, a general consensus can be observed, and for most “‘White slavery’ came to
mean the procurement, by force, deceit, or drugs, of a white woman or girl against her will, for
prostitution” (Doezema 1999, 25). Notably, this is virtually identical to the TVPA definition, though
with the added specification that the victims must be white.

There are enormous similarities between the “white slave” panic of the 20th century and the
current state of political and social discussion about sex work and sex trafficking. Both highlighted
stories in which women and girls were kidnapped or deceived into believing they would be doing
work other than sex work. Both strongly connected sex work to child sex abuse and focused on
portrayals of young victims (Doezema 1999, 28). Doezema cites research by contemporary
historians who argue that the number of women who actually met the widely accepted definition of
being white slaves at that time was much lower than the explosive, headline numbers that were
accepted as truth by many then and now (1999, 25-26).

If such concepts were defined, argued about, protested, and applied over one hundred
years ago, it becomes harder to make the argument that no possible hermeneutical tools exist to
conceptualize trafficking in the modern day. Of course, many dynamics and particulars have
changed, and the trafficking discourse from the turn of the 20th century did not get everything right.
But given how much ground we have retreaded in the last few decades of increased attention toward
trafficking, we may be faulted for not making use of the epistemic resources at our disposal. The
fact that we’ve had a very similar conversation with very similar disagreements so recently also may
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justify some incredulous toward the countless reports citing an unprecedented, unforeseeable
explosion in the prevalence of human trafficking.

Hermeneutical Injustices

Hermeneutical injustices, by definition, involve circumstances in which there is a conceptual
deficit that obscures some part of the marginalized person’s self or experience from understanding.
How can we know what we don’t know? How can we spot hermeneutical lacunas?

One possible solution involves recognition of how testimonial and hermeneutical injustices
interact. Listeners may recognize that marginalized peoples’ experiences are less likely to be
collectively recognized or deemed legible, and thus they are more likely to be placed in a situation
where they are taken to not make sense. They may be labeled irrational, over-reactive, or unserious.
When they protest these labels or attempt to explain their own understandings, that testimony may
be disregarded or challenged because of a combination of systematically downgrading the quality of
the testimony of the marginalized speaker combined with the lack of coherence the explanation may
have given available hermeneutical resources. A justice-minded listener might make an effort, then,
to exercise what Louise Antony calls epistemic affirmative action, whereby privileged listeners
assume that if a marginalized person attempts to communicate something that seemingly does not
make sense, that it is the privileged person who has a deficit of interpretive resources, not the
marginalized person who has failed to communicate (1995, 89). This approach will be most relevant
to species of hermeneutical injustice like isolation, ghettoization, exportation, and obstruction, in
which subjects have access to relevant epistemic resources even though they have not gained uptake
in the broader community.
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Because concept generation is such a hard project, we should expect that there will be
concepts and resources that we create when we’re attempting to fill a lacuna in our existing
hermeneutical resources will be continuously adjusted and redefined. Accordingly, we should
manage our skepticism when such concepts are contested or their boundaries are expanded or
contracted.

For example, there have been many vocal critics of the changing definitions of sexual
assault. The Ms. Magazine study inspired criticisms that accused feminists of attempting to “redefine
seduction as a form of rape,” (Podhoretz, 1991) and suggested the expanded understanding had the
ulterior motive of “giv[ing] women a simple way of thinking about sex that externalizes guilt,
remorse or conflict” (Is Date Rape Fraud? 1990). One of the most vocal critics of Koss’ study,
Katie Roiphe, famously objected to the finding that date rape was remarkably common by stating,
“if I was really standing in the middle of an ‘epidemic,’ a ‘crisis,’ if 25 percent of my female friends
were really being reaped – wouldn’t I know it?” (1993).

To cultivate good epistemic practices capable of warding off complicity in hermeneutical
injustices, we might think that Roiphe and other critics should suspend her incredulousness in this
case and consider seriously that such an epidemic could be a reality without their having been the
wiser. Rather, if those 25 percent of her friends who are women lacked language and the conceptual
tools necessary to render those experiences legible to themselves and others, it could be that the true
scope of sexual assault among college students is far wider than Roiphe believed.
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Of course, the options described above will not bring about the desired outcome of better
understanding in all cases. These strategies will be most effective in instances where some alternative
hermeneutical resources have already been developed, though have not yet been taken up by the
collective. However, there are circumstances where a hermeneutical injustice renders an experience
invisible or uninterpretable to everyone, including the subjects themselves. Marginalized people are,
of course, themselves members of the larger community and thus have access to many of the same
tools shared collectively with nonmembers. This may mean they themselves are unable to name or
described phenomena that reside within a hermeneutical blind spot.

Furthermore, the advice to listen more closely and believe more willingly also applies most
clearly to individual listeners. Given the argument that hermeneutical injustices are the consequences
of systematic failings rather than individual shortcomings, we should also expect that this solution
will not go far enough to bring about hermeneutical justice.

It should also be noted be that the changing bounds of concepts like sexual assault may be
overextended. A common criticism is that what sexual assault is – how it is defined and what
“counts” - keeps expanding. Critics suggest that this somehow introduces a question of legitimacy
about whether or not there really is a “there” there, or whether or not people are taking advantage
of work being done to highlight the existence of a certain kind of victimhood. The conceptual
expansion is rather evidence of a culture of victims.

To suggest that listeners manage their skepticism when people who are likely to be subjects
of hermeneutical injustices attempt to change what has been collectively accepted is not to say that
concepts can’t be overextended; this isn’t to say that there isn’t a truth of whether or not we

102

sometimes push the boundaries a bit too far. Rather it is a note that we should expect conceptual
boundaries to ebb and flow, to expand and contract, as we try to get at the truth of our concepts
and how to define them. We should expect that we’ll need to adjust meanings and definitions as we
work to find concepts that ring true to the experiences of the people that were attempting to better
understand or the people who are attempting to make themselves more legible to themselves and to
others.

3.2 Consciousness Raising

All I can say is that 1 hour spent with a victim who has been locked in a brothel for years, locked in a home or locked
in a factory will make a bigger impression than hours of reports. – Representative John R. Miller, Combating
Human Trafficking: Achieving Zero Tolerance, 2005

If we believe many people lack a collective understanding of some sort of harm or injustice,
but would adjust their concepts and beliefs if shown the error of their ways, then improving
collecting understanding through storytelling seems like a promising approach to unveiling epistemic
wrongs. Such initiatives involve the use of stories to raise awareness - with those stories often being
shockingly sad, unfair, or otherwise upsetting - told by sympathetic subjects.

In addition to being an effective strategy for improving collective understanding, storytelling
is an opportunity for those who have been silenced to be heard. When subjects describe their own
experiences in an attempt to raise collective consciousness about an experience, I will call this
storytelling.
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Communicating one’s experiences of trauma can open eyes, hearts, and minds and can
influence those in power to see things differently and extend more compassionate or charitable
treatment toward those they - as a result of those stories - come to see as victims. Successfully telling
one’s story can lead to greater access to resources and recognition (Corrigan and Shdaimah, 2016).
Thus, storytelling can be a way to bring about systemic change, as well as a way to help realize
beneficial outcomes in individual circumstances, too. Some victims also report that storytelling is an
important part of their healing process. Barbara Amaya, a survivor of trafficking, shares that telling
her story and advocating for changes in laws and responses to victims has helped her take her life
back (2015).

Of course, storytelling requires that the storyteller has the relevant hermeneutical resources
to make sense of their experiences, and they must be able to render those experiences intelligible for
listeners. Therefore, storytelling will not be a tool available for improving collective understanding in
circumstances of effacement, separation, or exclusion, as those all entail that a subject does not have
the necessary hermeneutical resources for understanding their experiences. We may expect that
storytelling is most likely to be effective in cases of exportation and obstruction, where
hermeneutical resource are available for subjects and some members of other social groups.

Consciousness raising efforts play an important role in influencing policymaking. Stories are
often shared at Congressional hearings. At the start of a Congressional hearing about human
trafficking that was held in 2010, numerous speakers highlighted the role a documentary on child sex
trafficking, ‘Playground,’ played in raising their awareness and concern about the exploitation of
American children (In Our Own Backyard: Child Prostitution and Sex Trafficking in the United
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States, 2010). A number of members of congress have indicated that “they become interested in
trafficking only after hearing a particular victim’s testimony” (Weitzer, 2007, 463).

As Rutherford notes, storytelling is “a prominent strategy of the anti-rape movement,” as it
lets “the voices of victims/survivors speak for themselves” (2017, 105). In fact, one of the earliest
moments in the anti-rape movement can be traced back to the 1860s, when a group of black women
testified to Congress about assaults committed against them during the Memphis Riots (Memphis
Riots and Massacres, 1866). Speak-outs during the 1970s were an essential tool for bringing about
changes in collective understanding and lobbying for greater legal protections.

The tremendous popularity of the #MeToo movement came about as a request that people
who had experiences of sexual assault post a hashtag on social media to both let other victims know
they were not alone and to raise awareness about the pervasiveness of the problem. In an attempt to
prevent the confirmation of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court of the United States of
America in 2018, many survivors of sexual assault gathered in Washington to share their stories,
confront lawmakers, and attempt to get those who may otherwise be reluctant to hear their stories
and acknowledge their existence. Some victims gathered on Capitol Hill to talk about their
experiences of violation and assault. The importance of storytelling as a method of collective
awareness raising is highlighted by the practice adopted by some of these protesters in which one
victim would tell the story of their assault, while the others in the group would loudly repeat the
story line for line, amplifying the volume and hopefully resonance of the story. Images of Ana Maria
Archilla and Maria Gallagher demanding that Senator Jeff Flake acknowledge them captured a
powerful moment of shared experience and shared pain. Online, another hashtag was used to shed
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light on the reasons why someone who has been assaulted might not go to the police.
#WhyIDidntReport was used in hundreds of thousands of tweets in a matter of days.

When Katie Koestner was raped in 1990 in her dorm room by someone she had been
romantically interested in, the term ‘date rape’ had not yet made its way into common parlance.
Though some researchers and advocates were aware of the frequency with which sexual assaults
were perpetrated during dates and by acquaintances of victims - evidenced by the study conducted
by Kloss and reported by Mrs. Magazine and Warshaw’s 1988 publication - the collective had not yet
come to possess that information or the interpretive tools necessary to make sense of the
experiences of victims of such sexual assaults. While the words “date and acquaintance rape” appear
on the cover of Warshaw’s book, Koestner’s use of the term “date rape” in 1990 and 1991 is
sometimes credited with bringing widespread awareness to the language.

It may be that prior to this widespread recognition that a hermeneutical injustice prevented
collective understanding of the experience of acquaintance rape. If that is the case, then that may be
best described as a case of obstruction (the subject, some members of the subject’s social group,
and members of another social group possess the hermeneutical resources required for
understanding, but the collective does not). However, it may also be a case of contributory injustice.
It may be that those who continued to deny the possibility of date rape, blamed Koestner for her
purported responsibility for the sexual encounter, and felt her rapist should not be held accountable
could have made use of hermeneutical resources that were available to them. Distinguishing
between cases of obstruction and cases of contributory injustice will be challenging, largely because
the difference is one of whether those who are ignorant have done their due diligence to be able to
understand the experiences of the oppressed. I do not know if the reporters, school administrators,
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law enforcement representatives, and members of the general public who were initially incredulous
when Koestner shared her story had access to but refused to implement the hermeneutical resources
that would have permitted them to understand her experience.

It is not always possible to tell if any particular effort to improve collective understanding
has been especially successful, but in Koestner’s case there is good reason to believe her storytelling
had a significant impact, helping to usher previously siloed hermeneutical resources more broadly
into collective understanding. Her experience, her willingness to share it, and undoubtedly her
presentation as a sympathetic victim made an impression on many people and likely factored into
subsequent changes in how colleges responded to sexual assault allegations. Koestner achieved a sort
of celebrity, repeatedly describing her traumatic experience and the aftermath of it on platforms like
The Oprah Show, Larry King Live, BBC, and in an HBO mini-series episode. In 1991, she appeared on
the cover of Time Magazine. According to Koestner’s website, she has given over 16,000 speeches,
and in those presentations she continues to use storytelling as a tool to do the work of raising
awareness. She regularly speaks on campuses and is the executive director of Take Back the Night.

We should be concerned about storytelling as a means for improve collective understanding
for a number of reasons. Consciousness raising through storytelling requires a substantial emotional
and psychological investment on the part of the speakers. Such story-centered collective awareness
raising efforts also require subjects to discuss some of the more difficult and traumatizing aspects of
their lives, and sometimes these disclosures are received incredulously by listeners. In the next
chapter, I will discuss possible epistemic harms that may occur when speakers tell their stories.

3.2.1 Consciousness Raising from the Outside
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Improving collective understanding can be exhausting and even dangerous work. To
demonstrate this, consider barriers that victims of sex trafficking might face when trying to improve
collective understanding of their experiences. One impediment to survivor-led advocacy is that
many victims of sex trafficking and sex workers do not feel free to express themselves publicly. By
telling their stories or expressing their views, they put themselves at risk of violence (from
traffickers, buyers, and others), judgment (given the taboo nature of sex work), and legal
repercussions (deportation and arrest are very real threats). Those most impacted by commercial
sexual exploitation may also be limited in their ability to communicate about their experiences
because of language and economic barriers. To attend rallies and speak outs, to write articles and
create organizations, to circulate petitions and protest legislation all require some investment of
time, energy, and often money. In the words of Kate Zen, cofounder and interim director or the
migrant sex worker advocacy group Red Canary Song, “representation is very difficult to achieve
given the systemic barriers of race, class, language, immigration status” (Song, 2019).

Because of the significant toll that work to improve collective understanding can take on
those who endeavor to achieve that end, there are times when it is more appropriate for the work to
be done by people who are not themselves subject to the experiences that awareness is being raised
about. In other words, because outsiders have less at risk, sometimes they must take responsibility
for doing the difficult work.

What I will call consciousness raising from the outside occurs when allies attempt to
improve understanding of the experiences of epistemically marginalized people. Because of their
relative social privilege, it is less likely that outsider allies will be exploited, ignored, silenced, or
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disbelieved. Thus, consciousness raising involves allies leveraging their testimonial credibility to
improve awareness about hermeneutical lacunas and to address other epistemic harms committed
against others.

Some consciousness raising efforts include ad campaigns, social media campaigns, and
documentaries. These also now include digital storytelling in the form of apps or video games
(O’Brien and Berents 2019). Digital games hold the promise of being able to tell more nuanced and
complex stories than ad campaigns, but still have the effect of distancing game players from the
experiences and people that are simulated. Kim Dempster, creator of an ad campaign called Stop
the Nightmare, is an outsider who has attempted to use her marketing skills to improve collective
understanding about human trafficking (2014). Another activist, Jessica Minhas, explains that after
being introduced to the reality of trafficking, she was compelled to “use her voice on behalf of the
voiceless” (2013).

Some social workers and service providers see themselves as responsible for speaking on
behalf of survivors. A social services program director interviewed by Peters states “I think
[advocacy is] a really important role because we are the… closest thing that comes to the survivor’s
voice…” (2010, 106). Because of their first-hand experience working directly with victims, Peters
describes services providers as a possible “conduit to survivor experience.” (2010, 235).

Social scientists may play an active role in improving collective understanding. For example,
Koss’ study of acquaintance rape among college students had notable consequences. The
information collected, interpreted, and reported by Koss played a key role in the passage of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 (Rutherford 2017, 101). The influence of the study
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is demonstrated by the Act’s requirement that all colleges and universities receiving federal aid report
sexual assault statistics.

Rutherford’s work notably recasts the role of social scientists like Koss not as mere talliers
of a phenomenon, but as playing an important role “in actually realizing new ontological, social and
political realities” (2017, 102). The question of construction versus discovery is an important and
interesting one, though one that unfortunately is beyond the scope of what I can address here. But I
do think that if we consider realization as a key stage in the process of hermeneutical resistance - as
a part of the engineering/re-engineering and dissemination of new hermeneutical resources - then
we can understand Rutherford as suggesting social scientists like Koss contribute to the
identification of hermeneutical lacunas and take steps toward addressing them. Rutherford describes
Koss’ work as using accepted scientific and methodical practices to render “a particular experience
as ontologically and politically legible, and therefore significant for policy-makers and other
stakeholders” (2017, 102). By rendering legible what was previously inscrutable, the study has
facilitated understanding not only for outsiders, but for insiders, too.

Furthermore, Rutherford argues that the methods used by Koss and others have not merely
lifted the curtain to reveal an epistemological entity - a concept or conceptual tool - that has been
there all along. Those methods are not “transparent measuring instrument[s],” but rather they
contribute to an ongoing creation of reality. This is importantly distinct from the claim that Koss’
work “conjured up a phenomenon that did not previously exist,” which has been a frequent criticism
by those who believe sexual assault statistics grossly misrepresent the frequency of sexual violence.
According to Rutherford, social scientists studying sexual assault are not making up experiences that
were not there before, but they are playing an active role in the development of hermeneutical
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resources for making sense of those experiences. According to Rutherford, “the concept of
date/acquaintance rape was realized through a method, and an examination of its scientific, public
and political trajectories shows how tightly enmeshed the very legibility of the phenomenon remains
with the method that has realized it” (Rutherford, 102-103).

Of course, when outsiders take on the mantle of doing the work to engineer or disseminate
hermeneutical resources, there are risks they will do so in ways that do not ultimately serve the
interests of those they advocate for. This work by outsiders may be endorsed by those they see
themselves as representing, but they may also be self-appointed. The ideas they champion may or
may not align with the ideas upheld by insiders. I will review some of the harms that outsiders can
cause when engaged in consciousness raising work in Chapter Four.

3.3 Strategic Ignorance and Appropriating Dominant Meanings

Bailey, in ‘Strategic Ignorance,’ writes about how cultures may be marked by dominant
epistemologies that intentionally “see wrongly” (2007, 88). Bailey makes use of the work of Charles
Mills to argue that dominant individuals in a society may endorse a factually incorrect way of
viewing the world, since doing so makes the maintenance of their dominant position easier. For
example, white people in America may participate in a kind of shared hallucination that tells them
that there was a prior time in American history where everything was good for hardworking, middle
class, white Americans (2007, 80). Along with seeing things that are not there, a dominant
epistemology may ignore parts of reality that do not mesh well with beliefs that are convenient for
the dominant group.
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Citing Mills and Lugones, Bailey also discusses ways that oppressed people in a society may
make use of these dominant epistemologies, fictional as they are, to resist their oppression. Because
this method of resistance requires behaving as if one believes something that is not true, Bailey calls
it strategic ignorance. One way to be strategically ignorant is to pretend not to be as smart or capable
as one is. Bailey cites a study by Robin Kelly that found that Southern black laborers would act in
ways that fit stereotypes about blackness: slowing their work, breaking things, and feigning illiteracy.
While pretending to be exactly what their oppressors expected them to be, they managed to organize
and share civil rights literature with less notice than they would have drawn had they challenged
those stereotypes in front of their employers (2007, 88). Because their dominantly-situated
employers did not understand the truth about the people they employed, they were susceptible to
being duped. Meanwhile, black laborers were able to covertly develop hermeneutical resources,
which they wanted to conceal as oppositional secrets. Bailey notes that this strategy takes a
psychological toll on the subject, who must carefully mask their true self and in ways that are likely
uncomfortable and upsetting. Furthermore, strategically ignorant subjects cannot afford to be truly
ignorant. They need to remain aware of the dominant meanings and how they are being received by
those dominant actors (2007, 89).

Strategic ignorance is a form of hermeneutical resistance because it allows marginalized
people to avoid some of the harmful effects of being misunderstood. It provides space for
hermeneutical dissent and for engineering and re-engineering better concepts. It keeps those
concepts hidden when hiding them is prudent to avoid hijacking or appropriation. And while
mistaken epistemologies are widespread, it can help victims protect themselves from the practical
and epistemic harms that epistemic injustices can cause. It allows victims to avoid confrontations
that might cause them to question what they know and if they know anything at all.
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While some victims may strategically emphasize sympathy-eliciting aspects of their
victimhood, it is also possible that people who are not victims of sex trafficking, for example, those
who are willfully engaging in sex work or who have immigrated illegally but are not exploited, could
present themselves as victims in order to access opportunities and resources available to victims. A
number of studies have found that many people involved in commercial sex who crossed borders
were aware of the nature of work they would be doing. This runs counter to a narrative often
espoused by abolitionists that highlights stories in which unsuspecting people, typically women, are
tricked into migrating and are forced into sex work despite having been under the impression that
they would work in a different industry. Doezema cites studies conducted in Australia, Ghana, the
Dominican Republic, and Hungary to show that “women seeking to migrate are no so easily ‘duped’
or ‘deceived,’ and are often aware that most jobs on offer are in the sex industry” (1999, 33). Weitzer
reviews reports from Cambodia and Holland, noting that in each study a small percentage (6 out of
100 in Cambodia, and “few” of 72 in Holland) were defrauded or coercively trafficked. The others
knew the work they were migrating to do would be sex work, and many had been involved in
commercial sex before migrating (2007, 453). Reports of how often women enter sex work after
migrating may be unreliable because those who participate in those studies may misrepresent the
kind of work they were doing before migrating. This misrepresentation could be motivated by a
desire to avoid legal trouble and to better conform to the expectations of those who believe sex
workers are in need of rescue. Knowing that many people believe sex workers are helpless and in
need of rescue, some sex workers may use a strategy of strategic ignorance and behave as if this
widespread attitude is accurate in order to access needed resources or avoid harsh penalties.

3.4 Disengaging
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“There’s power in not telling your story.” - Tarana Burke, quoted in Wulfhorst, 2019

I will explore two ways that epistemically marginalized people might epistemically engage to
protect their well-being. The first involves disengaging from instances where attempting to
understand would be harmful. The second involves disengaging from instances where attempting to
improve collective understanding would be harmful.

In Chapter One, I reviewed a number of ways that individuals can be harmed or wronged as
knowers. I argued that these epistemic harms occur when listeners are unfairly excluded from
contributing to shared conceptual resources or from being able to meaningfully attempt to change
the ideas and attitudes of others. Both forms of disengaging I introduce below involve subjects
making a choice to remove themselves from certain intercommunal exchanges of information and
knowledge. Thus, one might object that someone who disengages is no longer subject to epistemic
injustices of the kind introduced in Chapter One. By choosing to remove themselves from the
epistemic marketplace, the argument might go, it cannot be said that they have been excluded from
that marketplace.

However, this objection is mistaken. When a subject refuses to engage or even to understand
another knower because understanding would require accepting ways of seeing the world that would
undermine their own epistemic agency or because they recognize listeners would contort or ignore
their testimony, that subject engages in an act of hermeneutical resistance. But they also suffer the
epistemic injustice of testimonial smothering. That a would-be speaker chooses not to respond
when another attempts to compel them to provide an explanation of their oppression does not
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negate the fact that the request is epistemically exploitative. That a would-be speaker chooses not to
express certain ideas around some people because they have good reason to believe their epistemic
labor will be, at best, ignored or, at worst, used to cause them further harm, does nothing to nullify
the fact that the would-be listener’s prejudiced attitudes have created an environment where the
would-be speaker must undermine themselves in their capacity to provide knowledge to protect
themselves from the ethically and epistemologically bad behavior of the would-be listener. That a
sub-group of knowers are unwilling to share conceptual resources they have developed to protect
themselves is not incompatible with it being the case that members of that group are excluded from
meaning-making practices, thus obscuring aspects of their lives from collective understanding.
Rather, as Pohlhaus Jr. notes, disengaging from others, especially more dominantly-situated knowers,
may be necessary if further engagement will result in those contributions being “distorted or
misapprehended” (Pohlhaus Jr. 2017, 21), which could result in epistemic harms of hermeneutical
hijacking or epistemic appropriation.

We must not confuse the steps that knowers may take to protect themselves from further
harm with epistemic justice or an absence of conditions that coerce a knower into silence. Even
when silence is prudent, that does not mean victims are not harmed or wronged by being silenced.
A subject can both choose to protect themselves by not speaking while also being harmed by the
circumstances that have compelled them to remain silent. When disengaging occurs against
background conditions of epistemic oppression, then overall it would be in the would-be speaker’s
interest to be able to be able to express themselves and be better understood. Conditions that make
it imprudent to speak thereby disrespect and hermeneutically marginalize knowers, even if those
ideas are not actually expressed.
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As Medina argues, hermeneutically marginalized people facing possible hermeneutical death
have “a right (if not a duty) to fight epistemically by any means necessary (including the right to lie
to hide, to sabotage, to silence others, etc.), demonstrating loyalty and solidarity only with alternative
epistemic communities (communities of resistance)” (2017, 49). Disengaging is epistemically
permissible when a speaker has good reason to believe that sharing testimony or hermeneutical
resources would lead to either testimonial silencing (a lack of response such that it is as if the
speaker said nothing at all) or worsened conditions for oppressed people (epistemic or otherwise).

3.4.1 Strategic Refusals to Understand

In “Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand,” Pohlhaus Jr. argues that
sometimes when we ask someone to try to understand a certain line of reasoning, we can thereby
wrong that person. Understanding requires that one situate themselves within a conceptual
framework and accept certain background conditions as being true (2011, 225). If those background
conditions render a subject unintelligible or require that they accept oppressive assumptions about
themselves, then requests for understanding in those cases is harmful (2011, 231-32).

To illustrate what it means to transition between conceptual framework, Pohlhaus Jr.
explores what it would mean for someone or some group of people to both be and not be capable
of playfulness. Pohlhaus Jr. argues that it might be the case that someone who is playful in many
contexts cannot be said to be playful in other circumstances. This inability to be playful in certain
contexts is not because they’re not physically capable of engaging in the same kinds of actions that
would characterize playfulness in other contexts. Rather, it is because of the social structure, in those
other contexts, that playfulness is inhibited. Pohlhaus Jr. calls these different worlds. An individual
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can occupy multiple worlds at once. Thus, we do not say something contradictory when we say that
someone can both be playful and not. Instead, what we’re saying is that certain worlds permit that
characterization, whereas others do not (2011, 231).

If a black woman is asked to understand why a white store owner might not answer a buzzer
when she rings it in an attempt to enter their store, an example first introduced by Patricia Williams
that Pohlhaus Jr. explores in the paper, then she is asked to try to adopt the kind of beliefs - at least
for a moment - that such a store owner would have to possess for their actions to make sense (2011,
233). Such requests for understanding often happen in circumstances where we want to explain
someone’s behavior without endorsing it. Often this kind of rhetoric is followed by a plea that we
cut the person, whose actions might have been wrong but are understandable from a particular
vantage point, some slack. We also engage in this kind of adaption of other perspectives when
where we are trying to develop ways to argue against particular conclusions and perspectives. To
develop a persuasive counterargument, we may feel that we must adopt those background
assumptions that our conversational opponent has assumed.

As Pohlhaus Jr. points out, when we call upon someone to be understanding in such cases,
we are compelling them to enter into a world that might actually be harmful for them and might
undermine their ability to communicate important aspects of their experience. Returning to the
example introduced above, by asking the black woman who’s attempting to enter the store that she’s
being kept out of to try to understand the perspective of the shop owner, we ask her to occupy a
world in which her own testimony is rendered non-credible. We are asking her to enter a world in
which her own existence is in some way suspect, because that is a world in which the shop owner
can be understood as having reason to treat her with suspicion.
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To engage someone in a good faith argument requires accepting that both parties are in
agreement about certain logical moves and endorse some common premises, thereby conceding a
great deal about the shared logical space in which the argument takes place. And in some cases, it
might not be in the best interest of hermeneutically marginalized person to agree to those logical
moves, and thus not in their best interest to engage in that argument. Thus, resistance, in such cases,
may manifest as a refusal to engage with an argument or line of reasoning.

While storytelling is one way of trying to improve that which is not understood, it comes at
a cost. I want to note here that refusing to engage in such disclosures is a way that victims and other
hermeneutically marginalized people may choose to protect themselves. Refusal to engage is a way to
resist some of the epistemic harms I review in the next chapter, like hermeneutical hijacking and
epistemic appropriation. It is a way to reject the demand that one convince others of their
oppression, which is what occurs in cases of epistemic exploitation. It is a way to protect
oppositional secrets and refrain from contributing to prescriptive and constrictive narratives. It is a
way to resist having to accept dominant ways of seeing that might invalidate the speaker’s own
authority. As Tarana Burke stated at Women Deliver in 2019, “There’s power in not telling your
story” (Wulfhorst, 2019).

A sort of disengaging was exercised by sex workers during negotiations and advocacy to
inform the articulation of the definition of trafficking in the Palermo Protocol and TVPA. In
Doezema’s words, “Paradoxically, the best way of protecting sex workers rights in the debate on
defining trafficking was through making sex workers invisible” (2005, 78). Sex workers strategically
tried to make both their presence invisible in the work and to make sure mention of sex work did
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not appear in the law. If prostitution was mentioned by the laws, then it would be further cemented
as tied to trafficking. Exclusion of prostitution and sex work would leave conceptual space between
the two.

Some anti-trafficking advocates have also reported feeling that engaging the abolitionists on
their descriptions of trafficking involves participating in conversations that distort reality and require
that they make use of distinctions and relations that they reject. Peters describes a conversation she
had with a director of a social services program that she calls Charlotte, wherein Charlotte remarks
on the frustration of trying to engage abolitionists on the issue of whether labor and sex trafficking
are distinct kinds, saying, “I don’t like talking about sex trafficking versus labor trafficking, because
to me it’s all trafficking.” But because abolitionists have been relatively successful in controlling
conversations about trafficking, resistance of that idea is perceived as necessary. It requires using a
distinction that people like Charlotte see as false. In trying to convince others that labor trafficking
can be as horrendous as sex trafficking, arguing that there are not meaningful differences between
the two kinds (though there can be meaningful differences in the experiences of victims), and thus
there truly is a single kind, Charlotte finds herself frustrated by her own points. She highlights how
traumatic labor trafficking can be, and how sexually assault can be a part of labor trafficking.
Contrastingly, she notes that some sex trafficking victims sometimes have more freedom of
movement and outside resources when compared to someone labor trafficked in a domestic setting,
for example. But she catches herself, adding “But then again, that’s leading into their saying one is
more horrible that the other” (Peters 2010, 106-9).

3.4.2 Development of Oppositional Secrets
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There may be instances in which marginalized people are not interested in outsiders having a
greater understanding of their lives and experiences or some facet of their lives and experiences.
They may choose to disengage from efforts to improve collective understanding about particular
aspects of their experiences, and instead develop information intended for insiders only. This
shared, insider information may constitute an oppositional secret. This secrecy may involve the
development of “covert network to escape or mitigate oppression,” or may manifest as a sort of
strategic appropriation of dominant meanings or a “politically central identity” (Hundleby 2005, 47).

For example, in communities where homosexuality is not accepted, it may be that some
people will choose to try to pass as straight in order to avoid discrimination. They may date or marry
partners of the opposite sex, dress according to gendered expectations, and engage in other
behaviors to obscure their sexual orientation. It may also be the case that there are signals or covert
ways of communication shared by people within the gay community that enable them to identify
one other. They may form spaces in which they can feel comfortable expressing their sexualities. In
such a case, the experiences of gay people in this community is not understood by the collective
community. We can imagine that even attempts to express certain parts of that experience to
outsiders would fail, as those experiences are rendering unintelligible. These ways of being and
communicating with insiders constitute oppositional secrets. These secrets provide group members
with tools for sustaining and protecting themselves and can be instrumental in building resistance to
the status quo. Ideally, such secrets would eventually become needless as homosexuality became
socially acceptable. However, if they are revealed too early, they may invite increased scrutiny and
put group members in danger.
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Sex work can be extremely dangerous, but people engaged in sex work, either coercively or
by their own volition, have sometimes found ways to mitigate the risks they face. One way that some
people involved in commercial sex have been able to protect themselves is by using the Internet to
advertise their services, set up meetings, and exchange payments. Sex workers have also used the
Internet to communicate with one another about clients who are abusive, also known as “bad date
lists.” In response to the introduction of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers (SESTA) and Allow
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking (FOSTA) Acts, some people involved in sex work
report that they are attempting to make online posting about their work even more covert. These
insider-generated and protected trade secrets may be thought of as oppositional secrets.

We may wonder whether, when oppositional secrets are intentionally blocked from collective
understanding, the marginalized person is in fact a victim of a hermeneutical injustice. In order to
experience a hermeneutical injustice, one must be excluded from the generation of epistemic
resources that are in one’s interest to be created and collectively employed. If one is intentionally
keeping resources to oneself, then one is not being excluded from, but opting out of, the epistemic
marketplace (Fricker 2007, 153). In some ways, the fact that the marginalized group is keeping
secrets that they could share seems to inflict an epistemic harm on the larger community.

Broader understanding of oppositional secrets does not bring about epistemic justice if the
marginalized people using them are not able to contribute more generally to meaning-making
practices. Overall levels of understanding may be temporarily improved, but the marginalized people
are not better off because of it. They are no less hermeneutically marginalized. And as Hundleby
observes, part of the value of hermeneutical justice is that the underdeveloped understandings must
be of benefit to the people who are being oppressed. Greater collective understanding of this secret
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information may even be used to harm subjects, as the relevant concepts could be hermeneutically
hijacked or epistemically appropriated. Secrets can be a way for marginalized people to protect
themselves from physical harm, exploitation, and further epistemic wrongs.

Davis, acknowledging that not all hermeneutical resources are part of the collective
hermeneutical resources, notes that resources can be shared in a number of ways: accidentally,
mutually, forcefully, or through acts of resistance (2018, 703). Accidental sharing of resources occurs
naturally when people from different communities mingle with one another. Mutual sharing occurs
when members of different communities make an intentional and explicit attempt to better
understand one another. Forceful sharing occurs when a members of a powerful group strong-arm
others into sharing information and interpretive tools. Forceful extraction of intracommunal
resources may result in the divulging of oppositional secrets. Forceful extraction also jeopardizes the
viability strategic ignorance as a strategy of resistance and dissent.

An advocate, interested in addressing an epistemic lacuna and improving collective
understanding of the marginalized group, may attempt to raise collective consciousness of those
experiences. In doing so, they may disclose insider information that the group would prefer to keep
to themselves. Both insiders and outsiders may reveal oppositional secrets either with or without
knowledge that at least some of the insiders of that group do not want greater collective
understanding of the experience at issue. In some cases, someone who is trusted and permitted into
spaces where oppressed people feel comfortable and safe could become privy to and subsequently
disclose oppositional secrets. Accordingly, allies engaged in consciousness raising should be wary of
accidentally revealing oppositional secrets. Even with good intentions and when motivated by the
aim of revealing hermeneutical blind spots, secret revelation can occur. Hundleby argues that if the
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further one is from the content of a secret, the less authority one has to reveal it. In other words, the
less the secret has to do with you, the more likely it is that you shouldn’t share it. But she also
contends that one should refrain from personally seeking more information about the secret, while
acknowledging the hardship this imposes. If one is in a position to investigate something, then one
likely does not yet know if what one is investigating is an oppositional secret. Part of finding out
whether something is a secret used to gain power and fight oppression is uncovering the secret itself
(Hundleby 2005, 50).
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CHAPTER FOUR: PITFALLS

When I began this project, my intention was to use historical analyses of advocacy movements
that have aimed to raise awareness about sexual violence to demonstrate the existence and
persistence of epistemic injustices for victims of those kinds of experiences. Initially, I took largely
for granted the accuracy of the definitions used by and assertions made by advocates engaged in
such work. Much of my initial perspective was informed by my own experiences working with a
survivor support organization that connects with victims in hospital emergency departments,
courtrooms, and through referrals from the likes of social workers, lawyers, doctors, and detectives.
In that work, particularly as it pertained to sex trafficking, I frequently heard statements like “most
victims don’t know they are victims,” and these assertions were uncontested and treated as obviously
true. In fact, it was such a statement made during a conference held by Womankind, a New Yorkbased nonprofit that serves survivors of gender-based violence, in 2017 that led me to begin
thinking of the potential connections between human trafficking and epistemic injustice.

However, as I began to seriously investigate the history of both the anti-sex trafficking and antisexual assault movements, it became clear that there are heated disagreements about who, in fact,
knows what.

In Chapter Two, I reviewed the legal definition of trafficking, the position of advocates who
believe widespread myths and misunderstandings make trafficking invisible for insiders and outsiders
alike, and some of the harms that result from that poor understanding. In the first section of this
chapter, I will introduce some criticisms of the ways some of the most visible advocates have gone
about defining and raising awareness about commercial sexual exploitation. Trafficking has been
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defined in ways that are at odds with the views of many sex workers willfully engaged in commercial
sex, some self-identified trafficking victims, and others who identify as belonging to both groups at
different times in their lives. Critics argue that distorted and unsupported statistics,
misrepresentation in the media, and fearful language have contributed to a moral panic that raises
serious questions about what trafficking is, who victims are, and who gets to say. Subsequently, I will
consider how these criticisms raise serious questions about the veracity of those definitions and, at
times, suggest additional epistemic injustices have been committed by those advocates. The subjects
of those epistemic injustices may be the very people who advocates aim to support, or they may be
other marginalized people, like sex workers.

At the start of this project, I thought that the hardest step in moving from theory to
application would be attempting to identify the existence of hermeneutical lacunas. This is, of
course, incredibly challenging. But perhaps just as hard is coming to know when those lacunas have
been filled. How to determine when we have the right epistemic resources and whether they are
being produced and disseminated by the appropriate epistemic authorities will also prove to be a
significant and ongoing challenge.

In what follows, I will sometimes explore not only how anti-trafficking advocacy may
epistemically harm victims of sexual assault and commercial sexual exploitation, but also nonexploited sex workers. This dissertation is about epistemic injustice and victims of sexual violence,
so I want to make it clear that by including sex workers in the discussion and identifying epistemic
injustices they may face as byproducts of anti-trafficking work, I do not mean to suggest sex
workers are necessarily survivors of sexual violence. I have chosen to refrain from endorsing any
particular views about sex work, consent, and how to determine who is and is not exploited, but I
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am committed to leaving open conceptual space for understanding that there may be people
engaged in commercial sex who do so willfully and as the consequence of rational deliberation of
the options available to them. But whether sex workers are understood to be victims or not, it is
undeniable that they are impacted by discussions of sex trafficking. Because sex workers are so often
treated with disregard and even outright contempt, they are often denied an active role in defining
and explaining their experiences to outsiders. They are, regardless of whether they are or are not
victims of sexual violence, relatively socially powerless. Thus, a discussion of how anti-trafficking
advocacy addresses and possibly perpetrates epistemic injustices must include consideration of how
sex workers may also be wronged as knowers.

4.1 The Controversial History of the Anti-Trafficking Movement

Nothing I say in what follows, though at times critical of the work of and approaches taken
by some advocates, should be taken as a denial of the reality of trafficking or a skepticism about the
severity of trafficking when and for whom it occurs. Victims are physically and psychologically
harmed in ways that cannot be captured in words, though many courageous and resilient victims
have shared their stories in an effort to improve collective understanding of their experiences and
the conditions and events that led to their exploitation.

While many of the most visible activists involved in raising awareness of sex trafficking are
largely in agreement about how to define the problem, this threatens to obscure the fact that there
are serious and important disagreements about who is trafficked and what should be done about it.
Peters notes that the belief that trafficking is awful is widely shared, but also acknowledges that what
counts as trafficking has proved to be a divisive question. Some critics have argued that the
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presentation of trafficking by some of the most visible advocates is misleading. In Ronald Weitzer’s
words “[w]hile no one would claim that sex trafficking is fictional, many of the claims made about it
are wholly unsubstantiated” (2012, 1337).

Broadly speaking, there are two opposing camps in the anti-trafficking world: the rightsbased movement (also known as the liberal feminist coalition, mainstream feminists [Weitzer, 2007],
or autonomy feminists [Schwarz, Kennedy, and Britton, 2017]) and the abolitionist movement (also
known as the left/right coalition or the neo-abolitionist movement [Doezema, 1999], or the antiprostitution feminists [Peters 2010 citing Stolz]). Alternatively, Weitzer describes those who see all
commercial sex as “institutionalized subordination of women” as endorsing the oppression
paradigm, while those who believe that there are many ways that someone might engage in
commercial sex, with some involving subordination and others realizing other kinds of power
dynamics, endorse the polymorphous paradigm (2012, 1338).

Activists in both camps see human trafficking as a real and devastating problem and believe
that victims are under recognized and under supported. However, the rights-based movement tends
to view sex trafficking as a species of labor trafficking and distinguishes between sex trafficking and
sex work.16 The abolitionist movement is marked by a tendency to view all sex work as inherently
16

GAATW is a strong representative of the rights-based movement. Doezema says of

GAATW that “their vision on trafficking and consent… inspired by the global sex worker rights
movement, GAATW sees prostitution as labour” (2005, 68).

It is not always clear if the claim that sex work and sex trafficking are distinct is empirical or
theoretical. Schwarz, Kennedy, and Britton state that autonomy feminists “believe that most sex
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exploitative and directly tied to trafficking.17 A number of influential organizations like the Coalition
Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) and Standing Against Global Exploitation (SAGE) have
endorsed an abolitionist approach and adopted the oppression paradigm. Then co-director of
CATW, Dorchen Leidholdt, wrote in 2000 that “prostitution, sex trafficking, and related practices
are, in fact, forms of sexual violence that leave women and children physically and psychologically
devastated” (2000, 1).

When the TVPA and the Palermo Protocol were being debated and developed, abolitionists
wanted it to be stated that “recruitment, transportation within or across borders, sale, transfer,
receipt or harboring of a person for the purposes of prostitution, sexual exploitation, exploiting the
marriage of such a person, exploited labor, or slavery-like practices with or without the consent of
victims” (CATW 1999, emphasis mine, quoted by Doezema 2005, 72). Whether or not to call sex
trafficking out as distinct from other forms of labor trafficking was also central to many hearings
and debates held at the time of the development of the law. Abolitionists felt strongly that sex
trafficking should be noted as a separate category because they felt that form of exploitation “is
workers actively choose this employment” (2017, 17). Alternatively, one might think that many or
even most people involved in commercial sex are exploited, but that conceptually there can be and
at least sometimes actually is a distinction.
17

The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) is a strong representative of the

abolitionist movement.

Again, there is some ambiguity here, as there is a difference in saying all sex work is
inherently exploitative (and thus itself constitutes trafficking) or that the existence of a commercial
sex industry leads to conditions in which trafficking can be sustained.
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uniquely vile, uniquely brutal, and cries out for its own comprehensive solution” (Representative
Smith in the Markup of the Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act, quoted by Peters 2010, 47-48).

Rights-based advocates wanted sex work and sexual exploitation to be left out of the
definition entirely. Rather, they advocated for a single definition that would encompass both sex and
labor trafficking. They felt commercial sexual exploitation should not be singled out as a distinct
kind of trafficking, as they felt sexual exploitation was one of many forms of exploitation and that
common causes of all kinds of trafficking could and should be sought. A previous bill - the
International Trafficking of Women and Children Victim Protection Act of 1999 - did not
distinguish between sex and labor trafficking, and did not include general and severe definition
distinction. This bill did not make it out of committee.

The wording of the definition of trafficking presented in the TVPA and Palermo Protocol
was intended to be a compromise between the two parties. As it became clear that if no such
compromise was reached, there was concern the entire project of introducing national and
international language to define trafficking - an end both sides wanted to bring about - would be
jeopardized (Peters 2010, 39). As Doezema notes, during these discussions, both sides took
themselves to “speak the truth about trafficking, and by extension, about the meaning of
prostitution” (2005, 72). While the TVPA does define trafficking as any act that abets commercial
sex and distinguishes between sex and labor trafficking, only instances that involve force, fraud, or
coercion are designated as “severe” and punishable (Grant, 2018).

Notably, the unlikely alliance between conservatives and some feminists that produced the
left/right coalition was also reflected during the “white slavery” panic of the early 20th century.
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Social purists, intent on reforming behavior generally, found support from some feminist sects,
particularly Butlerite feminists, who believed legal sex work helped sustain the trafficking of women
(Doezema 1999, 27, citing Coote, Walkowitz, and Gibson). And as has been the case in the modern
era, purists and their allies were criticized by other feminists who felt the alliance “provided arms
and ammunition for the enemy of women’s emancipation” (Theresa Billington-Greig, quoted by
Doezema 1999, 27).

By and large, the modern-day abolitionist movement has been more successful in spreading
its message. Influential abolitionists have been the face of the anti-trafficking movement before
Congress, on task forces, and on big and small screens. In doing so, abolitionists have made
significant strides toward bringing their conceptions of trafficking into the realm of collective
understanding. The National Security Directive 22 (NSPD-22) is evidence of the relative success of
the abolitionist approach. Signed by George W. Bush, this directive asserted that the United States
officially takes an abolitionist approach toward sex work and sees sex works as “contributing to the
phenomenon of trafficking in persons.” In 2003, Bush also included a conscience clause in the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), requiring that any organizations receiving
aid through the plan explicitly denounce prostitution. While the Supreme Court found this
requirement unconstitutional in 2013, organizations outside the United States that receive aid are still
required to adopt such a position.18

Advocates often cite shockingly large numbers when describing the scale of the problem of
trafficking. And much of the time when the problem is spoken or written about, it is described as an
18

The Supreme Court reached this decision in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for

Open Society International, Inc. (2013).
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epidemic, a rapidly growing but woefully under recognized threat. But critics have noted that many
assertions about the scope of trafficking and stories about the experiences of victims are based on
generalizations from too-small samples, highly speculative, and arguably cherry-picked. Some of
these problematic statistics are consistently asserted in literature on and campaigns directed at raising
awareness of trafficking. After being repeated enough, these frequently cited numbers come to be
treated accepted knowledge.

For example, activists often state that the average age of entry into prostitution is 12 years
old (Bergquist, 315). Linda Smith states the average age is 12-14 in her TEDxPortland talk (2015),
and Kanani Titchen says 15 in her TEDx talk (2017). In a 2010 special hearing before the
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, Senator Durbin stated that approximately 100,000
American children are trafficked each year, adding that the average age of entry into sex work is 13
(United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 2010, 2). But the Polaris Project, a leading
organization in the fight against trafficking, reports these commonly cited figures are “not actually
supported by any data” (2016).

Because of the covert nature of trafficking, it is extremely difficult to estimate the number
of people who are affected. A review of human trafficking literature published by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services notes that, “the data and methodologies for estimating
the prevalence of human trafficking globally and nationally are not well developed, and therefore
estimates have varied widely and changed significantly over time” (Human Trafficking into and
within the United States: A Review of the Literature 2009, 4). The reliability of the numbers cited
when discussing human trafficking was questioned in a 2006 report by a Government Accountability
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Office, acknowledging that there was not yet “an effective mechanism for estimating the number of
victims” (quoted by Weitzer 2007, 456).

As stated earlier in this dissertation, the first TVPA report to include estimates of the scale
of both national and international trafficking stated that as many as 4 million people were trafficked
transnationally and that 50,000 victims were trafficked in the United States. In the years since this
2002 publication, the estimate of how many people are trafficked nationally and internationally has
dropped, and by the end of the first decade of the millennium, included only the vague claim that
“thousands” of people were trafficked each year. (See Weitzer’s tracking of these numbers in 2007,
462). Contrastingly, in the introduction to the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, Mike Pompeo
stated that a staggering 24.9 million people “are robb[ed]… of their freedom and basic dignity,”
despite the report itself dedicating significant attention to the difficulty of tracking and reporting
accurate numbers. Of the databases cited in the report, the greatest number of recorded cases is
91,416, which reflects the transnational number of cases included in the IOM Counter Trafficking
Data Collaborative (CTDC).

Because the prevalence of trafficking has not been tracked in the past, we cannot compare
current rates to some prior baseline (Weitzer 2012, 1348). However, neither that nor the dipping
figures cited in annual Trafficking in Person’s Reports has stopped abolitionists from describing
trafficking as a rapidly expanding epidemic.

The fact that prosecutors report that they were trying cases that today would be considered
criminal even before the passage of the TVPA also provides evidence that the problem is not new,
despite renewed attention and ways of speaking. A federal prosecutor stated to Peters during an
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interview that “[w]e’ve been doing trafficking cases since before the enactment of the TVPA; we just
called them something different - involuntary servitude cases or peonage cases” (2010, 60).

4.2 Pitfalls

Now that I have introduced various approaches to epistemic resistance and rebellion, I will
review various pitfalls of consciousness raising, a form of epistemic rebellion frequently used by
activists and movements to improve collective understanding of the experiences of marginalized
people. These pitfalls are themselves epistemic harms and wrongs. I am referring to them as
“pitfalls” to highlight their relationship to consciousness raising efforts, as I see them as sometimes
threatening to undermine or, at the very least, complicate, efforts to bring about epistemic injustice.
However, I do not mean to insinuate they are different in kind from the potential epistemic
injustices highlighted earlier in the project.

I will frequently refer to events, dynamics, and arguments related to activist work around the
sexual assault and sex trafficking intervention movements to demonstrate how these pitfalls play out
in real life. My ultimate goal is to contribute to a better understanding of some of the common
dynamics that play out when efforts are made to improve collective understanding of the
experiences of marginalized people.

In particular, I will spend much of this chapter exploring disagreements between two
prominent factions of the anti-trafficking movement. But I must note that I do not have the kind
insight into the best way to define or describe sex trafficking that first-hand experience might
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provide. I am not a survivor of commercial sexual exploitation, and I do not feel any sense of
certainty that I am in a position to contribute to available hermeneutical resources for understanding
the experiences of people who are. Therefore, I want to be careful not to suggest that the concepts
advocated for by either group of activists are clearly right or clearly wrong. Rather, my hope is to
show that disagreements in the sex trafficking intervention activist movement highlight the ways that
efforts to address epistemic lacunas could potentially lead to further epistemic harms. I believe many
of these points can be made without endorsing either the abolitionist or rights-based approaches to
defining sex trafficking and distinguishing it from sex work, but instead by highlighting how the
statements made by advocates with different views can be understood by applying the language and
theoretical tools introduced in works on epistemic injustice.

For this reason, I will do my best not to issue any verdicts of losers or winners when
considering the concepts, definitions, and resources put forth by activists and dissenters (both
groups include insiders and outsiders). However, I also recognize that my comments are more
critical of the abolitionists. This is in large part because of my perception that 1) more self-identified
sex workers tend to stand in opposition of the abolitionist approach to anti-trafficking work than
support it, and 2) survivors and victims are more often centered as leaders in rights-based groups.
As I acknowledge in this work, I believe it is possible for outsiders to possess hermeneutical tools
that insiders may be lacking. However, situations in which this appears to be the case - situations
where outsiders take themselves to be educating insiders about the nature of their experiences - are
rife with danger, since all of the societal prejudices that led to the epistemic oppression faced by
those subjects will make it difficult for them to resist or revise those attributions. That being said,
there are many self-identified victims of trafficking who support and lead abolitionist efforts. Their
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voices are important, their epistemic labor and insights are valuable, and throughout my critique I
will attempt to respect those perspectives.

4.3 Epistemic Exploitation

“We share and share and share. We offer up our experiences for mass consumption, hoping that maybe this will be the
time we break through. But does any of it make a difference?” - Lyz Lenz, 2019

Epistemic exploitation occurs when marginalized people are compelled by those in
dominantly-situated positions to offer an explanation of their own oppression (Berenstain 2016,
570). This labor is often unrecognized and uncompensated, despite being extremely costly. But
importantly, oppressed people do not have a legitimate choice about whether or not to engage in
this work, as they face a double bind. If they do not engage, then they could be blamed for being
complicit in their own oppression by not taking a more active role in re-educating others. When
speaking up, there is a significant risk that marginalized people will not be granted due credibility,
thereby being subjected to a subsequent testimonial injustice (Berenstain 2016, 576). Berenstain
notes that after oppressed people provide the labor demanded of them, presenting arguments
demonstrating and evidence of their marginalization, that work “rarely leads to actual institutional
change” (2016, 574). Those in relative positions of power may choose to ignore it or find it
insufficient.

Even when the person compelled to provide testimony about their experience is successful
in communicating with the hearer or hearers and their testimony is given appropriate credibility,
there are still costs associated. In particular, Berenstain describes the opportunity cost that occurs
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when an oppressed person has been compelled to explain their oppression. Even when in doing so
they transform the hearers understanding of their experience, they still had to spend their time
doing that instead of something else. This can result in a kind of busy work that keeps oppressed
people caught up in activities and conversations related explaining their experiences and trying to
explain to other people why those should be taken seriously.

In her paper, Berenstain describes a situation in which Richardson is expected by her white
peers to educate them about what it’s like to be a black woman. Further, she reports feeling that she
is not allowed to complain or express frustration with those experiences unless she can offer some
solution. She’s not permitted to simply have feelings of frustration, sadness, and anger about her
oppressive experiences, and she is saddled with the responsibility of coming up with a positive
solution to contribute to the conversation (2016, 577).

It is important to note that, as defined, epistemic exploitation is a constitutive part of efforts
to improve collective understanding of the experiences of marginalized people if those efforts
involve the participation of insiders. Berenstain herself notes that epistemic exploitation “is
common within… activist coalitions and alliances” (2016, 570). The hermeneutical resistance
strategy of storytelling places the burden of improving collective understanding on the shoulders of
those who have the most at risk, and this by its very nature is epistemic exploitation. Marginalized
speakers risk not being heard, understood, or believed. Listeners may not give them due credibility (a
testimonial injustice) or may be unable to understand them because of a deficit of interpretive tools
(a hermeneutical injustice). Even in the best circumstances, ones in which they’re heard and
believed, there is an opportunity cost to be considered as well as the cost of engaging in an
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emotionally and sometimes physically taxing experience that can be upsetting or traumatizing. Too
often this labor is under recognized and under compensated.

Epistemic exploitation may occur in instances where it appears listeners are deferring to the
authority of marginalized knowers. But even when granted credibility, marginalized knowers may
still be subject to epistemic objectification, treated as “mere sources of information” or as subjects
whose contributions are limited to those that relate to their marginalized status (Davis 2016, 488-89).
Survivor-speakers may be invited to conferences or rallies to tell their stories, but could harmed and
wronged if they are treated as informants rather than full and genuine participants in the search for
and generation of knowledge. Medina argues that we may sometimes mistake regulated inclusion of
marginalized speakers as unproblematic, but notes this is still problematic when they are not given
“full and equal epistemic” involvement in the production of knowledge. As Medina describes them,
informants are not permitted to fully engage by “formulating hypotheses, probing and questioning,
assessing and interpreting opinions, and so forth.” The relationship between a speaker and hearer
when the speaker is treated as an informant is not fair, as it is neither reversible nor reciprocal (2012,
204)

When an insider is identified as a possible spokesperson for their group, there is tremendous
pressure to present information about the experiences of one’s group accurately and compellingly.
This burden, the anxiety it may induce, and the lack of recognition of what is being demanded
means that even when speakers are granted significant credibility, they may be epistemically
exploited (Davis 2016, 492).

4.3.1 Epistemic Exploitation and Reluctant Storytelling

137

While there may be many ways to assess the effectiveness of storytelling, one indication of
success is when a listener’s attitudes are changed or when a listener comes to treat a speaker as an
appropriate epistemic authority. But even when effective, storytelling brings with it potential costs
and harms.

Consider again the lifetime commitment Katie Koestner has made to raising awareness of
the prevalence and harm of acquaintance rape. Many would argue, and I believe Koestner herself
would say, that her efforts to improve understanding have been relatively successful. While her first
attempts to get outsiders to understand her experience were met with incredulity, she is now a
“sought-after exper[t] on student safety and healthy relationships” (Koestner Biography, 2020).
Collective attitudes about sexual assault have changed since Koestner’s rape in 1990, and her
contributions to bringing about those changes are important. But they have also been costly.
Koestner enrolled at the College of William and Mary to study chemical engineering and Japanese.
Her entire life changed in the aftermath of her assault. The costs of her epistemic labor or
immeasurable, and she’s felt some responsibility to perform this labor in service to other victims,
nothing that “every time I make myself tell my story” there are tens more stories to be told, and that
because of a sense of responsibility to other victims she “felt like I couldn’t stop” (Koestner, 2016).

Anita Hill and Christine Blasey Ford told their stories very publicly, and while there are many
who believe and support them, they faced significant risks in doing so. Both women saw their
characters impugned by skeptics. Both women saw their alleged assailants confirmed to the Supreme
Court, nonetheless. Both women will forever be tied to their victimhood. Being ignored or called a
liar are not the only risks one faces when storytelling. People who share their experiences of assault
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risk being threatened or even physically harmed. Their reputations may be ruined; their professional
and personal lives may be derailed.

In her opening statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Blasey Ford stated “I am not
here today because I want to be. I am terrified. I am here because I believe it is my civic duty to tell
you what happened to me while Brett Kavanaugh and I were in high school” (U.S. Congress, 2018)
Her deep reluctance to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee, but resolve to do so out of a
sense of obligation, highlights just how exploitative it is to compel a person to turn their traumas
inside out for public scrutiny in the hopes of being believed.

While telling her story in a TEDx talk, Casandra Diamond, a survivor of commercial sexual
exploitation, begins by saying she is partially holding cue cards to “help focus on her messages while
at the same time shielding [her] from painful memories and intrusive thoughts” (2020). She notes
that retelling her story retraumatizes her, but that she tells it in order to improve collective
understanding and hopefully savings others from trafficking.

Some anti-trafficking advocates have complained that when survivors are present in
decision-making spaces (i.e., at conferences or on task forces), it is often to provide testimonials
rather than to play a full role in decision making processes. Some sex workers have also expressed
the feeling that they have been excluded from the process of defining and legislating around sex
trafficking only notionally. This in and of itself is an epistemic harm when speakers are
hermeneutically marginalized because survivor speakers are put in the costly position of having to
provide testimony about the nature of their oppression to an audience that may or may not believe
them. Even if they are believed, there are opportunity and psychological costs. If the survivor-
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speaker is not made a fully participating member of the task force or decision-making body, then
they may also be harmed by being alienated from the outcome of their testimony.

In response to the outpouring of survivor stories triggered by the popular #MeToo hashtag,
movement creator Tarana Burke stated at a conference in 2019, that what she had witnessed was
“the world trade on the labor of survivors… they trot us out to tell these gory stories, and nobody
takes into account what that does it us” (quoted by Wulfhorst, 2019). While the very idea of
#MeToo was to raise awareness and create a sense of solidarity by demonstrating the pervasiveness
of sexual assaulted, Burke’s statement also highlights the frustrating limits of storytelling. In a TED
Talk, Burke states “[s]urvivors of sexual violence are all at once being heard, and then vilified”
(2018). Re-opening traumatic wounds to convince others that those experiences are real and worthy
of consideration is effortful, painful, and according to Burke, neither sufficient nor necessary for
understanding.

Epistemic Exploitation and the Expectation of Storytelling

Sometimes victims choose to tell their stories. They may do so enthusiastically, out of a
sense of obligation, or with motivations that are somewhere in between. But other times, stories are
demanded from them. The explicit or implicit threat may be that if they do not cooperate by
disclosing their traumas and victimhood, then they will not be given the support they need.
According to interviews conducted by Corrigan and Shdaimah, divulging intimate information,
including deeply personal traumas, is essentially required in order for “legal resources, recognition,
and protection” to be made available (2016, 434). Peters cited Kleinman and Kleinman (1997) as
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describing stories as a kind of currency that victims have to exchange with listeners in order to gain
access to services they need (like case management, federal benefits, housing) (2010, 18).

Court diversion programs that work with people arrested for prostitution-related offenses
often encourage defendants “to tell their stories, offer compelling explanations of their behavior,
and emerge as full and complex human beings” (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016,434). According to
Corrigan and Shdaimah, courts “use questionings to elicit information in ways that justify prostitute
women’s claims to resources and recognition” while committed to “the fundamental belief that
prostitute women are victims.” Defendants are told to “come clean of their secrets” in the same way
that defendants in drug diversion courts are expected to come clean about their drug use (2016, 46162). Participants in various prostitution diversion programs studied by Leon and Shdaimah reported
that court representatives were “intrusive,” as the researchers report that one program supervisor
told them that she encourages court participants to share their secrets, and advises that keeping
them will lead them down a dark path (2012, 259).

When marginalized people attempt to resist epistemic exploitation by disengaging, this can
be interpreted as confirmation of whatever skeptical or critical attitudes may have been assumed
about that person. As Corrigan and Shdaimah note, “[c]ompliance is one of the most important
ways that women establish their intelligibility, the therefore their worth, to criminal justice actors”
(2016, 467). Non-compliance will, in most cases, not be met with understanding, sympathy, or
support. Rather, it is likely to frustrate the person asking that the marginalized person provide a
convincing case for their oppression or victimhood, who then has the power to withhold resources
and recognition.
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One woman involved with a treatment court in Philadelphia reported that a staff member
insisted that she had a history of trauma and that she disclose it. When she denied this
characterization, “a probation supervisor accused her of being ‘evasive’ and ‘dishonest.’” In her
words “I just felt like I was being abused all over again” (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016, 477).
Compelling marginalized people to expose parts of their lives that they are not comfortable
disclosing in order to convince listeners in positions of authority who are gatekeepers to resources
that those marginalized people need is a manifestation of epistemic exploitation. But such
requirements also leave victims vulnerable to other kinds of harms. To begin, it is not always safe for
victims to be open about their experiences. Traffickers do pose a threat to some people’s safety or
the safety of their family members. Many victims may have negative or even traumatic experiences
with law enforcement in their pasts. Disclosing such private information may mean one’s life is
totally uprooted, including where one lives, who one talks to, and how one makes a living.
Furthermore, discloser of intimate and possibly painful details may be emotionally difficult.
Schwarz, Kennedy, and Britton also note that survivors of trafficking could be retraumatized as they
“are called upon to tell and retell their stories within the judicial system and research studies” (2017,
3). This is compounded by the ever-looming threat that even disclosure will not result in their being
believed.

While such programs may tacitly or explicitly promise victims that they will receive
compassionate treatment and care if they expose their traumas and vulnerabilities to the court,
scholars have argued that access to compassionate treatment is more dependent on a person’s ability
to convincingly appeal to the listener’s ideas about what a victim is like than the reality of their
situation. This expectation of the performance of victimhood is a manifestation of epistemic
exploitation, and the requirement that display their trauma in a way that is interpretable to those who
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have the power to control whether the defendant has a good outcome increases the likelihood that
the marginalized person’s efforts to educate others about the nature of their oppression will fail. A
defendant unwilling or unable to present a convincing portrayal of trauma may be given a harsher
mandate (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016, 434). Peters interviewed a prosecutor she calls Kyle who
admits that deciding whether or not someone should be processed through the system as a
trafficking victim is “often times a gut check” (2010, 93). Of course, such a subjective and imprecise
method of evaluation means victims, who are likely to have their credibility unduly downgraded
because of aspects of their social identities, may be dismissed as unreliable. In such cases, epistemic
exploitation (the marginalized person has been asked to convince the outsider of their own
oppression), testimonial injustice (the marginalized person is not given due credibility because of
their social identity), and posturing (the outsider has inappropriately deemed themselves an
epistemic authority) have all occurred.

We certainly do not take it to be the case that everyone must reveal their most personal and
traumatic experiences in order to be trustworthy or to be seen as deserving of good treatment or
credibility. Someone uninterested in baring their soul to strangers would typically be thought of as
reasonable or even prudent. But if that person is a victim of sexual violence, especially one
interested in humane treatment by the criminal justice system, then this reticence is often interpreted
as noncompliance, incriminating, and justification for adversarial treatment.

Epistemic Exploitation and the Risk of Testimonial Smothering

Because of the risks that accompany epistemic resistance, epistemic exploitation can have the
terrible effect of driving marginalized people into silence. Berenstain highlights the role skeptical
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responses from those in privileged positions may play in leading speakers to self-silence to avoid the
risks involved with attempting to have a conversation with someone who is not a competent hearer
(2016, 580-581). This harm, described by Dotson, is one of testimonial smothering.

For example, before Blasey Ford’s story was leaked, she had resigned herself to silence out
of a conviction that sharing her story would not change anything, asking, “Why suffer through the
annihilation if it’s not going to matter at all?” (quoted by Lenz, 2019).

In 2019, I attended a discussion at the Rebellious Lawyering Conference hosted at Yale
University where a panel of sex workers discussed how lawyers can provide advocacy and support
for people engaged in commercial sex. All members of the panel expressed frustration with the ways
that some anti-trafficking advocates have cast a wide net and defined trafficking to include most if
not all of sex work. They reported feeling that they could not complain about their experiences or
talk about what actually is dangerous or uncomfortable about being a sex worker without it
somehow being used against them. If they complained, then they feared they were providing fodder
for those who wanted to say that their work is inherently oppressive and coercive. In one panel
member, Kaya Lin’s, words “If you are a sex worker, you can’t have bad days.”

Another member of the panel, Lorelei Lee, describes elsewhere how she “pretended all of
[sex work] was a kind of adventure. That what I gained from it was more than rent,” to fend against
the common response of pity when other people discovered she was a sex worker (2019). This
pretending prevented her from also sharing the hard parts of trading sex - being paid less than
promised, being violated, and dealing with times that she did not want to do that work at all. But this
pretending, despite its costs, was preferred over the alternative of repeatedly attempting to convince

144

outsiders that her mistreatment mattered. In Tarana Burke’s words, “[w]e shouldn’t have to perform
our pain over and over again for the sake of your awareness” (2018).

In these examples, Blasey Ford, Lin, and Lee all report feeling pressured into silence when
confronted with the impossible demands to explain their own mistreatment and oppression while
also being denied the credibility necessary to do so. These are all cases of testimonial smothering,
which occurs when epistemically oppressed people choose or are coerced into not engaging in
conversations because those conversations are too risky, possibly because other people in those
conversations have demonstrated in the past that they’re unwilling or unable to properly receive the
testimony provided by the speaker. In many cases, testimonial smothering is a means of selfprotection; it is a way for folks who have been exploited in the past and who are epistemically
oppressed, to protect their well-being and to avoid putting energy and resources into something that
has proved to be harmful or futile. Silence may also be a way to avoid other kinds of threats, like
arrest or deportation.

There is a collective loss when testimonial smothering occurs, as all outsiders lose the
opportunity to gain access to valuable epistemic resources. Testimonial smothering prevents
knowledge from entering the epistemic marketplace. But of course, the harm that comes from
testimonial smothering is asymmetrical. Ultimately those who are in a relatively privileged position
are mostly fine without these additional epistemic concepts that aren’t being introduced because of
the silencing of those who are oppressed, whereas oppressed folks are further harmed because their
experiences continue to be made invisible and illegible.
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While demonstrating epistemic exploitation and testimonial smothering, the comments of
Lee and Lin also point to the power of the threat of posturing, as the panel members feel they must
conceal their thoughts and beliefs because they may be misconstrued or misrepresented by outsiders
who feel they are better positioned to make sense of those experiences than the subject themselves.

Avoiding or Mitigating the Harm of Epistemic Exploitation

When social movements aimed at improving collective understanding of the experiences of
epistemically marginalized people make use of a storytelling strategy, the weight of the request that
oppressed people provide this labor should be recognized and given due respect and appreciation.
At the very least, subjects should be met with open-minded, receptive listeners. They should also be
appropriately compensated for their time. To avoid casting speakers as mere informants, subjects
must be given “full and equal epistemic cooperation” (Medina 2012, 204). Finally, it is important to
consider the possibility that when subjects are silent in conversations about their oppression, it may
be because they have elected to disengage to avoid epistemic exploitation and not because they are
unable to make sense of or describe their experiences.

4.4 Posturing

“Save us from our saviors.” - Slogan of VAMP, a collective of sex workers
“How can you say this is a rescue when we were arrested?” – Shan Women’s Action Network report, quoted by
McKelvey, 2004
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Outsiders who occupy positions of privilege, or expertise (like social workers, lawyers,
academics, or activists) may have the authority and influence to improve collective understanding of
the experiences of people who are hermeneutically marginalized, like victims of sexual violence.
They may be considered more credible than victims, and thus less likely to have their testimony
disregarded or downgraded. They may be able to speak in spaces and to others in positions of
power in ways that are not available to marginalized victims. For these reasons, outsider allies may
have the opportunity and even an obligation to try to right epistemic wrongs through consciousness
raising efforts.

But we cannot lose sight of the fact that this also puts outsider allies in the position of
gatekeepers. When engaged in the practice of consciousness raising, or when enforcing regulations
or distributing resources, outsiders may find themselves making determinations of who “counts” as
a victim based on their own feelings, judgments, and assessments of whether the person in question
is behaving as they expect a victim would.

In such cases, an outsider may be guilty of posturing. Posturing occurs when a listener
inappropriately positions themselves in a way that suggests they are the epistemic peer of a speaker.
This harm constitutes an injustice if the listener’s presumption that they are qualified to scrutinize
the testimony of the speaker is produced by an ethically and epistemologically culpable error, like a
prejudiced attitude directed toward the speaker. Assessing whether someone is or is not guilty of
posturing will be difficult in practice. In many cases, we will not be able to determine with certainty
if this harm or wrong has occurred, as we will not have enough information to determine whether
the listener’s assessment of themselves as appropriately situated to judge the speaker’s testimony is
mistaken or not. But because of the possibility that the testimony of less socially powerful speakers
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will be treated with less than due credibility because of their social identity, and given the significant
harms that are caused when these speakers are degraded as knowers, we should tread carefully when
even the risk of posturing is present.

Posturing during consciousness raising efforts can occur when outsiders presume to be
epistemic authorities on the experiences of marginalized people. When presented with the testimony
of insiders, outsiders, even with the best of intentions, may posture and consider themselves to be
an epistemic peer to the person who is hermeneutically marginalized. They may express skepticism
about what they are being told about the other person’s experience. They may insist that the speaker
do more work to provide a convincing case that they are, in fact, oppressed (epistemic exploitation),
or they may call upon that person to consider views or opinions that undermine their epistemic
agency. Posturing on the part of outsiders may lead marginalized folks to silence themselves,
expectant that if they speak they will be inappropriately challenged by people who have mistaken
themselves to be epistemic peers. This may lead to testimonial smothering, and in extreme cases,
hermeneutical death. Posturing may also incline outsiders to believe they are best positioned to
define an experience they have not had. Thus, posturing may be involved in hermeneutical hijacking,
which we will discuss in the next section.

Posturing as a Persistent Threat for Some Species of Hermeneutical Injustice

In some cases, it may be that outsiders are better positioned not only to generate
hermeneutical resources for understanding the experiences of those subjects, but also to apply them.
This may be true when the species of hermeneutical injustice is one of separation or exclusion,
meaning relevant epistemic resources are available to outsiders, but at least some subjects of the
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experience at hand do not have access to the relevant hermeneutical resources to make sense of
their experiences. In such cases, an outsider who is skeptical of or disagrees with an insider’s
testimony or perspective is not guilty of posturing, as they are, in fact, an epistemic peer of the
speaker. They have as good, or possibly even better, of an understanding of the topic at hand.

However, there is good reason to worry that the voices of outsider advocates will take on a
disproportionately large significance given that it is likely that many outsider advocates have a degree
of social power that will result in their opinions and judgments being taken seriously even when the
value of opinions and judgments expressed by victims of sexual violence are unjustly downgraded
because of their social identities. If outsider advocates and epistemically marginalized insiders
disagree about how best to describe or evaluate some type of experience, in many circumstances the
outsider advocate may have an unfair advantage in swaying public opinion.

Furthermore, an outsider advocate can support a position that is accurate, even one that
aligns with the perspective of insiders, but still be guilty of posturing. Posturing is an epistemic harm
that is not dependent on the judgments endorsed by outsiders being untrue. Whether posturing has
occurred depends, rather, on the inappropriate presumption of epistemic authority. If a correct
judgment is formed, but the outsider bases their reasoning on prejudiced assumptions about the
speaker or if they refuse to consider the subject’s perspectives and opinions in their assessment, then
the listener will be unwarranted in their determination that they are an epistemic peer of the speaker,
nonetheless. Thus, even if a hermeneutical lacuna has been successfully identified by an outsider, an
additional epistemic injustice could be perpetrated in that identification. This possibility, that an
outsider could accurately diagnose a hermeneutical lacuna and advocate for conceptual changes that
insiders either do not have the epistemic tools to make sense of or even actively disavow,
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demonstrates that in the process of improving awareness, epistemic harms are difficult to avoid.
Rather than preventing any and all epistemic wrongdoing, the goal should be to engage in
thoughtful, subject-centered,19 efforts to improve collective understanding.

4.4.1 Posturing and Advocacy

McKinnon notes that allies who see themselves as working with and on behalf of
marginalized people may sometimes give the testimony of insiders diminished credibility, relying
more on “their own fist-hand experience over the testimony of the person they’re supposed to be
supporting.” She adds that this may occur when the “‘ally’ suspects that the affected person isn’t
properly epistemically situated” (2017, 169). As we reviewed in Chapter Two, many advocates believe
victims of both sexual assault and sex trafficking are not epistemically situated in such a way that
they are able to properly assess and articulate their experiences. This presumption that insiders are
ignorant of their own experiences creates a dynamic rife for posturing.

Risk of Posturing in the Identification of Victims

While the TVPA does distinguish sex work from sex trafficking, commonly cited statistics,
publicity around the topic, and law enforcement strategies obscure the line between the two. We
reviewed elements of that controversy earlier in this chapter.

19

Service providers often state something along the lines of “survivors are the experts on

their own lives.” This kind of mantra is intended to fend against posturing.
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Chief Judge Lippman, who pioneered the expansion of the New York City Human
Trafficking Intervention Courts (HTICs) in 2013, stated “[w]e have come to recognize that the vast
majority of children and adults charged with prostitution offenses are commercially exploited or at
risk of exploitation” (Un-Meetable Promises 2018, 23). The very fact that the court is called a
human trafficking intervention court and that cases related to prostitution are diverted there is
indicative of an assumed synonymy of sex work and sex trafficking. According to a report produced
by a partnership between the Yale School of Public Health, Yale Law School, and the Sex Workers
Project of the Urban Justice Center, the goals of the HTIC courts rest on the assumptions that
“trafficking is, at its base, equivalent with all prostitution, prostitution is exploitative, and prostitution
is criminal” (Un-Meetable Promises 2018, 41). Judge Fernando Camacho of the Queens Criminal
Court describes the HTIC defendants he sees as “poor, unfortunate, lost souls who have no choice
but to do this” (quoted in Un-Meetable Promises 2018, 27). Leon and Shdaimah report that
stakeholders in a prostitution diversion court they studied “debated for months over whether
prostitute women ‘needed’ to be coerced into accepting help for their own good” (2015, 262). To
argue such a paternalistic point, stakeholders must consider themselves appropriate epistemic
authorities capable of evaluating the question, even when the apparent necessity of coercion
indicates the court’s assessment of what is in the defendant and purported victim’s interest is at odds
with their own self-assessment.

Abolitionists assert outright that all commercial sex either is or directly facilitates sex
trafficking and that all sex workers are exploited, regardless of whether they see themselves that way.
For example, when lobbying for how trafficking would be defined by the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence and Protection Act in 2000, the National Organization of Women (NOW) argued that the
bill must identify punishments for “all traffickers who lure or force women into prostitution
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regardless of whether or not their victims ‘consent’” (cited by Chapkis 2003, 928). The inclusion of
scare quotes around “consent,” as noted by Chapkis, suggests NOW does not believe legitimate
consent is possible.

In a report on trafficking in New York City informed by interviews with “top law
enforcement officials, prosecutors, advocates and victims from around the five boroughs,” The New
York Post states that one of the reasons it is so hard to prosecute traffickers is because “[t]he women
and girls often don’t see themselves as victims” (Gonen, 2018). This statement renders victims who
are not girls or women completely invisible, while also taking for granted that those women and girls
who do not self-identify as victims are mistaken. In Chapter Two, I quoted Hughes as saying that
“[f]ew women and girls in prostitution are willing to acknowledge that they have or are controlled by
a pimp. The pimp has convinced her that he is a boyfriend or someone who cares about and looks
after her” (2005, 15). While she describes the experience of coming to see one’s partner as actually
being one’s trafficker as an admission that is potentially “psychologically devastating,” she provides
no support for this claim.

While it could be that an exploiter’s psychological control over a victim or a victim’s
reluctance to conceive of their circumstances as exploitative or abusive may make it difficult for that
person to see themselves as being taken advantage of, the confidence expressed by Hughes and the
other self-appointed experts cited above that they can see when someone is being trafficked or
exploited when the purported victim cannot demonstrate a concerning degree of assumed epistemic
authority. Again, that these outsiders are not themselves victims of trafficking does not necessitate
that they are harming or wronging insiders when they determine that they are the insider’s epistemic
peers or even that they possess superior hermeneutical resources that enable them to see clearer
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what victims themselves cannot see. I am not in a position to determine whether these outsiders are
or are not posturing, but it is clear to me that they risk posturing when they reach conclusions about
how best to categorize the experiences of those they believe they speak for, and the risk is greater
when those they believe they speak for actively resist those ascriptions.

There is also a risk of posturing when people are being ruled out as victims. When outsiders
assume that they occupy an appropriate epistemic position to evaluate the experiences of others,
they may inappropriately use that judgment to determine what is or is not forgivable,
understandable, or believable in a given circumstance. Peters reports that a federal prosecutor she
interviewed felt that sometimes purported victims “strategically misrepresent themselves” (2010,
93). The prosecutor, who she calls Kyle, felt these individuals were coached, he alleges by NGOs, to
say certain things during raids to access desirable benefits and avoid deportation. Peters notes that
“NGO services providers complained that law enforcement agents, in particular, often accused
victims of lying because their stories were incoherent or the agent had a feeling the victim was lying”
(2010, 94). A prosecutor Peters interviews and calls Kyle states that possible victims he encounters
are simultaneously secretive - “They could be afraid of the trafficker, or they might not trust you, or
all of those kinds of reasons that make them vulnerable.” - and deceitful - “But, on the other hand
these women are subject to be dishonest with you because they know they can get money and they
can get freedom” (2010, 93).

Of course, such feelings may be mistaken, especially when they do not take into
consideration the effects of trauma. To assume that one’s feelings about whether another person has
done a good job telling a consistent, convincing story about their experiences requires assuming that
one has the epistemic authority to make such a call. Furthermore, it may be that the testimony
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provided by speakers in such cases is unfairly treated as less credible because the speakers are likely
to be members of marginalized groups.

While the advocates quoted above do not identify themselves as survivors of sex trafficking
or as sex workers, they have concluded that they have the epistemic authority to define both
trafficking and sex work, nonetheless. Further, they are so confident in their epistemic authority, they
believe they can recognize circumstances of trafficking even when those they identify as victims do
not and protest that classification. In doing so, these outsiders presume to be experts on the
experiences of those marginalized people and risk epistemically harming or wronging those
individuals by posturing.

Risk of Posturing and Infantilization of Survivors and Sex Workers

Doezema argues that sex workers who are not victims of trafficking are rendered illegible
according to the abolitionist’s proposed hermeneutical schema. To deny that there can be nonexploitative sex work is to take the position that sex workers who are not exploited are impossible
and to disregard those who disagree as “deluded or frauds” (2005, 74). She adds, “the notion of a
prostitute who is unharmed by her experiences is an ontological impossibility: that which cannot be.
This is the ultimate exercise of power: to deny sex workers our very existence, to insist that we
cannot be” (2005, 74). Bergquist describes this view that “that sex workers are unable to perceive
their own exploitation” as “infantilizing” (2015, 322). In “Cash/Consent,” Lee reports that she has
been told she is “too traumatized, or too brainwashed, to understand [her] own experiences,” and
that when listeners acknowledge her intelligence they insist she is an outlier and that other people
involved in the sex trade are not as smart. To this she responds “[e]very sex worker I have ever met
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is as smart as I am; many are smarter” (2019). By portraying sex workers and trafficking victims in
this way, it becomes easier to discount testimony from those who resist the label of victim.

When outsiders posture, they may come to believe that they know what is in an alleged
victim’s best interest even when that person disagrees. This paternalistic approach can result in
purported victims being treated in ways that are hurtful and cruel. For example, a sex worker in
Canada named Mi reported that during a two-month detention she was not allowed to contact her
friends or family because the judge “said they had to protect me” despite her insistence that she was
not being trafficked or exploited (Lam 2018, 14).

If both trafficking victims and sex workers are portrayed as naive, helpless, uneducated,
manipulatable, or brainwashed, then activists who ascribe a label to their experiences that they resist
can more easily dismiss their objections as uninformed. For advocates who conceptualize those
involved in trafficking and sex work in this way - as essentially inactive, exploited, and without
choices - denying their ability to understand or define their experiences is a relatively uncomplicated
step. There is a persistent representation of victims of commercial sexual exploitation and sex
workers as being incapable of accurately assessing their situations and needs. For example, Kathleen
Barry, founder of CATW, states that women who describe their labor as sex work do so “out of
despair…because it seems impossible to conceive of any other way to treat prostitute women with
dignity and respect than through normalizing their exploitation” (quoted by Doezema 2005, 73).

When confronted with the fact that some sex workers do not identify as victims or explicitly
deny that the label applies to them, abolitionists like Barry respond by dismissing their testimony
and re-asserting their own presumed epistemic authority. A testimonial injustice in and of itself, this
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tendency also sets the stage for allowing outsiders - positioning themselves as more knowledgeable
and objective - to hijack the process of crafting hermeneutical tools for understanding the
experiences of both sex workers and trafficking victims. I will discuss this in more detail in the next
section. Such complete erasure, were it to be successful, would result in hermeneutical death.

Risk of Posturing When Comparing Sex Trafficking to Labor Trafficking

In a briefing on child sex trafficking, Representative Chris Smith describes trafficking as
“destroying a woman’s soul and body,” and states that the women forced into commercial sex by a
convicted trafficker had their lives “destroyed” (U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 2012). While some victims do feel this way - a survivor identified as Mr. B. testifying at the
same event shared his story and stated “[m]y life has been ruined…” - the sweeping statement about
all survivors and focus on those who are women (despite the survivor-speaker at the event being a
man) is presumptuous and threatens to erase the experiences of those who would describe their
lives and reactions differently.

Similarly, Peters quotes a federal law enforcement agent she calls Jim as saying, when
explaining why he views sex trafficking cases as “more important” than “forced labor” cases, that
“[w]hat happens in sex trafficking is horrendous. It takes everything away from a person.” He adds,
“In my opinion it’s worse than murdering someone, to continuously degrade someone like that”
(2010, 109-110).
While some survivors describe their own stories in ways that are reflected by the sentiments
expressed by Jim and Representative Smith, others see their lives and futures less bleakly. Peters
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reports that many victims “emerge from their experiences resilient and motivated to move forward”
(2010, 176, also, see Sylvia’s optimism in Peters’ work 158-59).

Agent Jim elaborates on his conviction that sex trafficking is worse that labor trafficking,
adding that he believes labor trafficking victims “wanted to come here in the first place,” whereas
most sex trafficking victims did not. This is challenged by evidence that suggests that some victims
who are trafficked after crossing borders were aware that the work they would be doing would
involve commercial sex (Doezema 1999, 24 and 32, citing GAATW study and Wijers and LapChew), though they may have been deceived about the conditions in which they would be working
and living. In such cases, sex trafficking victims have a great deal in common with labor trafficking
victims, as the problems they face are best understood by considering the conditions of their labor.

When outsiders determine that they are appropriately positioned to make judgments about
what kind of exploitation is worse, particularly when they do so without or in opposition to input
from victims, they risk epistemically harming or wronging victims by posturing. When they use that
assuredness of their own insight to motivate arguments about trafficking to influence policy and
legislation, they also hijack the process through which collective understanding could be improved.
We will explore the threat of hermeneutical hijacking in the next section.

Conclusion

I do not know if being sexually exploited is as bad as or more terrible than being forced,
defrauded, or coerced into performing other kinds of labor, and I suspect that there is no definitive
answer to the question of which is worse. Rather, the awfulness of instances of trafficking will be
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more a function of the conditions, duration, and means of control exerted in particular instances of
forced labor, as well as incomparable considerations of particular victim’s responses to and ability to
recover from what has happened to them. I also do not feel confident I know where to draw the line
between intentional, consensual sex work and commercial sexual exploitation.

But importantly, it is not necessary that we endorse any particular view to identify the
statements and actions of outsider advocates like those quoted above as potentially harming victims
and other marginalized people through posturing. It is consistent with my presentation of posturing
that abolitionists could, as a matter of fact, be right, when they conclude all commercial sex is
inherently exploitative, and that victims who do not recognize themselves as such are suffering from
denial or delusions. Agent Jim could be correct when he concludes that sex trafficking is much
worse than labor trafficking, and therefore worthy of more attention. But even if they are right, the
abolitionists and Jim could be guilty of posturing. That is because posturing occurs when outsiders
deem themselves to be the appropriate epistemic authorities capable of evaluating the experiences
of marginalized people, independent of whether they exercise their self-appointed authority to reach
the right or wrong conclusions. Thus, the quotes I have selected in this section were not chosen
because I feel the speakers are especially misguided, but rather to demonstrate the tendency outsider
advocates have toward presenting themselves as authorities on these experiences, even when their
judgments are resisted by those they see themselves as advocating on behalf of.

4.5 Hermeneutical Hijacking

“[W]e must be mindful of who speaks and who raises awareness of whom and on behalf of whom. Those of us
who hold the power of production and distribution of knowledge must let the people in vulnerable and exploitative
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situations, or in irregular work, speak for themselves and demand the change they need” - Sharapov, Hoff, and
Gerasimov 2019, 10

Consciousness raising is a valuable strategy for improving collective understanding precisely
because outsiders may have social advantages, including credibility excesses, that can be leveraged to
bring about the desired result and in a way that is not as costly to the epistemically marginalized
person. Furthermore, if it is possible that members of other social groups have the interpretive
tools to make sense of an experience while subjects of that experience lack those tools, a species of
hermeneutical injustice Goetze calls separation, then it may be the case the that sometimes these
outsiders have to take a lead role in generating and dissemination interpretive tools because subjects
themselves do not have them.

But, as we covered in the last section, separation is rife with the potential for further
producing further harms, both epistemic and practical. Because outsiders positioned to use their
privilege to improve collective understanding have greater social power and credibility, the concepts
that they champion are most likely to permeate into collective understanding. What they contest or
ignore will likely remain invisible or may be met with even greater skepticism. At times, these
outsiders may come to believe that their concepts and definitions are more accurate than those
advocated for by insiders, and they may endorse them to others during consciousness raising efforts.

In Chapter One I introduced a type of hermeneutical injustice I called hermeneutical
hijacking. Hermeneutical hijacking occurs when outsiders involve themselves in the process of
creating new hermeneutical resources in ways that make it harder for the subjects of those
experiences to develop and disseminate their own interpretive resources. Hermeneutical hijacking is
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a danger closely related to posturing. It occurs when an outsider takes hold of the project of
defining the experiences of an epistemically marginalized group and presents themselves as an (or
even, the) authority capable of facilitating collective understanding. When outsider advocates have
greater social power, they will be more likely to be believed and to have their voices amplified, and
thus they may come to dominate the conversation about the experiences of marginalized insiders.
This can make it less likely that the voices of those insiders can or will be heard. As Alcoff notes in
“Problem of Speaking for Others,” even well-intentioned speakers may “reinforce racist, imperialist
conceptions and perhaps also further silence the lesser-privileged grips own ability to speak and be
heard” when they take themselves to be capable of speaking for the marginalized (1992, 26).
Hermeneutical hijacking is not characterized by the intentions with which outsiders operate or even
how accurate their representations of the experiences that have been illegible are. Rather it is
distinguished by the potentially problematic position outsiders occupy, which can lead to their
domination the processes of knowledge production; they risk speaking not only for, but also over
the marginalized.

4.5.1 Hermeneutical Hijacking and Advocacy

Critics of the abolitionists’ view of trafficking and those who suggest current anti-trafficking
advocacy is generating a sort of a moral panic argue that abolitionists have popularized myths about
trafficking that distort the truth. Similarly, critics of changing and expanding definitions of sexual
assault have argued that these advocates have not exposed heretofore unrecognized cases of sexual
violence, but have reclassified regular, blameless behavior as violent. For example, Koss’ Ms.
Magazine study inspired criticisms that accused feminists of attempting to “redefine seduction as a
form of rape,” (Podhoretz, 1991) and suggested the expanded understanding had the ulterior motive
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of “giv[ing] women a simple way of thinking about sex that externalizes guilt, remorse or conflict”
(Is Date Rape a Fraud?, 1990).

These distortions are sometimes presented as unintended side effects of work carried out
with the best of intentions. Alternatively, some critics argue the truth is disregarded or
misrepresented for political gain. For example, critics of the work of Koss and others who have
advocated for greater attention to the problem of sexual assault by citing alarmingly high rates of
such assaults have suggested that those numbers are intended to elicit strong public responses.
Gilbert describes these statistics as “advocacy numbers,” which “embody less an effort at scientific
understanding than an attempt to persuade the public that a problem is vastly larger than commonly
recognized” (quoted by Rutherford 2017, 101).

Doezema argues that the narrative that trafficking has spiked relies on concepts of feminine
vulnerability and innocence that are mythical. Importantly, Doezema’s conception of mythicalness
does not entail distortion of truth, but instead recognizes the performative nature of statistics and
narratives like those put forth by advocates. In her words, a myth is not “a distortion of truth, but
rather a performative expression that interpellates, or brings into being, a vision of society” (2005,
65). Because what it means to be trafficked is without a fixed definition, and arguably the boundaries
of such an experience are essentially changing, discussions about what trafficking is contribute to the
evolution of that meaning being sought.

Similarly, Stanley Cohen’s notion of moral panic does not require that the subject of the
panic is not real. Rather, it means that the “condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges
to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests” (1, 1972). Collective attitudes about
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the subject of the panic take on a strong, maybe even out-sized gravity, representing a great deal
about our social values.

According to Rutherford, social scientists do not merely measure what they study. Rather,
they play an active role in creating and shaping reality. Thus, they have the ability to generate
hermeneutical resources that at times may not reflect the beliefs or attitudes of those they are
studying (Rutherford argues for such a performative understanding of social science methods in
2017, 102). Rutherford presents her analysis of the performative natter of social science as an
explanation of the controversy surrounding and defense of Koss’ work on acquaintance rape. But
this commentary on the way social science interacts with the world it aims to describe - that it does
not occupy some outside, objective position - also highlights the potential risk that social scientists,
who occupy positions relative social power, will exert undue influence when trying to define certain
experiences. The fact that so many of the individuals identified as victims of sexual assault by Koss’
study did not self-identify their experiences as rape has been used to criticize the survey method. By
identifying these individuals as victims despite their apparent denial that such a descriptor applies to
them, we may worry advocates risk speaking for those individuals, hijacking the process of epistemic
resource development.

It is hermeneutical hijacking that Doezema is worried about when she says “I am concerned
with how certain definitions of [trafficking] become dominant, whose knowledge is accepted and
whose is sidelined, and the social practices involved in constructing and legitimating knowledge”
(2005, 62), and asks about “the relationships among those who shape meanings of ‘trafficking in
women’ and between these ‘discourse masters and the object of their concern: the ‘sex slaves’”
(2005, 64). In the case of activism around the issue of sex trafficking, some survivors and many sex
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workers have argued that outsider activists have hijacked the tools for developing and the means for
disseminating conceptual tools.

Many sex workers and some trafficking victims vigorously objected to the passing of
SIESTA/FOSTA, and often their objections appealed to the inappropriateness and harm of
outsiders presuming to understand the lives of those involved in commercial sex and taking control
of the means for altering collective understanding of those experiences. Kristen DiAngelo, executive
director of the Sex Workers Outreach Project, who identifies herself as a trafficking survivor,
protested the SESTA/FOSTA bill saying, “I understand that very well-meaning people want to help,
but I also understand that they don’t know anything about our lives and what we live through”
(quoted by Lampen, 2018). We can understand DiAngelo’s statement to mean that those supporting
and advancing the bill are posturing when they take themselves to be appropriately positioned to
determine what is in the best interests of victims and sex workers, and hijacking the process of
generating and proliferating epistemic resources to make sense of the experiences of members of
those groups. A sex worker named Melissa stated to the Huffington post in an interview that “[t]his
stupid bill literally has taken away the one thing I felt as if I had control over in my life.”
Importantly, many sex workers report that the passing of SESTA/FOSTA has interrupted the
ability of people involved in commercial sex to communicate with one another. In the words of
Kendall from Los Angeles, “we mainly rely on our close-knit community and one another for our
safety and well-being. Ripping that away from us puts everyone at risk…” (quoted by McCombs,
2018). Valerie Scott reports that as a sex worker in Canada, her work is made more dangerous and
difficult by new Nordic-like laws that institute harsher punishments for buyers and require
mandatory counseling for sex workers when arrests are made. She states that good clients are more
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hesitant and call from blocked numbers. Predatory clients are emboldened because sex workers
cannot take the steps that were previously available to protect themselves (2015).

Rather than facilitating a better understanding of epistemically marginalized people and
making them safer, the sex workers quoted above feel outsiders have made their lives more
dangerous and voices harder to hear. Representative Ro Khanna was one of the minority of house
members who did not vote in favor of SESTA/FOSTA. Khanna has since stated that “[o]ne of the
travesties of passing FOSTA-SESTA is that the sex worker community was never consulted. They
were never in hearings. They never got to testify” (quoted by Irwin, 2020). In a video he released on
twitter, Khanna states, “We passed these laws without even considering their voice. They didn’t get
to testify in Congress.” When the voices of sex workers are given so little consideration that the
effect is they’ve said nothing, because they have not been meaningfully heard, this is an example
testimonial quieting.

In many spaces where trafficking intervention policies are decided, survivors and victims are
absent. Specialized anti-trafficking task forces have been created in some cities, but Bergquist notes,
“sex workers and their allies are usually not represented” on them (2015, 316). The Empower
Foundation stated in a 2012 report that “[n]o sincere consultations have ever been undertaken with
sex workers to seek their input, assistance, knowledge and experience in designing and implementing
trafficking intervention and prevention strategies without our own industry” (quoted by Bergquist
2015, 318). Kate Zen, co-founder of the sex workers’ rights organization Red Canary Song,
describes the importance of survivor and sex worker led groups like hers, stating migrant sex
workers “don’t have a voice… when it comes to policies that affect their lives” (quoted by Song,
2019). According to Peters, “Trafficked persons are rarely given the opportunity to voice their own
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experiences. They are often viewed at one end of an uncomplicated binary as either helpless victims
with no control over their own circumstances, or criminals because of their status as undocumented
immigrants or prostitutes” (2010, 151).

Conferences attended by social workers, academics, doctors, law enforcement, and politicians
are held to discuss causes of and responses to trafficking, but in some cases, victims are not
meaningfully included. For example, Elizabeth Bernstein describes a 2008 event in which an “allwhite array of panelists spoke to the audience about the urgent need to root out inner-city street
pimps and ‘pimp culture’” (2010, 53). While an exploration of the stereotypes about traffickers and
epistemic injustices committed against those who are cast as the villains - most of whom are men of
color - goes beyond the scope of this paper, this report serves to illustrate the disparity in the social
identities of those who are allegedly involved in trafficking and those who are considered experts on
the subject.

Hermeneutical Hijacking When Determining When and Which Survivor’s Stories are Heard

Survivor stories sometimes appear in spaces where survivors are absent. At a separate event
in 2009, Bernstein describes an activist who told a moving story about a trafficking survivor who
inspired her, the activist, to dedicate herself to anti-trafficking work (Bernstein, 59). Linda Smith,
founder of the anti-trafficking organization Shared Hoped International, often tells a story about
seeing a young woman in the brothel district of Mamba as the start of her being compelled to antitrafficking work. Peters reports hearing Sonia Ossorio, then President of the New York City
Chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW), retelling a buyer’s retelling of a survivor’s
story (2010, 116).
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Inevitably, these stories are repackaged in these tellings. Certain details may be left out,
either accidentally or willfully. Others may be embellished. Telling stories involves making decisions
about what details to include and exclude; it must involve attributing thoughts and feelings to the
victim that no outsider can attribute with certainty. Stories may be synthesized to craft a more
compelling narrative, as good stories bring followers, advocates, and funding. This creative license
threatens to fictionalize a real person’s experiences.

Notably, the telling of these stories also frequently centers the role of the ally or advocate.
Stories about advocates traveling internationally to raise awareness about trafficking and provide
support for alleged trafficking victims are often told as rescue stories, with the activist filling the role
of savior. Politicians and movement leaders sometimes describe themselves as saviors or as speaking
for those who cannot speak for themselves. They persist in these characterizations even when those
they claim to speak for vocally resist their proposed “solutions” and characterizations.20

Hermeneutical Hijacking Rendering Non-Exploited Sex Workers and Non-Women Victims Illegible and
Impossible

Abolitionists do not distinguish between sex trafficking and sex work. Rather, they maintain
that either all sex work is exploitative or all sex work contributes to the maintenance of conditions
that permit exploitation. Linda Smith, a prominent abolitionist advocates, states that, “[n]o girl
20

Lorelei Lee recalls assemblyman Isadore Hall describing himself as a “voice for the

voiceless” (her quote) while advocating for a bill that hundreds of performers in adult films argued
would make their work more dangerous (2019).
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wakes up and looks in the mirror and says, ‘I want to be a prostitute’” (2015). She then goes on to
say that these girls don’t want to grow up and be abused, unable to have families, to be used by men
however they wish. These statements conflate sex work and sex trafficking, suggesting anyone who
would want to engage in commercial sex acts would also want to be mistreated.

Notably, Smith’s statement is not consistent with the statements of some sex workers.
Valerie Scott, for example, shares that she has wanted to be a sex worker since she watched old
Western movies and shows as a kid, and says a friend of hers who is also a sex worker was inspired
by an episode of I Love Lucy (2015). Of course, neither of these women indicated they wanted to
grow up and be mistreated - the kind of life Linda Smith indicates is inevitable for prostitutes - but
they did want to grow up to realize a certain kind of life that involved sex work.

When anti-trafficking advocates like Smith or Hughes present all sex work as exploitative,
they deny the possibility of non-exploited sex workers. In the previous section, I explained how the
depiction of sex workers who resist being classified as victims of exploitation as being in denial,
brainwashed, or delusional creates a significant risk of posturing. By defining trafficking in a way
that includes all sex workers despite many sex workers rejecting that definition, advocates risk
hermeneutically hijacking the process of improving collective understanding of the experiences of
both sex workers and trafficking victims. They make it more difficult for individuals from those
marginalized groups to speak for themselves and be heard by others. They make it more difficult for
definitions that those groups endorse to gain uptake.

Some sex workers and victims who are willing and able to argue against the depiction of
trafficking put forth by the most visible activists and politicians feel that such resistance results in
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their being reclassified as criminals. Doezema argues that abolitionists tend toward a dichotomous
presentation that identifies everyone involved in commercial sex work as either being dangerous
criminals (and thus undeserving of sympathy) or helpless victims (and thus vulnerable and unable to
speak for themselves) (1999, 45). In Doezema’s words, “[t]he myth of trafficking both creates and
limits the discursive space around which these issues can be aired” (1999, 45). Those capable of
shaping the narrative of what trafficking is and who is impacted thereby control the hermeneutical
tools available; they control what counts as legible, scrutable, or reasonable. They define the terms.

The presentation of sexual violence as exclusively impacting women also means that people
who are not identified as women are sometimes denied resources and recognition. While there may
be value in investigating sexual assault and sexual exploitation as gendered forms of violence, most
often inflicted on women by men, that depiction also renders the experiences of men, boys, and
gender non-conforming people invisible.

4.6 Epistemic Appropriation

“How do we talk about our experiences without letting their meaning be stolen?” - Lorelei Lee, 2019

According to Davis, epistemic appropriation occurs when, during hermeneutical dissent,
marginalized folks become detached from the dissemination of new hermeneutical resources they
created or when those resources are then used in ways that disproportionately benefit the powerful
(2018, 705). Thus, while epistemically marginalized subjects are able to contribute to the
development of conceptual tools that make sense of their experiences, they are “prevented from
being recognized” for that labor (2018, 722). Importantly, epistemic appropriation is not a species of
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hermeneutical injustice, as in cases of appropriation, Davis argues there is no conceptual deficit
(resources exist - they are precisely what is being appropriated) and individuals may behave in
culpable ways when participating in the process of conceptual theft (2018, 719).

While I agree with Davis that there a instances where the individuals who appropriate the
hermeneutical resources produced by marginalized people are blameworthy for doing so, I do not
believe individual wrongdoing gets to the core of the injustice brought about by epistemic
appropriation. Davis herself acknowledges that “epistemic appropriate involves individual agents
(some of whom are culpable) and structures alike” (2018, 719). Marginalized knowers may be
unfairly detached from the resources they have created even if no particular, dominantly-situated
knowers intend to exclude them. Rather, the primary wrong of epistemic appropriation is the
continued hermeneutical marginalization and epistemic oppression of victims, even when they have
done work that should prove to any naysayers that they deserve to be full participants in the
production and sharing of hermeneutical resources. The exclusion of the hermeneutically
marginalized from making on impact with and on shared epistemic resources is sustained by their
being detached from their efforts. While in cases of epistemic appropriation, the epistemically
oppressed have succeeded in impacting the collective’s shared epistemic resources, this success is
mediated by the insertion of dominantly-situated knowers and speakers into the process. Exclusion
from knowledge-production processes cannot be executed by any particular listener. Rather, it is the
product of structural prejudice that privileges the resources and ways of communicating available to
some knowers and not others.

If a hermeneutically marginalized knower is detached from their epistemic contributions and
those resources disproportionately benefit the powerful, then the knower is both harmed and
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wronged by epistemic appropriation. This can occur even when individual agents involved in the
appropriation have not behaved in ethically culpable ways.

However, if agents involved in the co-opting of hermeneutical resources developed by
marginalized knowers are or should be aware that their actions unduly benefit the powerful, or if
they are motivated by prejudiced attitudes about the marginalized knowers, then those wrongs are
both structural and interpersonal. In such cases, those agents are culpable for the harms and wrongs
that result from their actions.

4.6.1 Epistemic Appropriation and Advocacy

While I am unsure of whether the hermeneutical resources that anti-trafficking activists have
attempted to introduce into collective understanding have been disproportionately beneficial to the
powerful, it is important to acknowledge that anti-trafficking work does benefit people in relative
positions of social power and privilege. As Kempadoo notes, “[a]ccolades abound for the rescue
work, including a Pulitzer nomination and prize, an honorary doctorate, various awards for human
rights and peace work, appointments as U.N. ambassadors, and Emmy awards for documentaries,
often launching individual campaigners to celebrity status” (2015, 12).

To start, there are political benefits for involvement with anti-trafficking work. For example,
Grant argues that this work allows conservative advocates to engage in work that is moralizing and
humanitarian. It’s an opportunity to “adopt a new identity: neither preachers nor scolds, but
defenders of human rights” (2018). Weitzer argues that moral crusades (he believes the antitrafficking movement to be one) aim to achieve both instrumental and symbolic goals. Those

170

symbolic goals provide an opportunity to “redraw or bolster normative boundaries and moral
standards” (2007, 448). According to some, the unlikely alliance between some radical feminists and
evangelical conservatives was no accident. Rather, it was a vision of Michael Horowitz’s. In ‘Beyond
Strange Bedfellows,’ Melissa Gira Grant asserts that Horowitz had previously attempted to form a
left-right coalition by stoking passions about religious freedom. Horowitz introduced the problem
of trafficking to Smith, who introduced the Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act to the House in
1999 (Peters 2010, 44 citing Skinner 2008). Grant states that Horowitz and other conservatives like
Representative Chris Smith were drawn to the issue of human trafficking specifically because the
sexual components of the conversation. This would explain why the focus of human trafficking
conversations has historically been on sex rather than labor trafficking. While they both involve
coercion, only one brings with it the salacious, media attention-grabbing elements of sex.

Abolitionist anti-trafficking work also aligns well with conservative values about sex and
sexuality. The founder of an anti-trafficking group called Evangelicals for Social Action states that
abolitionist work “certainly fits with an evangelical concern for sexual integrity. Sex is reserved for a
marriage relationship where this is a lifelong covenant between a man and a woman” (quoted by
Weitzer, 2007, 451). A federal prosecutor interviewed by Peters that she calls Mark suggests that
some abolitionists may willfully misunderstand criminal responses to trafficking and sex work that
recognize a spectrum ranging from willful and intentional to trafficking. In doing so, Peters notes
that “he suggests the conflation of trafficking and prostitution is both purposeful and political”
(2010, 120). If this is the case, if the conflating is politically motivated, then this may be an instance
of willful ignorance. Peters quotes Berman as saying that, “[t]he mere existence of prostitution is
antithetical to their moral system. Thus, constructing human trafficking as sex trafficking allows the
Christian right to reiterate and reinvigorate their other ideological positions, ultimately equating
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loose sexuality with criminality” (Berman 2006, 278 quoted by Peters 2010, 54). Such statements
suggest abolitionists’ comments about the inherently exploitative nature of sex work seem
duplicitous, since they suggest their concern is not so much with whether sex workers are choosing
their work, but with the nature of what they may be choosing.

Berenstein also notes that the alignment of some feminists with conservative groups has
happened at times of significant conservative political power. This may be because agendas that are
consistent with those conservative values are more likely to be successful and receive funding.
Reporting terrifyingly high rates of trafficking, even when those numbers are impossible to
substantiate, makes it easier to secure funding and instantiate harsh punishments for alleged
traffickers (Weitzer 2012, 1348). Faith-based organizations have been especially well-positioned to
capitalize on increases in funding, with Caroline Tetschner, State Department spokeswoman at the
time, reporting that the number of religious organizations receiving funding increasing from 7
percent to 22 percent from 2002 to 2003 (McKelvey, 2004). Doezema accuses some organizations
of appealing to the “mythical resonance” of trafficking to gain access to publicity and funding
(1999, 45).

For those who are opposed to people from certain parts of the world immigrating to the
United States, treating immigration and work in the sex industry as synonymous with trafficking not
only criminalizes the work of migrants, but morally impugns it as well. Rather than refusing to
welcome such immigrants to the country based on their immigrant identity, they can be refused on
more apparently humanitarian grounds. Schwarz, Kennedy, and Britton note that scholars (they cite
Davydova, Agustin, and Bernstein) “have argued that Europe’s anti-trafficking movement is a thinly
veiled attempt to surveil and maintain national borders” (2017, 8). Chapkis argues in “Trafficking
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Migration and the Law” that depictions of trafficking villainize “guilty migrants” through gendered
depictions of guilt and innocence, while also tying the protection of “innocents” to their
compliance with efforts of prosecutors (2003). In a review, Sharapov, Hoff, and Gerasimov note
that the horror of trafficking has been invoked to discourage and raise fears about immigration by
the likes of the European Commission and President Trump (2019, 3).

Critics of Koss’ findings on acquaintance rape “charge that Koss and other feminist
researchers were overruling women’s own perceptions and engaging in ‘politically-motivated
distortion’” (Rutherford 2017, 108 quoting Koss 2011).21 Roiphe’s criticisms of Koss’ study and the
popularity of Warshaw’s I Never Called it Rape suggest that part of what is so troubling about the
expanded definition of sexual assault is that the evolution of the concept is propelled by certain
people with certain motives. In particular, she suggests that the discovery of a crisis of rape was
utilized by feminists to popularize a particular kind of patriarchal critique and a sort of feminist
agenda. This could be understood as an accusation that the feminists Roiphe’s objects to have either
hijacked or appropriated the hermeneutical resources introduced to make better sense of sexual
violence, though Roiphe considers those resources to be misguided rather than revelatory.

4.7 Narrative Constraint

“But whatever community coalitions we build, whatever work we do to speak about our own lives even when it is
dangerous to do so, our voices will continue to be ignored if what we’re trying to say doesn’t fit into preexisting
narratives. Not only have the legal and cultural frameworks of the past two decades shaped the public meaning of our

21

Critics include the likes of Roiphe, Hoff Sommers, and Gilbert.
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work, caricaturing us as permanent victims or as “empowered” businesswomen (and in these narratives, we are always
“women”); they have shaped our ability to even point out their faulty premises.” - Lorelei Lee, 2019

Storytelling as a means of improving collective understanding is necessarily limited. A person
is only able to speak from their particular perspective. No group of people is monolithic, so as
certain stories come to shape the collectively accepted narrative, the experiences of individuals with
different perspectives will not be represented and may become further marginalized. When, in the
process of improving collective understanding about the experiences of epistemically marginalized
people, certain kinds of experiences come to be seen as representative in a way that further
marginalizes the experiences of others with different experiences, I will refer to this as narrative
constraint.

Accepted narratives may even come to be prescriptive, such that victims feel a pressure to
make sense of their lives and tell their stories in particular ways to be seen as a real victims. Both
insiders and outsiders interested in creating greater collective understanding may suggest that “real”
victims look, act, or feel a certain way that is not representative of the experiences of all. This could
further marginalize people whose experiences are not well-described by the newly introduced tools.
It could also cause victims whose experiences are not reflected in the most visible stories to be
treated incredulously or disqualified from needed support, while also changing how victims conceive
of their experiences and themselves. In fact, it may be that any time we introduce a new concept,
there will be people whose experiences are not well-accounted for using that new language and
understanding. They may find that they are even more epistemically marginalized than before, and in
extreme cases they could even be rendered impossible or illegible by the new schema.
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The narratives available to victims may be produced by both positive and negative
stereotypes. In her discussion of identity-prejudicial credibility excess, Davis notes that one of the
reasons that identity-prejudicial credibility excess is ethically wrong is that it involves hearers treating
people who are identified as members of a stereotyped social group as if they are interchangeable
(2016, 487-88). Individuals from marginalized groups have their presumed epistemic authority
limited to reflect only that which outsiders view as their area of expertise - their stereotyped identity.
Speakers may be harmed when the voice they are permitted is one “of distinction” such that they
are compelled to speak as representatives of their group rather than as individuals (2016, 490).
Particular individuals from marginalized groups may come to be seen as ambassadors by those on
the outside. They may be compelled to speak on behalf of their group (a manifestation of epistemic
exploitation) as spokespersons, or they may do so voluntarily. These token individuals may be
“granted positions in spaces primarily occupied by the advantaged” even while all but these chosen
few from the group are “systematically denied opportunities for advancement” (2016, 491).

But spokespersons can only speak to their personal experiences, which may be representative
of some experiences shared by other group members. They cannot provide universal access or
insight. Further, the visibility of some stories may create an impression that “disparities between the
advantaged and disadvantaged have largely disappeared” even when that is not the case, as visible
testimony can still be marginalized (2016, 493).

4.7.1 Narrative Constraint and Advocacy

Narrative Constraint When Defining Trafficking and Sex Work
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As Lorelei Lee points out in “Cash/Consent,” both abolitionists and liberal feminists have
painted in broad strokes when talking about sex workers. Abolitionists have taken the position that
all sex workers are exploited, regardless of whether they believe themselves to be or not. Liberal
feminists, on the other hand, have tended toward descriptions of sex workers that portray them as
“empowered” by having “‘consented’ to our work” (2019). Both camps also selectively listen to the
stories shared by people engaged in commercial sex. Lee identifies the liberal feminist approach as
the “less terrible of the two ideas,” but notes these activists often treat victims and sex workers as
sources of data rather than the complicated, multi-faceted people that they are. Schwarz, Kennedy,
and Britton also argue that both sides of the dichotomy of autonomy versus abolitionist feminists
fail to recognize the complexity of the lived experiences of both sex workers and trafficking victims.
Attending to how it is that those involved in commercial sex shape their lives so that they are livable,
the authors argue that both major voices involved in the anti-trafficking debate advocate for a
picture that fails to capture the lived experiences of many (2017).

These constraints result in conditions that might induce testimonial smothering, as sex
workers and victims who do not feel that either available narrative describes their experiences may
feel they are unable to express themselves in ways that will be received by others. Taken to the
extreme, this narrative constraint may make it such that people with experiences that are not
captured by either paradigm are rendered illegible or even impossible. Consider, again, Doezema’s
assertion that abolitionist activists have rendered the existence of non-trafficked sex workers
impossible according to their concepts. For abolitionists committed to the idea that all sex work is
inherently exploitative, “the notion of a prostitute who is unharmed by her experiences is an
ontological impossibility: that which cannot be. This is the ultimate exercise of power: to deny sex
workers our very existence, to insist that we cannot be” (Doezema 2005, 74). The realm of
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narratives about life as a sex worker that are legible given these epistemic resources is not only
constrained. It is obliterated.

Narrative Constraint and Whose Stories Are Told and Heard

The stories that tend to receive attention are those that feature especially innocent and
passive victims, extreme violence, and/or “successful”22 rescues. These stories also often feature
outsiders who play a prominent role in the victim’s “rescue” from exploitation.23

The importance and limitations of improving collective understanding by appealing to
compelling stories about and by victims is highlighted by looking back at the ways politicians and
journalists portrayed sex workers at the turn off the 20th century. During the moral panic about sex
work that ultimately led to the passage of the White-Slave Traffic Act, also known as the Mann Act,
stories about sex workers tended to draw sharp distinctions between lost souls and fallen ones.
Certain women, especially those from white, respectable families, were thought to be victims, stolen
away into sex work. Others were presumed guilty offenders. This stark contrast, this black and white
22

I’ve included scare quotes here because what counts or does not count as success will vary

depending on the standard applied. If a victim chooses to continue to be involved with commercial
sex, but does so in a way that they do not feel is hurtful, some may consider that to be a success.
Others would not.
23

“Anti-trafficking discourses often follow a rescue narrative, where an innocent, helpless

female is rescued from an evil trafficker by a heroic rescuer” (Baker, 15). “Despite their diversity,
most awareness-raising messages continue to deliver simplistic narratives of ‘victims, villains, and
heroes’” (Sharapov, Hoff, and Gerasimov quoting O’Brien, 8).
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portrayal of everyone involved as either low-life criminal or helpless victim, is woefully undernuanced for capturing the complicated spectrum of choice and coercion involved for most people
involved in commercial sex.

Thus, the stories that tend to receive most attention are those that feature a victim whose
innocence is hard to deny. Typically, this victim is a woman or child, and they are presented as having
few or no opportunities to make choices that would suggest they are in any way culpable for the
things that have happened to them. According to Peters, “[t]he construction of a victim who appeals
to the public and policymakers must be sexually blameless, and anti-trafficking policies continue to
be based on the notion of the ‘innocent,’ unwilling victim” (2010, 18). This is illustrated by the
presentation of the character Alisha in (Un)Trafficking, a game intended to facilitate better
understanding of sex trafficking. Alisha, who is the trafficking victim and character controlled by the
player, is only given voice through a sob that is heard when someone else in the game makes a
decision that harms her (like refusing her help when she asks for it) (O’Brien and Berents 2019, 92).
They lament that of the few games that aim to educate people about trafficking, some, like
(Un)Trafficking, reduce victim’s stories to ones of mere passivity and tragedy, with game victims
exerting no agency and given little back story beyond their victimhood.

One reason narratives available to those involved in commercial sex, willfully or not, are
constricted may be because condemnatory attitudes toward sexuality require that in order to see
someone involved in sex work as deserving of compassion, kindness, and humane treatment, the
public needs to also believe they are helpless. In describing the circumstances around the “white
slavery” panic of the early 20th century, Doezema reports that it was “[o]nly by removing all
responsibility for her own condition could the prostitute be constructed as a victim to appeal to the
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sympathies of the middle-class reformers” (1999, 28). If not innocent, sex workers are often
depicted as criminal and treated with low regard. To generate sympathy for those involved in
commercial sex, the counter-narrative highlights their vulnerability, focusing on conditions of
poverty, innocence, and lack of education to paint a picture of someone in need of rescue and
rehabilitation.

While this alternative depiction has some benefits that the criminalized narrative lacks (it is
more likely to induce judges, lawyers, doctors, and laypeople to respond with kindness rather than
harsh judgment), it also undermines the credibility of sex workers and trafficking victims. If they
disagree with statements about themselves or take issue with proposed policies that relate to their
work and lives, those disagreements can be discounted as uninformed, naive, or even the result of
brainwashing. Portraying trafficking victims and sex workers as ignorant victims who were too
desperate, too weak, or too foolish to avoid their circumstances means that they can never be right if
they disagree with educated, worldly, or powerful people.

Ultimately, these stories undermine the epistemic authority of insiders, crafting a dynamic
between victims (helpless, ignorant) and advocates (knowing) that can be used to justify paternalistic
responses to both trafficking and sex work and creating conditions in which testimonial injustices
like posturing and other epistemic injustices like hermeneutical hijacking are likely. Advocacy that
reduces the role that survivors play in their own stories to such a degree that they are denied the
opportunity to determine or even influence how their stories are told is hermeneutically
marginalizing.
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The stories that are told also usually feature graphic, and some have argued gratuitous,
violence. According to Weitzer, moral crusades rely on “horror stories and ‘atrocity tales’ about
victims in which the most shocking exemplars of victimization are described and typified” (2007,
448). The stories that are told are those “of a few ‘rescued’ victims,” which “are presented as
evidence” (2006, 463). Publications also use these atrocity tales to probe reader interest. Headlines
cite rescued sex slaves, report disturbing and extraneous details, and even include pictures of the
locations of alleged trafficking. Chapkis reports that lobbying for the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 “relied heavily on very graphic accounts of extreme sexual
violation of innocent women and children” (2003, 929).

Victims who have the opportunity to tell their stories to an audience that is receptive to
hearing what they say are usually “rescued” already, meaning they are no longer engaged in sex work.
In Bergquist’s words, “[d]ue in part to the nature of the problem, the voices that get heard are of
those that have been ‘rescued’ and more specifically, whose stories either support the publisher’s
intended message or have potential to elicit humanitarian responses” (2015, 316). According to
Doezema, “‘prostituted women’ who agree with the feminist abolitionist analysis of their situation
are accepted and supported” (2005, 73).

Narrative Constraint and Whose Stories Are Not Told and Heard

Advocates may not share, support, or create platforms for the stories of victims whose stories
are complicated by a perceived lack of innocence. If victims have made decisions that may be
expected to elicit moral condemnation, were coerced or defrauded in ways that some may not see as
sufficiently exploitative, or reject offers of assistance they feel are invasive or harmful, they are not
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as likely to have their stories heard. Because sex trafficking victims are most often represented as
being women, the experiences of victims who are not women are also underrepresented. As Bonilla
and Mo state, because, “[h]uman trafficking tends to be represented by issue-area elites in a fairly
singular manner… [t]rafficking victims who are not women, and neither sexually exploited nor
smuggled, are often being overlooked in programming about human trafficking” (2018, 2).

While there is value in investigating sexual assault and sexual exploitation as gendered forms of
violence, most often inflicted on women by men, that depiction also renders boys, men, and nonbinary victims invisible. Limiting the realm of accepted narratives so that the issues of sex
trafficking and sexual assault are presented as exclusively impacting women also means that people
who are not identified as women are sometimes denied resources and recognition.

Greater credibility and visibility is typically granted to trafficking victims who are considered
“recovered.” According to Sweet, some people have to work harder than others to perform recovery
in a convincing way, as they may met with incredulousness because of stereotypes (2018, 418). In
other words, the testimony they present about their experiences as victims may not be given due
credibility, combining testimonial injustice with the other epistemic harms perpetrated against them.
People with more complicated relationships with the rescue missions of anti-trafficking initiatives like sex workers who distinguish between sex work and trafficking or people how have felt
personally harmed by the efforts to reduce the prevalence of trafficking (like those who have been
arrested during police raids) - are less likely to have their voices amplified. Some organizations
require that the victims that they work with and provide support to (housing, financial support,
emotional connection, etc.) must abide by strict criteria to remain eligible for those services. These
criteria may include requirements like participation in Bible studies and prayer groups and promises
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not to engage in sex work again (Bernstein 2010, 65). Victims who feel constrained or oppressed by
these conditions may have to choose between accessing critical, possibly life-sustaining resources
and honestly expressing themselves.

Those who are unable or unwilling to tell their stories in ways that meet these expectations
may be denied services and sympathy. As Corrigan and Shdaimah and state, “[r]eliance on victim
stories also privileges some women (who may fit more closely with the ideal victim narrative) over
others in the competition for scarce public resources (investigation, prosecution, treatment options)”
(2016, 440). People who are not willing or able to perform recovery in satisfying ways are unlikely to
be recognized as victims, may be denied services and support they need and deserve, and may be
villainized or even criminalized. Doezema goes as far as to say that abolitionists treat sex workers
who deny that they are exploited “as being in league with ‘pimps’ and ‘traffickers’” (2005, 73), as
their continued participation is allegedly creating conditions for the demand of trafficking to be
sustained.

Whether or not a case leads to an investigation or prosecution depends, in part, on whether
law enforcement finds a trafficking victim’s story to be believable and one that will garner sympathy
in court. Victims whose cases do not lend themselves to investigation and prosecutions may not get
immigration relief (TVISAs), federal benefits (like Medicaid, food stamps, and cash assistance), case
management, or legal assistance (Peters 2010, 92). So, not being considered believable has significant
costs.

Narratives that differ from the trope of victimhood advocated for by some person or group
may be disregarded and marked as anomalous. For example, when criticizing the idea that pimps
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could create safer conditions for sex workers on the street or that sex workers might feel safer when
working (for or with) a pimp, Hughes acknowledges that some women did report feeling safer.24 But
she quickly disregarded this minority opinion. It seems then like the expressed attitudes of sex
workers who disagreed with Hughes’ personal feelings about pimps had beliefs not worthy of
consideration. Critics may also choose to ignore dissident opinions as the result of brainwashing or
ignorance, a strategy that threatens additional epistemic harms in the form of testimonial injustice,
posturing, and hermeneutical hijacking.

While some advocates may choose not to highlight the stories of victims whose experiences
may be harder to sympathize with or who are critical of the most visible anti-trafficking work, others
who are committed to increasing the visibility of all victims, no matter how heterogeneous, may not
be able to do so. Given the nature of epistemic lacunas and hermeneutical injustice, there is always
the chance that someone’s experiences will remain so inscrutable given available hermeneutical
resources that they are omitted from discussion and consideration. This suggests a need for
continuously evolving conceptions of who victims are, so that our definitions remain responsive to
new and unforeseeable developments.

Narrative Legibility and Access to Resources

Prosecutors may choose not to bring cases to trial if they don’t think they’ll be able to
convey a sympathetic narrative of a victim’s experiences to the jury (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016,
452). This in and of itself can constrict the ways that victims can tell their stories in multiple ways.
24

Hughes reports that “a minority of the women interviewed said they felt safer [when their

pimp was around]” (Hughes 2005, 17).
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“[R]eal victims are also expected to offer meaningful and appropriate presentations of trauma,”
Corrigan and Shdaimah state, adding, “[d]emonstrations of trauma themselves are insufficient to
mark women as worthy victims; trauma must be presented and experienced in ways that coincide
with law enforcement expectations” (2016, 473). Peters makes a similar observation, stating, “[o]ften
whether someone was recognized and counted as a trafficking victim depended on how a victim’s
circumstances and story fit into the investigating agent of officer’s own narrative of trafficking”
(2010, 89).

Sweet, in discussing the separate issue of domestic violence, states that victims must
convince those in positions to offer them assistance that they are true victims to access things like
“housing, police protection, and pathways to citizenship.” This requires a demonstration of what
she calls “survivorhood” (2018, 412). Survivorhood requires that one has experienced significant
trauma, but not so much trauma that recovery seems unlikely. Corrigan and Shdaimah make a similar
observation, noting victims “should be sufficiently traumatized to be sympathetic and convincing,
but not so traumatized they are unable to fulfill their role as a witness to the assault” (2016, 479). To
be perceived as recoverable, one must present oneself as tenacious and destined for greater things, a
truly paradoxical requirement if we believe that victims of violence did nothing to deserve or earn
the abuse they must now present themselves as being recoverable from. According to Sweet, “to be
recoverable to institutions, women learn to narrate their experiences through the language of
emotions, selfhood, and internal transformation” (2018, 413). Victims must learn to tell their stories
in ways that can be heard and will be accepted, which involves learning new language, restricting
emotions that may ill-received, and leaving out details of their lives.
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If someone presents their story with too much detail, too lucidly, too accurately, or too
calmly (with what counts as too much of any of these determined by outsiders in positions of
power), then their credibility is reduced because they do not behave as traumatized people are
expected to behave (Corrigan and Shdaimah 2016, 479). Trafficking survivors who display character
traits of strength and agency may see that count against them “in terms of having their cases taken
by law enforcement… their testimony believed by juries… their plans and aspirations supported by
service providers… and may even paradoxically heighten vulnerability to trafficking” (Hume and
Sidun 2017, 9).

Strategic Storytelling

In the section on the controversial history of the anti-trafficking movement, we explored the
unreliable statistics frequently cited by advocates. Data that is available is likely skewed by the way it
is collected. Many trafficking survivors who access resources do so through religious agencies or
service programs that may adopt an abolitionist philosophy. Others participate in programming
because they are mandated to do so by a court. People in such positions may feel that they must
describe their experiences in a way that conforms with the picture of victimhood prescribed to them
in order to access critical support and be shown compassion. Thus, they may alter their narratives to
fit those expectations. As Weitzer notes, there is no reason to believe these sample populations are
representative of the whole, and reliable inferences generalizing from non-representative samples
cannot be made (2007, 452).

Sweet notes that advocates for survivors of domestic violence often try to help by
“translating” their “experiences across these systems in order to make victims more sympathetic.”
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These efforts are carried out with the best of intentions, and may produce very real benefits for the
folks advocates are working with. However, they can also bring about the undesirable consequences
of reinforcing the idea that victims look a particular way, and clients may feel pressured “to perform
recovery” (2018, 417). By focusing on ways to navigate an unjust and unfair system to help particular
clients or victims, advocates (like social workers, counselors, lawyers, and activists) play a direct hand
in shaping institutional and collective notions of who deserves help and who deserves to be
believed.

This requirement that victims describe themselves in ways that will be positively received by
those that they need assistance from has epistemic consequences. First, it involves epistemic
exploitation and results in some testimonial smothering, as victims must explain their oppression to
those in positions of privilege while also keep some things to themselves out of fear that they will
not be believed or will be punished. Sweet calls this kind of work narrative labor, a term she uses to
describe how survivors “must make contortions of their selves and social networks, and they must
tell stories about their experiences that fit existing ‘social problems’ narratives” (2018, 411).

Changing Self-Conceptions

It is also important to note that in doing narrative labor, victims may come to see themselves
differently. In other words, a victim may, in determining how to present experiences and events in
their life in a way that produces a coherent narrative with a hopeful conclusion, come to have
different self-conceptions.
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Sweet writes about how the medicalization and institutionalization of domestic violence has
altered the way victims talk about and even make sense of their experiences. She describes “how
women who have experienced domestic violence become domestic violence survivors as they navigate
institutions of surveillance and aid after abuse” (2018, 411). A person’s status as a “survivor” is not
automatic, but rather comes to be ascribed through interactions with institutions that prescribe or
sometimes even require such a designation to process, make sense of, and assist those individuals.
Coming to present oneself as a victim that will be recognized accordingly may require suppressing
parts of aspects of one’s life.

She quotes one victim as referring to her status as a domestic violence survivor as a
“diagnosis,” which dramatically altered her understanding of her life and 40-year marriage (2018,
419). Another victim interviewed by Sweet, Margaret, notes that even thigh she feels she has a lot of
confidence, she apparently does not have “good self-esteem.” Her evidence for this seemingly
contradictory state is that she is a victim of domestic violence, which she has learned through
interactions with institutions and services for domestic violence services means her self-esteem is
low. Sweet assesses Margaret’s commentary on the chasm between what she believes she is supposed
to feel and how she actually feels, stating “[t]his is the paradox of legibility at work: Margaret is
transforming her life to become a savor according to DCFS demands, telling her story in the
language of domestic violence even though other structural forms of violence are more pressing,
and the language she is given to explain the situation is that of self-esteem” (2018, 422).

The highly personal nature of storytelling produces what Sweet calls the paradox of
legibility. In describing how narrative constraint impacts survivors of domestic violence, she states
that “women must tell stories of psychological survival, even as those very stories erase the
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structural context of their victimization and their infrastructural labor surviving abuse.” As we have
noted already, hermeneutical injustices are systemic problems. As the failure to understand the
experiences of victims is a collective failure, hyper fixation on the details of the decisions and
traumas of individuals is a distraction from the nature of the problem at hand.

Conclusion

There is so much disagreement about who sex workers are and why they do the work that
they do. Are they fallen, criminals who engage in work that warrants punishment? Are they victims
who should be rescued and rehabilitated? Are they empowered and enlightened professionals,
engaged in work that provides economic opportunity that is not otherwise available? Are they care
workers, providing a service that should be seen as essential and compassionate?

It may be that the tendency toward dichotomous thinking makes the problem of
distinguishing between exploitation and choice, sex work and trafficking, necessarily lacking and
artificial. Certainly, the gray area between the two remains uninterpretable for many.

All these depictions are certainly oversimplifications of reality. Some recent scholarly work is
critical of the dichotomous argument that has emerged between those who feel all sex work is
trafficking and those who have mostly established themselves as opposed to those abolitionists
(sometimes falling prey to over generalizations themselves, see, Weitzer citing studies involving only
12 or 15 subjects), and sentiments of frustration are sometimes shared by service providers (Peters
interviewed a provider who bemoaned the extensive infighting). For example, work published by
Bettio, Giusta, and Di Tommaso found that “agency operates along a continuum,” and whether a
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person has greater or lesser agency is largely a function of stigma. This is because stigma impacts
“the ability of sex workers to influence the terms of exchange - earnings, working conditions, hours
of work, choice of clients, choice of service, and so on” (2017, 5).

Continued work toward recognizing greater nuance is essential for counterbalancing the
tendency to marginalize some in the pursuit of improving recognition and support of others. One
important step toward creating a more honest narrative about trafficking is acknowledging that some
people who are being trafficked might still be interested in engaging in sex work under better
working conditions.
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CONCLUSION
In this project, I have worked to demonstrate that anti-sexual violence advocacy work can
illuminate epistemic injustices, but that the consciousness raising efforts of both insider and outsider
advocates can lead to further injustices committed against marginalized knowers. A possible
response to these assessments of harms or wrongs that advocates might commit while trying to
address injustices might be one of defeat. If one can perpetuate unjust, marginalizing conditions
when aiming to address epistemic wrongs, are our advocacy efforts doomed?
Fortunately, we need not arrive as such a bleak conclusion. My hope is that the work I have
done here shows not that advocacy work is futile, but rather that it is complicated and situated in
existing systems and dynamics of power and powerlessness. Advocates need not feel they cannot
help shape a more just society through consciousness raising work, but rather should remain open to
feedback and even criticism out of an acknowledgement of just how difficult and complicated it is
to address injustices, epistemic or otherwise. Good intentions are not in and of themselves sufficient
for justifying the efforts made by insider or outsider advocates intent on improving collective
understanding of the experiences of marginalized people. One can hijack, appropriate, or otherwise
undermine or disrespect hermeneutically marginalized people even when motivated by a sincere
desire to be of service to them. And as I have acknowledged throughout the project, it will often not
be easy to assess who knows what and who is appropriately or inappropriately speaking for whom
during particular moments in time. All of this uncertainty requires that advocates remain humble,
open to critical feedback, and reflective.
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